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ABSTRACT 
The body of work presented in this thesis results from an in depth investigation of the moral reasoning 
of male offending and male and female non-offending adolescents in the UK using the Sociomoral 
Reflection Measure-Short Form (Gibbs, Basinger & Fuller, 1992). In Chapter I a review of the 
research relevant to field of study was presented. In Chapter 2 findings from initial investigations into 
the patterns of moral reasoning of male offending and male and female non-offending adolescents 
were presented. Key aims of the studies presented in Chapter 2 were to replicate previous findings 
using the measure amongst offenders and non-offenders, in particular to test claims that offenders 
were morally immature in relation to non-offending peers, and to investigate gender differences on the 
measure. In line with predictions, the measure discriminated between offenders and non-offenders, 
with offenders having significantly lower mean scores than non-offenders. No gender differences 
were observed in the overall sample. However, some difficulties were found in discriminating 
between younger male offenders and male non-offenders. Tests of the internal characteristics of the 
scale were also performed. In Chapter 3, subsequent analyses of data were performed using 
"categorical" methods. This represented a novel means of tackling the data. A key aim was to test 
the Gilligan (1982) hypothesis that females and males differ in use of Stage 3 "mutual and prosocial" 
and Stage 4 "systemic and standard" reasoning. Results of the "categorical" analyses apparently 
corresponded to the Gilligan hypothesis. Patterns of intra-individual variability in moral stage use 
were also investigated to test claims regarding structural consistency in moral reasoning. It was found 
that participants were demonstrating intra-individual variability in their patterns of moral reasoning, 
this presented a challenge to certain aspects of the moral reasoning model. The final chapter 
summarised key fmdings to emerge from the thesis, and discussed these in theoretical context. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
The findings presented in this thesis result from an in-depth comparative investigation of the moral 
reasoning of male offending adolescents and male and female non-offending adolescents using the 
Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form (hereafter referred to as the SRM-SF), carried out 
amongst a UK based sample. This introductory chapter presents the theoretical background to the 
measure, reviews key findings in the field and concludes with an overview of the empirical research 
presented in the current study. 
Moral reasoning enhancement forms a core component of many cognitive-behavioural intervention 
programmes used by practitioners working with young offenders in the UK; however, the assessment 
of moral reasoning provides certain challenges to the researcher working with young offenders, both 
in terms of identifying clinical need and in terms of evaluating the relative impact of a moral 
reasoning intervention on offending behaviour. The first section of this chapter provides a brief 
historical overview to the use of cognitive-behavioural interventions in the UK and describes some of 
the issues involved with the assessment of the moral reasoning components of these programmes. 
The second section of this chapter reviews the theoretical background to the SRM-SF, paying 
particular attention to Lawrence Kohlberg's cognitive developmental model of moral reasoning. The 
third section of this chapter provides an outline of the Gibbs et al (1992) revisionist model of moral 
reasoning, gives a description of the format and content of the measure and reviews the currently 
published research that has used the SRM-SF. The third section of this chapter also presents some 
unresolved research issues to be addressed within the current study. The chapter concludes with a 
description of the body of empirical work to be presented in this thesis. 
1.2 Cognitive-Behavioural Interventions with Young Oifenders 
During the 1970's and 1980's the prevailing view amongst professionals carrying out research into 
the impact of clinical interventions on the reduction of offending behaviour was that "nothing 
worked". This pessimism stemmed from a number of wide-ranging surveys carried out in the 1970's 
that had failed to uncover evidence to indicate that any programme of intervention could be 
consistently be relied on to reduce offending behaviour (see McGuire, 1995, McGuire, 2000 for 
reviews). However, from the mid 1980s researchers started to challenge the prevailing opinion that 
"nothing worked" (e.g. McGuire & Priestley 1985). Largely as a result of a series of studies using 
meta-analytic techniques it was demonstrated that the conclusion drawn by researchers that '"nothing 
worked" was flawed, (see e.g. McGuire & Priestley 1995, Vennard et al 1997, McGuire, 2000, Blud 
et al 2003, for reviews) and that the "net effect" of treatment on offenders actually represented a 
reduction in recidivism ofupwards of 10% (see e.g. Lipsey, 1995). Over the last decade the emphasis 
in the criminal intervention literature has shifted towards a more positive outlook that has been 
broadly centred around the so-called "What Works?" (McGuire, 1995) approach. 
The most encouraging findings to initially emerge from the "What Works?" literature appeared to 
concern those programmes that could be broadly categorised as adopting "Cognitive-behavioural" 
approaches to tackling offending behaviour (see Ross et ai, 1988 for a description of "Reasoning and 
Rehabilitation", which is one of the most widely used programmes to be applied in UK prisons). The 
majority of cognitive-behavioural interventions are "multi-modal" and focus on addressing a variety 
of cognitive and behavioural skill deficits that have been identified as criminogenic risk factors 
amongst the offending population. Typical "core components" of these cognitive behavioural 
programmes address perceived deficits in social perspective taking, anger management and moral 
reasoning (Hollin et ai, 2002). 
A meta analysis carried out by Izzo and Ross (1990) on 46 studies of interventions with young 
offenders concluded that programmes that included a cognitive component were twice as effective as 
those that did not. Lipsey (1995) in a meta-analysis of over 400 research studies concluded that well-
structured clinical interventions that were focused around "behavioural, training or skills issues" and 
that maintained a high level of programme integrity were those that were most likely to succeed 
(Lipsey, 1995:77-78). For a comprehensive review of the initial findings to emerge from the "What 
Works?" research see McGuire & Priestley (1995); see also Hollin (1990, 1993) for earlier reviews 
assessing the impact of cognitive-behavioural interventions with young offenders. 
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Multi-modal cognitive-behavioural intervention programmes are currently the favoured option 
amongst practitioners in the UK (Vanstone, 2000). However, it has not been until extremely recently 
that a comprehensive evaluation of the impact of these programmes has been carried out in Britain 
(see Friendship et ai, 2002b, 2003a). The recent evaluation that was carried out by Friendship et al 
was carried out amongst an adult prison population using reconviction data as an outcome measure. 
Results of this large scale evaluation have provided some apparently positive findings: when 
comparing reconviction rates of those who had participated in cognitive behavioural programmes with 
a matched control sample, it was found that there was a drop in reconviction rates of 14% (Friendship 
et al2002b). 
McGuire (2000) notes that whilst the evidence regarding the effectiveness of multi-modal cognitive 
behavioural programmes seems to be encouraging, there is a considerable amount of research that 
remains to be done in this field (McGuire, 2000). In particular, McGuire considers that assessment of 
the relative importance of individual components of cognitive programmes needs more detailed 
analysis and testing. Vennard et al (1997) express some concern at the apparent over-reliance on 
"reconviction rates" as a source of outcome data, and stress that evaluations of programmes of 
intervention need to include measurement of change in the target attitudes, behaviour or skills as well 
as in reconviction rates (Vennard et aI1997). Finally, both McGuire (2000) and Vennard et al (1997) 
express the need to exercise caution in applying findings obtained from largely North American 
samples to UK populations. 
The majority of cognitive-behavioural intervention programmes that are used with offenders derive 
from work that has been carried out amongst adults. There are relatively few cognitive-intervention 
programmes that are specifically designed for use with young offenders. Two programmes that have 
been developed in the US and are considered to be suitable for use with young adolescent offenders 
(Hollin et al 2002) are the EQUIP program (Gibbs et al 1995), and Aggression Replacement Training 
(ART) Programme (Goldstein et al 1998). Both of these programmes adopt a multi-modal approach 
and incorporate "moral reasoning enhancement" as one of their core components. The "Smart 
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Thinking" Programme currently being piloted in the UK has also been specifically designed for use 
with young people and sets out to develop social and moral reasoning skills in young people as part of 
a group-work discussion process exploring issues surrounding offending behaviour. However, up 
until relatively recently there has been little in the way of practically applicable assessment tools for 
researchers seeking to evaluate the "moral reasoning component" of such programmes. Indeed, 
although the recent Home Office documentation outlining guidelines for evaluators of cognitive 
interventions provides a list of recommended psychometric tests it does not identify a specific tool for 
measuring moral reasoning (Colledge et aI1999:31-32). Part of the problem may stem from the fact 
that traditional measures of moral reasoning such as Kohlberg's Moral Judgement Interview (see e.g. 
Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) are impractical for use with large samples. Administration and assessment 
of the Moral Judgment Interview is complex, involving a lengthy structured interview process and 
requiring familiarisation with an intricate scoring procedure. 
1.3 The Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form 
The SRM-SF that is the focus of the current study has several advantages over traditional measures of 
moral reasoning in terms of user-friendliness and has been designed for use with young people. The 
SRM -SF also has the advantage of being directly relevant to the assessment of moral reasoning 
enhancement within the context of a cognitive intervention with young people. The first author of the 
measure, John Gibbs, has provided the major contribution to the "sections" on moral reasoning in 
both the ART programme (Goldstein et ai, 1998) and the EQUIP programme (Gibbs et ai, 1995). 
Indeed, use of the SRM-SF as an assessment tool forms part-and-parcel of the EQUIP programme. 
However, as with much of the work in this field, the main body of empirical evidence concerning the 
use of the SRM-SF with young people derives from research that has been carried out in the US. 
Whilst there have been some recent UK-based studies (e.g. Palmer & Hollin, 1998) that have 
compared the moral reasoning of offending and non-offending adolescents using the SRM-SF, there is 
a need for further work in this area, particularly with reference to younger participants. Furthermore, 
the assessment of "moral reasoning" in young people brings with it a number of methodological and 
theoretical issues that, in the author's opinion, have not as yet been clarified by existing work in the 
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field. It therefore seems timely to carry out a comprehensive UK-based investigation of the moral 
reasoning of offending and non-offending adolescents using the SRM-SF. 
1.4 Theoretical Background to the SRM-SF 
The SRM-SF is a "production" measure of moral reasoning that has been developed by John Gibbs 
and colleagues (Gibbs et aI., 1992). The measure has as its theoretical basis a revised version of 
Lawrence Kohlberg's stage model of moral development. Over the years, Kohlberg's theory of moral 
of moral development has aroused considerable controversy and debate. Today, nearly haifa century 
after Kohlberg started his groundbreaking research, it is probably true to say that there are hardly any 
psychologists who would consider themselves to be Kohlbergians in the strictest sense. However, 
few researchers would fail to acknowledge the invaluable contribution that Kohlberg has made to the 
direction of research in this field. This section reviews key aspects of Kohlberg's theory and provides 
an overview of the revised Kohlbergian model put forward by Gibbs et al. (1992). 
1.41 Overview of Kohlberg 's Theory of Moral Development 
Kohlberg's justice-oriented stage theory of moral judgement centres on developmental changes in 
moral reasoning. Kohlberg's model is a cognitive one, and follows Piaget in its underlying 
phenomenological, constructivist and structuralist assumptions. Moral judgements define and predict 
moral action. Before one can define an act as moral, one needs to know something of the reasons 
behind the act. If one is to understand and predict when and why people will "do right" one needs to 
gain insight into the way in which they think about "doing right". For Kohlberg, moral development 
occurs not merely as a result of the passive intemalisation of cultural norms, but as an active 
constructive process. By thinking about and acting on the world, individuals construct moral meaning 
for themselves. Moral development is viewed as a process that takes place by progression through a 
sequence of stages characterised by certain underlying cognitive structures that are universal and 
invariant. Whilst social and cultural factors may influence the rate of progression through stages, and 
the content of moral judgements; the way in which moral judgements are structured within each stage 
and the sequence of development followed is perceived to be the same for all cultures. For Kohlberg, 
then, it is the form of thinking or the "general organising principles" surrounding beliefs and opinions 
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that exhibit developmental regularity and are generalised within and across individuals, not the 
individual beliefs and opinions themselves. 
Moral development is seen as akin to cognitive development that occurs in logicomathematical and 
social perspective taking domains, with acquisition of the higher moral stages requiring higher levels 
oflogical and social cognitive sophistication. However, high levels of logical and social cognitive 
sophistication are not sufficient in themselves for moral advancement. In order to achieve one's full 
moral potential one needs experiential exposure to role-taking opportunities in the social world. Role-
taking opportunities occur through ones participation in various social groups, for example as a 
member of a peer group, member of a family and as a member of society. It is the level of social 
participation rather than the nature of the particular group that is seen as influential in the stimulation 
of moral development. For Kohlberg, parental socialisation is not critically necessary or unique for 
moral development as the necessary social stimulation may be provided by other sources (Kohlberg, 
1984:75). 
Kohlberg considered each moral stage to represent a structural whole, however, he also acknowledged 
that this presented challenges when seeking to account for mechanisms oftransition from one stage to 
the next. Colby and Kohlberg (1987) noted that researchers in the field tend to distinguish between a 
transformational model of stage development and an additive or layer cake model. In the extreme 
form ofa transformational model, the higher stage displaces the structure of the lower stage, and 
information in the lower stages is no longer accessible. Within the transformational model each 
developmental stage is perceived as strongly holistic, this implies great internal consistency in moral 
reasoning. In an additive or layer-cake model, higher stages are added to the repertoire with no loss 
of information from the lower stages. This model is associated with greater heterogeneity of stage use 
(Colby and Kohlberg, 1987:7). 
Kohlberg when describing his position on the "Transformational model" versus "Additive model" of 
stage development claimed that the development of moral judgement as a whole was too broad in 
scope to be described by a single model. He argued that moral judgement includes a number of 
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distinct modes or processes including comprehension of moral judgements made by others, evaluation 
of judgements made by others and spontaneous production of moral judgements in response to 
questions about what is wrong and why (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987:7). 
Kohlberg did not consider that the development of moral reasoning comprehension would conform to 
a transformational model - as it is clear that people at higher stages of moral development can 
comprehend moral judgements at lower stages, and "sometimes" may comprehend a stage or two 
above their own (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987:7). He also suggested that evaluation of or preference for 
moral judgements made by others might also fail to conform to a transformational model. This is 
because lower stage judgements "may often retain validity when seen from a higher stage perspective; 
the higher stage individual may attribute different meaning to lower stage judgements, but this does 
not prevent higher stage subject from endorsing as valid many ideas that are valid at lower stages" 
(Colby & Kohlberg, 1987:7). Kohlberg believed a transformational model was, however, appropriate 
for describing the "spontaneous production" of moral judgements. 
Kohlberg qualified his position on the "Transformational" versus "Additive" model of stage 
development by making the distinction between moral competence and moral performance. He 
acknowledged that people do not always perform at their highest level of moral competence. 
However, he further argued that insofar as one was able to elicit moral competence through his 
"Moral Judgment Interview" technique (Kohlberg's moral judgment assessment tool), one would 
expect to find internal consistency in moral reasoning across a variety of moral dilemmas. He 
contrasted his transformational model of moral competence with additive models of social perspective 
taking. He noted that for some types of social perspective taking problems responses might vary 
across different levels even if it was the highest level of competence that was being assessed, as for 
some problems the lower level was all that is required to solve the problem. He argued that in the 
moral domain lower levels of reasoning were never morally more adequate, even if under certain 
circumstances they were psychologically more adequate. He argued that individuals would only use 
lower than optimum levels of moral judgement in situations of significant downward moral press (for 
example, offenders living in the "low-level" moral atmosphere of a prison may exhibit lower levels of 
moral reasoning on hypothetical prison dilemmas than on other moral dilemmas). However, 
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Kohlberg did acknowledge towards the end of his life that performance variables influential in the 
expression of moral judgement had only just begun to be delineated and that was an area that needed 
further work (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987:8). 
1.42 Description of Kohlberg 's Moral Stage Typology 
Kohlberg's moral typology consisted of three levels, each level incorporating two developmental 
stages: The "preconventional" level (encompassing moral stages 1 and 2), the "conventional" level 
(encompassing moral stages 3 and 4) and the "postconventional" level (encompassing moral stages 5 
and 6). Kohlberg suggested that the differences between the three levels might best be understood by 
interpreting them as representing a changing relationship between the self and society: 
"Levell (preconventional) is a perspective from which rules and social expectations are 
something external to the self; in the Level 2 perspective the self is identified with or has 
internalized the rules and expectations of others, especially those of authorities. and the Level 
3 (postconventional) perspective differentiates the selffrom the rules and expectations of 
others and defines moral values in terms of self chosen principles ". 
(Colby, Kohlberg et ai, 1987:16) 
1.42i The Preconventional Level 
Kohlberg viewed the preconventionallevel as typifying the moral reasoning of most children under 9, 
some adolescents and many adolescent and adult offenders (Kohlberg, 1976). At this level, whilst the 
child is aware of and is able to respond to cultural concepts of "right and wrong", moral values are 
perceived in terms of the physical consequences of an action or with reference to instrumental 
concerns. At Stage 1, (the "Punishment and Obedience" Orientation) the "goodness or badness" of a 
moral act is defined by rewards or punishments associated with the act or with reference to the status 
of the actor. At Stage 2, (The "Instrumental Relativist" Orientation) moral values are interpreted in 
terms of direct exchanges, pragmatic needs and hedonistic concerns. Frequently, moral justifications 
are presented as "costlbenefit" analyses weighing up potential advantages and disadvantages for the 
individual. As Kohlberg put it, "human relations are viewed in terms like those of the market place" 
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(Kohlberg, 1981: 17). At the preconventional leveL then, moral awareness is "external to the self' in 
that moral values tend to be conceptualised according to direct outcomes of a moral act or with 
reference to superficial attributes of the actor. 
1. 42ii The Conventional Level 
Kohlberg's "conventional" level is deemed to be characteristic of the type of moral reasoning attained 
by most adults in most societies. At this level, the individual has come to "internalise" moral values, 
in the sense that maintaining the social expectations of others are now valued in their own right, 
regardless of the "immediate and obvious outcomes" (Kohlberg, 1981:18). At Stage 3 
("Interpersonal Concordance" or "Good Boy / Nice Girl" Orientation) moral acts are perceived as 
those that help, please and are approved of by other people. It is at this stage that the intentions of the 
actor become relevant when defining an act as moral. As Kohlberg puts it "the judgement 'he means 
well' becomes important for the first time" (Kohl berg, 198 L 18). At Stage 4, (Society Maintaining 
Orientation) interpersonal considerations are extended to encompass society's expectations. Moral 
acts are interpreted with reference to ones responsibility as a member of society and the individual 
who reasons at this stage has internalised society's norms. At this stage, "Doing ones duty as a 
citizen", "maintaining social order" and "showing respect for legitimate authority" are valued in their 
own right (Kohlberg, 1981). 
1.42iii The Postconventional Level 
Kohlberg's postulation of a "post conventional" level of moral reasoning is one of the most 
contentious aspects of his theory. The postconventionallevel represents an "ideal" in terms of moral 
maturity, and has been identified in only a minority of adult individuals in certain "complex" 
societies. The "post conventional" reasoner has moved beyond the need to define moral values 
according to interpersonal or societal norms. At this level, moral values become conceptualised as 
principles that are valid in their own right. These principles are independent from the authority of the 
people holding these values and from the relationships that the principled reasoner has with people 
holding these values. At Stage 5 (The Social Contract Orientation) "morality" is conceptualised in 
terms of individual rights and / or in terms of commonly held standards that have been arrived upon 
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through critical debate. The Stage 5 reasoner acknowledges the relativism of personal values, is likely 
to question commonly held standards and emphasises the possibility for changing law, when 
necessary, as part of a democratic process. Kohlberg claimed that "Stage 5" was the official morality 
of the American Government and Constitution (Kohlberg, 1981: 19). At Stage 6 (The Universal 
Ethical Principle Orientation) - the highest stage in Kohlberg's typology - morality becomes 
embedded in the self. "Right actions" are those that conform to personal conscience and that are in 
accord with an individual's self-constructed moral principles. These principles are ones that "appeal 
to logical comprehensiveness, universality and consistency". They are "abstract" and "ethical" rather 
than a set of concrete rules such as the Ten Commandments. Kohlberg saw these principles as 
" ... universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality o.fhuman rights and of 
respect for the dignity of human beings as individuals .. 
(Kohlberg, 1981, 19) 
1.43 Kohlberg 's Moral Judgement Interviews: The "Heinz Dilemma" 
In order to explore individual differences in moral reasoning, Kohlberg constructed a series of moral 
dilemmas- the best known of these being the so-called "Heinz dilemma". There are some variations 
to the Heinz dilemma, but broadly speaking the scenario is as follows: 
"Heinz's wife is dying from a serious disease. There is a drug that the doctors think can save her, a 
drug that has been developed by a pharmacist living in the same town as Heinz. However. whilst the 
drug is expensive to make, the pharmacist is charging ten times what it cost him to make. Heinz goes 
to everyone he knows to try and borrow the money for the drug, but can only raise half the amount he 
needs. Heinz goes to the pharmacist and explains his situation. asking the pharmacist to reduce the 
price. The pharmacist refuses. Heinz gets desperate and breaks into the pharmacy to steal the drug. .. 
Participants in moral judgement interviews are first asked whether Heinz should have stolen the drug 
and then a series of probing questions in order to elicit moral justifications - for example: "Why 
should/shouldn't Heinz have stolen the drug?" "Should Heinz be punished for what he did?" ''Why 
should/shouldn't Heinz be punished for what he did?" Kohlberg was interested in the justifications 
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that participants gave for the decisions they arrived at rather than the actual decision itself. Responses 
to the Heinz dilemma may be coded according to Kohlberg's moral stage typology. Someone 
reasoning at Stage 1 ("Punishment and Obedience Orientation") might justify the decision for Heinz 
to be punished for stealing the drug by saying: "He'd be a thief~fthey caught him and the police 
would put him in jail" (Kohlberg, 1981: 257), punishment being seen as an automatic response to a 
bad act. However, someone reasoning at Stage 5 (The Social Contract Orientation) might justify not 
punishing Heinz by making reference to the need for the judge to take into consideration the special 
circumstances surrounding this case. Or in Kohlberg's words: "The judge's duty is not merely to 
apply general rules to particular cases but to do so in such a way that fairness to indiVidual 
disputants is achieved and the underlying purposes or polices of the law are served" (Kohlberg, 
1981: 236). 
1.44 Empirical Investigations of Kohlberg 's Theory: The Longitudinal Study of us Males 
Kohlberg and colleagues carried out several empirical studies to test his stage model of moral 
development (see e.g. Colby, Kohlberg et aI, 1987 for reviews of the early work). Possibly the best 
known of these studies is Kohlberg' s longitudinal investigation of age trends in moral reasoning 
among US males. This study - which was started in 1956 - followed the progression of 50 males 
(aged 10, 13 and 16 at outset) over a period of20 years. Participants' moral reasoning was assessed 
every 3 years using Kohlbergian moral dilemmas. The final outcome of this project provided some 
evidence to support claims that moral reasoning developed according to Kohlberg' s typology. In 
general, over time, it was found that individuals' "preconventional" reasoning diminished with age, 
whereas "conventional" reasoning increased with age. Additional support for the notion that moral 
development follows an invariant sequence came from further studies that demonstrated that advances 
in moral reasoning were almost always to the next stage up (reviewed in Colby, Kohlberg et al 1987), 
with little evidence to suggest that individual skipped stages. However, it should be noted that during 
the course of the study, Kohlberg had to make refinements both to his typology and scoring scheme in 
order to address issues that arose at intermediate stages of the project. For example, using his original 
scheme, Kohlberg found that a substantial minority of his participants demonstrated apparent "Stage 
regression" at an intermediary follow-up period. In particular, some individuals who had been scored 
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at the post-conventional level (Stage 5 or Stage 6) during high school were later scored as being at the 
preconventionallevel Stage 2 when retested as college students. This observation was clearly contra 
to the theory that the development of moral competence corresponded to a "transformational" stage 
model. Kohlberg and colleagues attempted to reconcile this apparent conflict with reference to certain 
complexities in coding moral protocols. Redefining the coding scheme to produce a standardized 
Structural Issue Scoring scheme resolved many of the methodological difficulties, yielding "more 
orderly" data (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987:39). However, in the course of resolving methodological 
problems associated with scoring moral protocols, Kohlberg may have created a new theoretical 
problem relating to the distinction between the "conventional" and the "postconventional" levels 
(Gibbs et ai, 1992: 15-16). This issue will be discussed in more detail when considering the Gibbs et 
al (1992) revisionist model of moral reasoning later in this chapter. 
1.45 Empirical Investigations of Kohlberg 's Theory: Cross-Cultural Studies 
Kohlberg and others have carried out a number of studies in a variety of different countries in order to 
test the claim that his typology represents a universal culturally invariant model of moral 
development. The majority of work that has been carried out has involved cross-sectional 
comparisons of age differences in moral reasoning across cultures; however, some longitudinal 
studies have also been carried out in different cultures. These include a longitudinal study carried out 
amongst Turkish males (Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982) and a longitudinal study of kibbutz adolescents in 
Israel (Snarey, et aI, 1985a). The evidence that has emerged from the cross-cultural studies has 
provided qualified support for some of Kohlberg's underlying claims. Snarey (1985) in his review of 
45 different studies in 27 different countries concluded that the evidence pointed to a certain 
universality for Kohlberg's scheme when considering his preconventional and conventional levels of 
moral reasoning. However, Snarey found little evidence to support the claim for universality of 
Kohlberg's postconventionallevel of moral reasoning. Cross-cultural evidence of this level was rare, 
and when it was found was restricted to middle-class populations in complex urban societies. 
Whilst Kohlberg's approach to moral reasoning emphasised "naturalistic" developmental processes he 
also postulated that optimal moral development could only be achieved in a socially rich environment 
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- the greater the level of stimulation through social participation the greater the rate of moral 
development. For Kohlberg, potentially important markers of social role-taking opportunities 
included socio-economic status of origin, sociometric status and level of formal educational attained. 
In his longitudinal study of US males, Kohlberg found moderate to strong effects for social class and 
formal educational level as mediators of moral reasoning level (though only very limited effects for 
sociometric status). Kohlberg interpreted differences in socio-economic status and fonnal educational 
level as representing "differential participation in and identification with the society and its secondary 
institutions" and argued that these differing levels of participation create differing role-taking 
opportunities (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987: 113). Some researchers have sought to relate the failure to 
evidence postconventional reasoning cross-culturally to the "social participation model"; however, as 
Snarey noted, seeking to rationalise the findings in this way raised the issue of cultural ethnocentrism 
in the Kohlbergian model (Snarey, 1985:227). As Snarey pointed out, there is no reason to suppose 
that members of so-called "tribal" or folk communities do not experience the social prerequisites for 
the development of postconventional moral reasoning. Snarey argued that a theory of this nature even 
in its mildest form would apparently support a misguided doctrine of "social evolution" with so-called 
"primitive" societies at lower levels of the hierarchy and complex urban societies such as the US at 
the top (Snarey, 1985). Snarey drew attention to the fact that whilst Kohlberg's description of the 
preconventional and levels of moral reasoning were well based on "empirical operative judgments", 
his description of the postconventionallevel was primarily drawn from the writings of Western 
philosophers. Snarey concluded on the basis of his research review that whilst there was considerable 
evidence to support Kohlberg's underlying assumptions relating to the preconventional and 
conventional moral levels, his description ofthe postconventional level was probably incomplete and 
required supplementation from a wider range of cultural world views (Snarey, 1985:228-229). 
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1. 46 The Relationship between Moral Reasoning and Offending Behaviour 
A key assumption underpinning Kohlberg's theory is that moral reasoning is an important determinant 
of moral action. However, Kohlberg did not himself elaborate on this assumption by providing a 
formal definition of the relationship between moral judgment and moral conduct. In acknowledging 
that people do not always do what they think to be right, he merely noted that the relationship between 
moral judgment and moral action is "complex and incompletely understood" (Colby & Kohlberg, 
1987:2). Whilst Kohlberg stressed the point that moral reasoning defined and predicted moral 
behaviour, it is also clear from his theory that he did not expect there to be a "perfect" relationship 
between reasoning and action. If one considers potential responses to the Heinz dilemma, one finds 
that individuals reasoning at disparate developmental levels may favour the same course of action (for 
example "stealing the drug"), whilst justifying the course of action in different ways. Conversely, 
individuals reasoning at the same level of moral development may favour different courses of action 
using structurally similar types of moral justifications. 
Blasi (1980) pointed out that cognitive-developmental theory was vague when it came to approaching 
the relationship between cognition and action (Blasi, 1980: 1). Blasi set out to address this issue by 
reviewing the available empirical research in the field. He concluded that whilst there was 
considerable support for the hypothesis that moral reasoning and moral action were related, the level 
of support varied according to the domain under investigation (Blasi, 1980:37). The empirical studies 
that provided most support for the claim that moral reasoning related to moral action came from the 
work that investigated between-group differences in the moral reasoning of delinquents and non-
delinquents. In a review of 15 studies comparing delinquent and non-delinquent samples, Blasi found 
that in 10 of these there were significant differences between the two groups with delinquents 
demonstrating lower levels of moral reasoning than non-delinquents (Blasi, 1980: 12). 
Blasi noted that Kohlberg located differences in the moral reasoning between delinquent and non-
delinquent adolescents in disparities in the use of preconventional and conventional levels of moral 
reasoning. Kohlberg believed that the majority of adolescent offenders were functioning at the 
preconventionallevel of moral reasoning, whereas the majority of "average" adolescents and adults 
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who understood, accepted and attempted to uphold the values and rules of society were functioning at 
the conventional level of moral development (Kohlberg et aI., 1975:243). However, when Blasi 
explored this proposition within the context of his own review his findings were equivocal. Whilst 
some studies he reviewed indicated that the majority of offenders were functioning predominantly at 
the preconventionallevel there were other studies reporting that a substantial number of adolescents 
scored at Koblberg's conventional level of moral reasoning (Blasi 1980: 12). lurkovic, carrying out a 
similar review study in 1980 concluded that empirical support for the claim that delinquents reasoned 
"immaturely" about moral issues varied considerably both across and within studies (Jurkovic, 
1980:719). Furthermore, lurkovic pointed out that findings from some studies that investigated the 
moral reasoning of delinquents indicated that there was evidence of considerable inter-individual and 
intra-individual variation in moral reasoning - especially amongst those who appeared capable of 
conventional moral reasoning (Jurkovic, 1980:717). 
The studies carried out by Blasi and lurkovic in 1980 were, essentially, narrative reviews of the 
available empirical research. In later work using more sophisticated statistical techniques of analysis 
greater credence was given to the Kohlbergian view that offending and non-offending adolescents 
could be distinguished in terms of preconventional and conventional levels of moral reasoning. There 
is now a substantial body of research that has established that in terms of moral reasoning offenders 
are "developmentally delayed" in comparison with their non-offending peers (see e.g. the meta 
analysis carried out by Nelson et ai, 1990; also studies carried out by Lee & Prentice, 1988; and 
Chandler & Moran, 1990). However, it is perhaps worth flagging the equivocal findings of Blasi 
(1980) and Jurkovic (1980), as one tends to find that these early reviews are often cited in the research 
literature as providing strong evidence for Kohlberg's claims. 
1.47 Moral Reasoning Interventions with Young Offenders. 
As was noted in the beginning of this chapter, moral reasoning enhancement forms one of the core 
components of many of the most widely used multi-modal cognitive interventions currently used with 
offenders in the UK. However Kohlbergian moral reasoning enhancement has been used as an 
intervention with young offenders in its own right almost since the inception of Kohlberg's theory of 
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moral development. Interventions designed to raise levels of moral reasoning in young offenders fall 
into two categories: microinterventions and macrointerventions (Hollin et aI, 2002:39). 
Microinterventions typically focus on seeking to enhance the moral reasoning of participants as part 
of a group-work process. For example, the "Smart Thinking" programme that was being piloted at the 
time of the current study presents young people with a number of differing scenarios involving moral 
dilemmas. Facilitators encourage moral reasoning enhancement through a guided discussion process 
that presents participants with challenges to existing moral beliefs. 
Macrointerventions are more ambitious than micro interventions in that they seek not only to enhance 
the moral reasoning of participants, but also to enhance group members' "moral climate". It will be 
recalled that Kohlberg believed that in order for optimal moral development to occur, individuals 
needed to have access to a socially rich environment. In some early studies investigating the impact 
of moral reasoning interventions in prisons, Kohlberg noted that whilst there was evidence of some 
positive outcomes in terms of moral reasoning enhancement, overall the effects were weak (e.g. 
Kohlberg et aI1975:244). Kohlberg was, however, not surprised by this, bearing in mind the "moral 
environment" of traditional prisons. He considered that many prisons operated at a "significant 
downward moral press" (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987:8, see also Scharf & Hickey, 1976). Kohlberg and 
others encouraged the setting up of "democratic" or "Just Community" units within the prison 
environment, where prisoners were encouraged to actively participate in and contribute to certain 
aspects of the running of the unit. The "Just Community" approach has also been adopted as a means 
of enhancing the moral climate of some schools (see e.g. Kuther & Higgins-D' Alessandro, 2000). 
As Hollin et al (2000) point out, whilst there have been a number of studies that have demonstrated 
that group work interventions can enhance the moral reasoning of offenders, there have been 
relatively few studies that have examined the impact of moral reasoning enhancement per se with 
reference to behavioural outcomes. However, in a study carried out in 1986, Arbuthnot and Gordon 
investigated the effects of a cognitive moral reasoning based programme on the behaviour of 
American adolescents previously identified as at "high-risk for delinquency". Individuals participated 
in a 16-20 week programme of moral reasoning education that included discussion sessions and role 
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playing opportunities. Arbuthnot and Gordon administered a variety of pre and post tests to both the 
experimental and the control group. Whereas there were no significant differences between control 
and experimental group on any of the measures at pre test, at post test significant differences were 
observed between the two groups on a number of the measures. There was a significant improvement 
in moral reasoning in the experimental group. There was also a significant reduction in behaviour 
problems among the experimental group, with fewer referrals to the school office for behaviour 
problems, fewer incidences of lateness, and far fewer reported contacts with police or juvenile courts 
(Arbuthnot & Gordon 1986). 
1.48 Potential Gender Bias in Kohlberg's Typology 
One of the major criticisms of Kohlbergian theory that has in itself aroused considerable debate and 
controversy is that the theory is gender-biased and represents a male oriented view of morality. The 
best known and most prominent figure to initially make this claim was Carol Gilligan (see Gilligan. 
1982, 1998). Gilligan claimed that Kohlberg' s justice oriented model of morality failed to 
acknowledge the importance of the "ethic of care" prevalent in women's dialogues about moral 
issues. Whilst Gilligan's theory is perhaps most commonly associated as representing a feminist 
perspective on psychology, it is interesting to note that her initial concerns regarding the neglect of the 
"care ethic" in Kohlberg's theory arose from her observations of young males confronted with real 
life dilemmas. Her first intimation that there might be a problem with Kohlberg's theory of moral 
development came when she was co-teaching a course of moral development with Kohlberg during 
the Vietnam era. Gilligan noticed that the young men in her class were reluctant to talk about the 
draft, apparently aware that there was no room in Kohlberg's theory to talk about their feelings 
without sounding morally undeveloped (Gilligan 1998: 128). 
In Kohlberg's typology one finds that at his conventional level a developmental progression is made 
between Stage 3 ("Interpersonal Concordance" or "Good Boy / Nice Girl" Orientation) and Stage 4 
(Society Maintaining Orientation). Gilligan argued that the differences between Stage 3 and Stage 4 
represented qualitative differences in styles or voices of morality rather than different developmental 
stages of moral reasoning (Gilligan 1982). For Gilligan, Stage 3 approximated to a "Care and 
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responsibility" ethic characteristic of the "female voice", and Stage 4 corresponded to a "Justice and 
rights" ethic more characteristic of males. Gilligan attributed gender differences in moral voices to 
differential patterns of upbringing experienced by males and females. Gilligan argued that males are 
socialized to become independent and assertive whereas females are encouraged to become empathic 
and nurturing (Gilligan 1982). 
The implication of Gilligan's hypothesis, then, is that when assessing differences in conventional 
styles of moral reasoning adult females will typically score at a lower moral stage (Stage 3) than adult 
males (Stage 4). A review of the literature reveals that evidence for Gilligan's claims is conflicting. 
Certainly in some early studies there was evidence to indicate that females tended to do less well than 
males on Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, and that in some cases this could be attributed to 
greater evidence of Stage 3 reasoning amongst females (see e.g. Bussey & Maughan, 1982 and Ford 
and Lowery, 1986 for reviews). However, in an influential meta-analysis published in 1984 Walker 
concluded that if one controlled for occupation and educational differences, there were no "non-
trivial" gender differences in use of Stage 3 and Stage 4 reasoning (Walker, 1984; but see also 
Baumrind, 1986 for a rejoinder to Walker, and rebuttal by Walker, 1986). Jaffee and Hyde in a meta-
analysis of gender differences in moral reasoning (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000) concluded that evidence to 
support Gilligan's claims was at best limited. However, they did note that gender effect varied 
according to age, type of moral reasoning measure used and method of analysis. More recently 
Tangney and Dearing have observed that when gender differences do occur in moral reasoning, they 
invariably correspond to the Gilligan hypothesis. They report that they know of no studies where 
adult males demonstrate greater evidence of the care ethic than adult females (Tangney and Dearing 
2002:264). 
Garmon et al (1996) claim that an important distinction to make in the research on gender differences 
in moral judgement is between "stage level or structure, and expressive emphasis or content" 
(Garmon et aI, 1996:418). It will be recalled from the overview to Kohlberg's moral judgement 
typology that for Kohlberg internal consistency in moral judgement related to the way in which moral 
judgements were structured, not in the individual content of these moral judgements. Along with 
previous researchers, (e.g. Walker et al 1987) Garmon et al (1996) argue that Gilligan's critique of 
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Kohlberg's typology may be addressed as two separate research questions. Firstly, the question of 
whether the typology is stage biased against females. Secondly, the question of whether there are 
gender differences in moral orientation (or content) within each global moral stage (Garmon et ai, 
1996:419). Gannon et al (1996) note that whilst initial research investigating gender differences in 
moral judgement focussed on investigating differences in structural or stage leveL more recently 
attention has turned to the investigation of differences in content of moral judgement within each 
stage level. Drawing from the previous research literature and on the basis of their own empirical 
work, Garmon et al (1996) discount Gilligan's claim that Kohlbergian measures of moral reasoning 
are gender biased in structural terms (i.e. in terms of Stage 3 versus Stage 4 reasoning); however, they 
argue that there is partial support for the claim that there are gender differences in the qualitative 
content of moral judgements within each global moral stage. In their investigation of gender 
differences in stage and expression of moral judgement using SRM-SF data Garmon et al (1996) 
found no evidence of Stage bias favouring males. Indeed, they found evidence to indicate that during 
early adolescence that females were out-performing males on the measure. However, they did find 
evidence to indicate that within-Stage judgments varied in orientation according to gender, the content 
of moral judgements of females being more care focussed than those of males. 
Clearly, for those subscribing to a strong version of the Gilligan (1982) hypothesis, the apparent 
distinction between structure and content of moral judgements made by stage theorists may not 
represent a straightforward distinction to make. For Gilligan, Stage 3 is by its very nature more care 
focussed than Stage 4, which in turn is deemed to have a strong 'justice" emphasis". As noted earlier, 
for Gilligan, differences in Stage 3 and Stage 4 reasoning in themselves represent qualitative 
differences in styles of reasoning that should not be conceptualised as different points on a 
hierarchical typology. Rather, these differences are better represented as parallel pathways of moral 
development (Gilligan 1982: 18-23). Nevertheless, in the current study, in line with Garmon et al 
(1996) the distinction is made between structure and content of moral judgements. The empirical 
investigation of gender differences that forms part of this thesis is restricted to the investigation of 
structural differences in global moral stage use, not to the investigation of gender differences in moral 
content or orientation within stages. The rationale for this approach is two-fold: firstly, the bulk of the 
19 
research on gender differences in moral stage use has been conducted amongst adults, less attention 
has been paid in the literature towards potential gender differences in moral stage use amongst 
adolescents; secondly, in the author's opinion, there may be some theoretical issues regarding the 
coding of SRM-SF data by content category within stages. Some of the potential theoretical issues 
relating to the content categories of the SRM-SF global stage typology (so-called "Aspects") are taken 
up in the Discussion in Chapter 3 and are further elaborated upon in the Global Discussion that forms 
the final chapter of the current thesis. 
1.49 The Relationship Between Gender, Offending Behaviour and Moral Reasoning 
As is well documented in the offending behaviour literature, antisocial behaviour in young people is 
much more prevalent amongst young males than it is amongst young females (see Rutter et ai, 1998, 
for a review). However, on the face of it, it would seem that the moral reasoning research offers little 
in the way of providing an explanation for these differences. If one bears in mind the theoretical link 
between moral reasoning and offending behaviour, the apparent tendency for females to do less well 
than males on moral reasoning tasks would seem to be contradictory. As was noted earlier, 
Kohlberg's theory of moral development has been challenged on the grounds that it is gender-biased 
and that it has little to say about female morality (e.g. Gilligan 1982, 1998). Gilligan and Wiggins 
(1987) suggest that failure to identify gender differences favouring females in the moral reasoning 
domain may relate to issues of measurement. Typically, in the moral reasoning research one finds 
that findings are presented with reference to indices such as summary mean scores. It will be recalled 
that in some studies females have evidenced greater use of Stage 3 reasoning than males, and that 
males have evidenced greater use of Stage 4 reasoning than females. If it is the greater use of Stage 3 
amongst females that is key to understanding gender differences in antisocial behaviour, then one may 
not be able to evidence this through between-group comparisons of summary mean scores. Potential 
measurement issues relating to the SRM-SF are taken up later in this chapter. 
J.5 Gibbs' Revision of Kohlberg's Theory 
The moral reasoning measure used in the current study (the SRM-SF) is derived from John Gibbs' 
revisionist model of Kohlberg's theory of moral development (see e.g. Gibbs, 1977; Gibbs & Schnell, 
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1985, Gibbs et ai, 1992). As with Snarey (1985), Gibbs highlights the difficulties associated with 
Kohlberg's postconventionallevel of moral reasoning; however he comes to a different theoretical 
conclusion to Snarey. For Gibbs, the postconventionallevel is problematic not so much because it 
represents the writings of a Western philosophical elite, but that it appears to be an existential or 
reflective extension of the earlier stages rather than representing a natumlistic developmental 
progression (Gibbs, 1977). For Gibbs, then, supplementing the postconventionallevel with principles 
from non Western societies would not be enough to resolve the problems with this level as it would 
still confuse moral maturity with philosophical articulateness (Gibbs et aI, 1992: 19). Furthermore, 
Gibbs et al (1992) note that when redefining his typology as a result of anomalies observed in the 
intermediate phase of his longitudinal study, Kohlberg created a potential contradiction in the 
theoretical definitions of the conventional and postconventionallevels. In order to resolve some 
judgments initially coded at the postconventional level were subsequently recoded as being at the 
conventional level at a follow-up period. These included justifications such as: "the moral value of 
life takes precedence over obedience to laws or authority". By doing this, however, in Gibbs' view he 
created a contlict between the inclusion of justifications that apparently corresponded to "principled-
sounding moral ideality" within Stages 3 and 4 and the tmditional definition of these stages as 
conventional (Gibbs et aI, 1992: 15-16). Gibbs et al (1992) do not believe that Kohlberg resolved this 
issue. In their view, both Stage 3 and Stage 4 already demonstmte mature moral development. They 
have re-cast Kohlberg's original 3 level, 6 stage classification into a 4-stage system: Stages I and 2 
represent "immature" levels of moral reasoning, Stages 3 and 4 represent "mature" levels of moral 
reasoning. Progression between the major stages is conceptualised by the incorporation of 
"transitional" levels between Stages I and 2, Stages 2 and 3 and Stages 3 and 4. Further delineations 
between moral justifications are provided within each developmental stage by the inclusion of content 
categories known as "Aspects". 
Like Kohlberg's MJI, the SRM-SF is a production measure of moral reasoning. Production measures 
differ from recognition measures in that production measures are designed to elicit spontaneous 
production of moml judgements whereas recognition measures require individuals to evaluate or mnk 
examples of moral justifications. This difference is important when one considers Kohlberg's 
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consideration of the "Transformational" model versus the "Additive" model of stage development and 
his distinction between moral competence and moral performance. It will be recalled that Kohlberg 
considered the Transformational model to apply to the spontaneous production of moral judgements -
or moral competence - but not to the evaluation or comprehension of moral judgements. The SRM-
SF is, then, designed to tap into moral competence, and one would predict from this that individuals 
would be relatively internally consistent in their patterns of moral stage use. 
The SRM-SF differs from the MJI in that it does not make use of hypothetical dilemmas in order to 
elicit moral judgments. Instead, participants are first asked to evaluate the importance of, say, 
"Keeping a promise to a friend" and then to give reasons to justify their evaluation. 
As Gibbs et al (1992) note, over the years, the use of moral dilemmas as a means of assessing moral 
reasoning has been criticised by a number of researchers as being "artificial, inappropriate, or 
irrelevant for children" (Gibbs et aI, 1992:37). The straightforward format of questionnaire items in 
the SRM-SF makes it more suitable for use with younger participants than other production measures 
of moral reasoning. Pilot studies ofthe SRM-SF indicated that it may be used with children as young 
as 8 years old. From a practical point of view, the SRM-SF is easier to administer and analyse than 
other production measures, requiring only about 30 hours of initial training. 
1.6 Description o/Moral Stages in the SRM-SF 
Broadly speaking, progression through stages is seen as a cognitive process of increasing 
"decentration" from the superficial to the profound. Stage 1 is characterised by the young child's 
emphasis on salient, concrete, physical and inevitable aspects of moral events. By Stage 2, the child 
is able to incorporate psychological perspectives in their interpretation of events. However, these 
psychological perspectives are "superficial" in that the child focuses primarily on pragmatic, egoistic 
and instrumental concerns. Moral maturity is achieved once the person's interpretation moves beyond 
the superficial in order to be able to infer the bases of interpersonal relationships (Stage 3) or societal 
norms (Stage 4). This section provides a description of the SRM-SF stages as presented in Gibbs et al 
(1992: 21-31). 
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Stage 1 - Unilateral and Physicalistic: 
At this Stage, sociomoral justifications are seen as being "extrinsic" and "authority-oriented". 
Typically, the explanations that the young person gives to justify moral actions will make reference 
to a powerful authority figure, will be expressed in terms of absolutes and will often allude to the 
inevitable physical consequences of the act. The emotional consequences of moral behaviours, 
insofar as they are recognised, are described in terms of their overt expression, rather than with 
reference to the underlying feelings of individuals. 
Transition Stage 1/2 
The change from Stage 1 to Transition 1 /2 reasoning is characterised primarily by a shift from the 
inevitability of physical outcomes to a more probabilistic outlook. As Gibbs and colleagues put it: 
"External consequences become physical or inevitable, but not both." Linguistically, this shift tends to 
be manifested in a change from the use of the simple future - e.g. "you will get beaten up" - to the 
conditional- "you might get beaten up". 
Stage 2 - Exchanging and Instrumental 
By Stage 2, the young person's perspective has moved beyond the immediately obvious, physical and 
salient aspects of events. In contrast to the unilateral authority-oriented reasoning of Stage I, Stage 2 
reasoning is characterised by an "autonomous morality of social interaction" (Gibbs et ai, 1992:23). 
However, sociomoral concerns are restricted and immature in that they tend to be conceptualised in 
terms of "direct exchanges" and "pragmatic needs". Frequently, sociomoral justifications are 
presented as "costlbenefit" analyses weighing up potential advantages and disadvantages for the 
individual. Typically, reasoning at this stage is instrumental and calculative in style, with a strong 
emphasis on hedonistic concerns. 
Transition 2/3 
The change from Stage 2 to Transition 2/3 is perceived as a move away from the view of reciprocity 
as "fact" and a shift towards more hypothetical and intrinsic aspects of sociomoral behaviour. As 
with the change from Stage 1 to Transition 1/2, this shift manifests itself linguistically. Whereas 
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stage 2 exchange-type justifications are construed using the simple future tense - "they will return the 
favour", Transition 2/3 makes more use of the future subjunctive - "you would want them to keep a 
promise to you". It is during this stage that one first sees reference to intrapersonal considerations 
such as "conscience" being offered in justifications for moral behaviour. However, at this stage 
"conscience" is not formally internalised, being conceptualised instead as an external, potentially 
bothersome agent that would, for example, "hound" the individual. 
Stage 3: Mutual and Prosocial 
By Stage 3, the mature moral reasoner has ceased to focus on the superficial and the external aspects 
of moral behaviour. Social relationships are no longer perceived as types of business exchanges but 
instead are construed in terms of their intrinsic nature and worth. By this Stage, intrapersonal 
considerations such as conscience have been truly internalised. Justifications at this Stage reflect a 
deep understanding and consideration of the psychological and emotional welfare of others. 
However, moral justifications that move beyond the confines of specific relationships are also in 
evidence at this stage. Example of more "global" justifications are those that "generalise" care from 
individuals to the human race as a whole, or justifications that make reference to normative codes of 
conduct. 
Transition 3/4: 
As with the previous transitional phases, Transition 3 14 represents a shift from one moral stage to the 
next. As such, transitional phases are characterised by reasoning styles that are "blends" of adjacent 
stages. For example, transition 3/4 is typified by judgments that are generalised beyond specific 
relationships but do not yet extend to the functional needs of a complex social system. However, 
Transition 3 1 4 is different from the other transitional phases of moral reasoning in that there is a 
distinct style of reasoning associated with this stage. This style of reasoning is referred to as 
"Relativism of Personal Values" (RPV). Reasoning that is characteristic of this aspect relates to 
personally held values and beliefs. For example, obeying the law might be seen as being important, 
but "one should act according to one's values". Gibbs and colleagues believe that many individuals 
who emphasise this aspect of reasoning to extremes may "eventually come to realize its anarchic 
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implications" and will proceed to construct Stage 4. However, they believe that for some people RPV 
may remain a relatively stable aspect over considerable periods of time. 
Stage 4: Systemic and Standard 
The maturity evident at Stage 3 is extended to address the functional aspects of complex social 
systems. Typically, judgements at this stage are characterised with reference to society's needs, in 
terms of social justice or with reference to moral standards such as "integrity" and "self-respect". 
1. 7 Reliability and Validity of the SRM-SF 
In an extensive investigation of the psychometric properties of the SRM-SF Basinger et al (1995) 
tested the reliability and validity of the measure using a number of methods. They reported good 
levels of test / re-test correlations, internal consistency and inter-rater reliability of the SRM-SF. The 
questionnaire was also deemed to have achieved acceptable concurrent validity as Basinger et al 
(1995) found that the correlation between scores on the SRM-SF and the Moral Judgement Interview 
was highly significant. They also found the SRM-SF to achieve good construct validity in that the 
measure successfully discriminated between diverse age groups from 10 year olds to adults -
indicating that the measure was sufficiently sensitive for exploring developmental age trends. 
Basinger et al (1995) also found that the measure was successful in discriminating between delinquent 
and non-delinquent adolescents. A number of other studies carried out in the US, have, broadly 
speaking, confirmed the findings that the SRM-SF achieves good levels of inter-rater reliability (e.g. 
Garmon et al 1996), at least moderate levels ofintemal consistency (e.g. Krcmar & Valkenburg, 
1999), that the SRM-SF is sensitive to age (e.g. Humphries et al, 2000) and that the measure 
successfully discriminates between "delinquent" and "non-delinquent" adolescents (e.g. Gregg et al 
1994). Finally, in three reported studies, Gibbs and colleagues found that there was no correlation 
between SRM-SF scores and measures of social desirability (Gibbs et al 1992; Gregg et ai, 1994; 
Basinger, et al 1995). This suggests that the SRM-SF may be relatively resilient in terms of "faking 
bias" (c.f. Aleixo & Hollin, 1996). 
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As a measure, the SRM-SF's cross-cultural transferability has yet to be conclusively established. 
However, over the last few years findings have started to emerge from studies using non-US based 
samples that indicate that the SRM-SF's applicability is not restricted to a US cultural setting. Studies 
carried out by Comunian & Gielen in Italy found that an Italian version of the SRM-SF demonstrated 
acceptable levels of internal consistency and inter-rater reliability; Comunian & Gielen also found that 
the Italian version successfully discriminated between older and younger adolescents (Comunian & 
Gielen, 1995; Comunian & Gielen, 2000). Work carried out by Krettenauer and Becker indicated that 
a shortened German version of the SRM-SF was suitable for use with German adolescents. 
Krettenauer and Becker reported acceptable levels of internal reliability for their version of the SRM-
SF and that scores on the measure correlated significantly with age; Krettenauer and Becker also 
found a significant relationship between scores on their measure and greater or lesser admissions of 
offending behaviour on a Self Reported Delinquency Scale (Krettenauer & Becker, 2001). Ferguson 
et al (2001) concluded from their study comparing SRM-SF scores of Nigerian and Northern Irish 
children that the SRM-SF was suitable for use in a Nigerian setting (Ferguson et aL 200 I). Mizuno 
(1999) reports that the SRM-SF was suitable for comparing cultural differences in moral reasoning 
between Japanese and American adolescents. Finally, in Australia, the SRM-SF was found to be 
useful as a assessment tool evaluating the impact of a Victim Awareness Program with young 
offenders (Putnins, 1997) 
1.71 Evidence of Reliability and Validity of the SRM-SF from UK Based Samples: 
Research findings using UK based samples have also been published that indicate that the SRM-SF is 
suitable for use in a British cultural setting. An investigation of the SRM-SF's reliability and validity 
with reference to UK participants was carried out by Ferguson et al (1994) amongst a sample of 
Northern Irish children and young people. They reported high levels oftest / re-test correlations and 
acceptable levels of internal consistency for the SRM-SF. They also report acceptable levels of 
convergent and concurrent validity for the SRM-SF. Ferguson et al (1994) found significant 
correlations between scores on the SRM-SF and scores on the Sociomoral Reflection Objective 
Measure and also that SRM-SF scores correlated with age. Further work carried out in Northern 
Ireland also found that the SRM-SF was apparently sensitive to age: Ferguson & Cairns (1996) found 
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significant differences between the SRM-SF scores of to-II year olds and those of 14 - 15 year olds. 
In mainland Britain, the bulk of the evidence providing support for the reliability and validity of the 
SRM-SF comes from research carried out by Emma Palmer and Clive Hollin which has explored 
dimensions of offending behaviour, parenting styles and moral reasoning amongst young people in 
England. Palmer and Hollin have found the SRM-SF to be effective at discriminating between young 
offender and non-offender samples (Palmer & Hollin 1998, Palmer & Hollin 1999). They have also 
reported significant relationships between SRM-SF scores and age amongst non-offending samples 
(Palmer & Hollin 2000, Palmer & Hollin 2001). 
1.72 Gender Differences Identified by the SRM-SF 
There is little evidence to suggest that the SRM-SF is susceptible to gender bias favouring males in 
terms of Moral Stage development scores. Indeed, if anything, the reverse is the case - as in general, 
where gender differences have been reported females have out-performed males on the measure. 
Some researchers reporting gender differences favouring females have found these differences to be 
present exclusively in early adolescence and have therefore attributed these gender differences to 
differential maturation rates of males and females during puberty (e.g. Gibbs et aI, 1992; Basinger, et 
aI, 1995; Garmon et al 1996). A number of additional studies using the SRM-SF have also reported 
that adolescent females out-perform males during adolescence on the SRM-SF (e.g. Gregg et ai, 1994; 
Palmer & Hollin, 2001; Krettenauer & Becker, 2001). However, a review of the literature reveals that 
"mapping" gender differences in SRM-SF scores onto known pubescent trends is problematic for a 
number of reasons. 
Not all of the studies using the SRM-SF with both male and female participants have reported their 
findings regarding gender (examples of such studies include Ferguson et aI, 1994; Palmer & Hollin, 
1997; Krcmar & Valkenburg, 1999; Mizuno, 1999; Ferguson et aI, 2001). The findings that do report 
gender differences conflict in terms of the ages at which gender differences favouring females 
emerge; furthermore, the broad age ranges of the participants in some studies - e.g. Gregg et ai, 1994 
(age range 13-18); Palmer & Hollin, 1998 (age range 13-22); Palmer & Hollin, 2001; (age range 12-
IS) - makes it difficult to interpret those gender differences that have been identified. The following 
examples should help to illustrate some of the difficulties associated with mapping the gender trends 
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of the SRM-SF: Humphries et al (2000) in their study of African Americans aged 10-13 found no 
gender differences favouring females; Ferguson & Cairns, 1996, found gender differences favouring 
females amongst 10-11 year olds, but not amongst 14-15 year olds; Krettenauer & Becker (200 I) 
found gender differences favouring females amongst 16 year olds; Basinger et al (1995) found gender 
differences favouring females amongst 14 year olds but not amongst 10 year olds or 16-18 year olds; 
Comunian & Gielen found gender differences favouring females amongst 16 year olds and amongst 
15-21 year olds (Comunian & Gielen 1995; Comunian & Gielen 2000); Barriga et al found no gender 
differences amongst 16-19 year olds (Barriga et aI200l). A study carried out by Mason & Gibbs in 
1993 amongst college students in the U.S. identified gender differences that favoured older males; 
however, in a later study carried out by Van Ijzendoorn & Zwaart-Woudstra using a comparable 
sample, no effects for age or gender were found (Van Ijzendoorn & Zwaart-Woudstra, 1995). 
The general finding that there is no apparent gender bias favouring males on terms of SRM-SF scores 
has been taken by many researchers as evidence to challenge Gilligan's (1982) hypothesis that males 
and females differ in terms of their use of Stage 3 and Stage 4 types of reasoning. However, it is by 
no means clear that it is appropriate to make this particular assumption on the basis of the published 
work. Typically, researchers using the SRM-SF have presented their findings in terms of summary 
mean scores over the questionnaire as a whole. However, use of summary mean scores alone may not 
be adequate when seeking to uncover patterns of Stage use amongst an adolescent sample. For 
example, if (as in some studies) the age range of adolescent sample is broad, and younger females are 
out-performing younger males, then any evidence of greater Stage 4 use in older males might be 
masked by comparatively greater use of the immature Stages by the younger boys. In any case, use of 
summary mean scores across a questionnaire may not be entirely representative indicators of 
adolescents' pattern of Stage use. It is clear that adolescence per se cannot not be represented as a 
fixed point that is half-way between "immaturity" and "maturity". One might, therefore, expect to see 
more variability in terms of Stage use within individuals and across questionnaire items amongst an 
adolescent sample than amongst children and adults. However, there are relatively few studies using 
the SRM-SF that have sought to investigate patterns of Stage use by adolescents across individual 
questionnaire items (two notable exceptions are Gregg et ai, 1994 and Palmer & Hollin, 1998). 
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1.73 Differences between Offenders and Non-Offenders Identified by the SRM-SF 
In line with findings using other measures of moral reasoning, researchers who have compared 
offending and non-offending adolescent samples using the SRM-SF typically report that offenders arc 
"developmentally delayed" in terms of over-all moral reasoning with reference to their non-offending 
peers. Palmer & Hollin (1999) note that poor performance by offenders on moral reasoning tasks 
leaves the question of whether this is best explained by some form of cognitive structural deficit or 
whether it is because young offenders are "lagging behind" non-offenders in terms of moral 
development. They point out that this issue is critical when considering interventions for offenders. 
Clearly, in order to be able to provide a comprehensive answer to this question one needs to determine 
not only how this "lag" or "deficit" manifests itself among young people but also when in the 
developmental process it becomes evident. Furthermore, bearing in mind that in the UK at least, 
offending amongst males increases dramatically throughout the adolescent years, peaking at age 18, 
(see e.g. Coleman & Schofield 2001, p84) early intervention would seem to be key. However, 
curiously enough, the investigation of age related trends within adolescent offending samples is 
something that has received little attention in the SRM-SF research. In some studies, the age range of 
participant groups is broad; however, these groups have been treated as if they are homogenous 
groups of same-age adolescents. 
1. 74 Consensus Regarding "Importance" of Issues under Consideration 
Few studies - two to the author's knowledge: Gregg, et al (1994); Palmer & Hollin, (1998) - have 
compared the relative "importance" ratings given by offender and non-offender samples to the initial 
evaluative component of each question (i.e. comparing the choices made from the given options of 
"very important" or "important" or "not important" in response to, say "How important is it to keep a 
promise to a friend?"). The two studies that have carried out this type of investigation have reported 
similar findings. Gregg, et al (1994) and Palmer & Hollin (1998) report that a high level of offenders 
and non-offenders - around 90% - evaluate most of the SRM-SF items as being "very important" or 
"important". In both studies, these findings are seen as providing general support for Kohlberg's 
proposal that certain moral values are universal (Gregg et al 1994, p551; Palmer & Hollin, 1998, 
p233) and that delinquents "recognised" (Palmer & Hollin 1998) or "acknowledged" (Gregg et ai, 
29 
1994) the importance of these moral values. These interpretations seem rather odd (even if one 
disregards the controversy surrounding Kohlberg's claims regarding universal applicability of his 
moral typology). Firstly, it is difficult to see how generalisations about the "universality" of moral 
values can be made on the basis of these types of ratings given by two samples of Western 
adolescents. Secondly, it is not immediately apparent where the information that young offenders can 
"recognise" the importance of certain moral values leads in theoretical terms. Presumably, convicted 
young offenders have been made all too well aware of the relative "importance" that society attaches 
to e.g. law abiding behaviour through their contact with the criminal justice system. Finally, it is not 
clear from the studies that the researchers made reference to the content of the justifications when 
categorising responses as "important" or "not important". For example, it is possible that some 
participants circled the "important" response to an item but then went on to provide a disavowal in 
their justification (e.g. "it's important but. .... "). If this type of response was assigned to an 
"important" category, then this may have resulted in a distorted picture of the true level of consensus 
regarding the importance of the items. The evaluative component of the SRM-SF is, then, an aspect 
of the questionnaire that seems worthy of further investigation. 
1.8 Overview to Empirical Research Presented in the Current Thesis 
From the research review presented in this chapter it can be seen that there are a number of theoretical 
and methodological issues that need to be considered when seeking to investigate between-group 
differences in moral reasoning amongst adolescents. The development of the SRM-SF provides the 
researcher with a "user-friendly" tool that enables one to explore these issues in some depth. 
The empirical research presented in this thesis naturally falls into two parts, and is presented in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this thesis. In Chapter 2, work is presented that represents a partial 
replication of previous research using the SRM-SF to compare between-group differences amongst 
(male) offending and male and female non-offending adolescents (see e.g. Gregg et ai, 1994; Palmer 
& Hollin, 1998). A key aim of this partial replication is to corroborate previous findings using 
"conventional" techniques to analyse SRM-SF data. In order to accomplish this, between-group 
comparisons are carried out with reference to summary SRM-SF mean scores. Claims regarding the 
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comparative moral immaturity of offenders in relation to their non-offending peers are investigated. 
Between-group differences amongst male and female non-offending adolescents are explored, 
however, a variant to previous work is provided in that the age-range of participants comes under 
particular scrutiny. In addition to carrying out between-group comparisons of the moral reasoning of 
participants the internal characteristics of the SRM-SF scale come under investigation. 
The bulk of the "original contribution to research in the field" comes from the empirical studies that 
are presented in Chapter 3. As a result of the analyses presented in Chapter 2, issues are raised 
regarding the reliance on summary SRM-SF mean scores as the sole source of information to 
represent the moral reasoning of participants. In Chapter 3, SRM-SF data are analysed using 
alternatives to summary mean scores. Properties of the Global Moral Stage Status Scale (an 
alternative summary index presented by Gibbs et al (1992) to represent SRM-SF data) are 
investigated and issues regarding use of this scale are explored. The notion is put forward that 
through use of "categorical" techniques one may uncover between-group differences in patterns of 
SRM-SF stage use that were not revealed with reference to summary mean scores. It is noted that 
little attention has been paid in the SRM-SF research towards potential sources of intra-individual 
variation in patterns of moral stage use. As a result, potential sources of inter-individual and intra-
individual variability in moral stage use are explored. The empirical research concludes with a 
demonstration of how recoding SRM-SF "mature stages" may impact on findings relating to gender 
differences in moral reasoning. 
Chapter 4 summarises key findings that emerged from the empirical studies and discusses their 
theoretical and methodological implications. Suggestions are made for further research and 
concluding remarks are made. 
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CHAPTER 2: COMPARISON OF PATTERNS OF MORAL JUDGEMENT OF OFFENDING AND 
NON-OFFENDING ADOLESCENTS USING THE SRM-SF 
2.1 Overview 
In this chapter findings are presented resulting from work carried out using the SRM-SF to examine 
the differences in moral reasoning amongst male offending and male and female non-offending 
adolescents with reference to SRM-SF summary means. The first part of the chapter presents a 
description of the work to be carried out. In the second part of the chapter the results of the empirical 
findings are presented. In the final part of the chapter the findings are discussed in theoretical context 
and issues are raised that will be the subject of further investigation in Chapter 3. 
2.2 Research aims/or body o/work presented in this chapter 
The primary aim of the work carried out in this chapter is to replicate previous fmdings obtained using 
the SRM-SF to compare the moral reasoning of male offending and male and female non-offending 
adults. A further aim of the work to be carried out in this chapter is to test the internal characteristics 
of the SRM-SF scale. With that in mind, the specific aims of the empirical work and the key 
predictions that will be tested are as follows: 
Tests will be carried out in order to attempt to replicated previous findings that have established that 
the SRM-SF is sensitive to age, and is therefore suitable for exploring developmental trends amongst 
young people. Comparisons will be carried out of SRM-SF summary means and items to test the 
claim that the SRM-SF effectively discriminates between offenders and non-offenders in that 
offending adolescents demonstrate comparative "moral immaturity" on the measure with reference to 
their non-offending peers. Investigation of gender differences on the measure will be carried out, in 
order to test the claim that the SRM-SF is not gender biased in terms of favouring males. 
Investigation of age related trends within the participant samples will be carried out. A specific aim is 
to test the prediction that the SRM-SF effectively discriminates between offenders and non-offenders 
across all age groups represented in the sample. Investigations of the internal characteristics of the 
SRM-SF will be carried out, in order to test the claim that the SRM-SF represents a "unitary scale" in 
terms of factor structure. Finally an investigation will be carried out about levels of consensus of the 
evaluation of the "importance" of the SRM-SF items amongst participants, the purpose of this 
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investigation is to test the claim that issues under consideration in the SRM-SF represent commonly 
held values amongst all participant groups. 
2.3 Description of the SRM-SF (instrument used in the study): 
The measure consists of 11 questions relating to the following "commonly held" sociomoral values: 
"contract and truth", "affiliation", "life", "property and law" and "legal justice". Each question is in 
two parts. Firstly, participants are asked to evaluate how important they think it is, say, to keep a 
promise to a friend - "very important", "important" or "not important". Secondly, participants are 
asked to justify why they think that is "very important", "important" or "not important". The 11 items 
in the questionnaire and the sociomoral values they relate to are as follows: (Questionnaire items are 
presented in full in Appendix 1 
Contract and Truth: 
Q 1: Keeping a promise to a friend 
Q2: Keep a promise to a stranger 
Q3: Parents keeping promises to children 
Q4: Telling the truth 
Affiliation: 
Q5: Children helping parents 
Q6: Saving the life of a friend 
Life: 
Q7: Saving the life ofa stranger 
Q8: Living even if you don't want to 
Property and Law: 
Q9: Not taking things that belong to others 
Q 1 0: Obeying the law 
Legal Justice: 
Q 11: Judges sending law-breakers to jail 
2.3i Description of scoring procedure of the SRM-SF 
Scoring the SRM-SF takes place by "matching" the moral justifications given to each questionnaire 
item to protocols in the SRM-SF handbook. Each justification is coded according to the major stage 
or transitional stage rating. For the purposes of statistical analysis, stage ratings are converted into 
scores ranging from 100 - 400. So, for example, a "Stage }" response would be given a score of 100, 
a 'Transition 2/3" response would be given a score of 250. The primary summary score used for 
analysis of the SRM-SF is the Sociomoral Reflection Maturity Score (SRMS), which is the mean of 
all scorable responses. It should be noted that certain types of responses are considered to be 
"unscorable"; these include tautologies, "word salads" and justifications where a single "response 
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unit" matches equally well with protocols from disparate moral stages. Questionnaires resulting in 
less than 7 out of 11 scorable items are deemed invalid and are discarded. Once the SRMS score has 
been calculated, a "Global Stage" status may also be assigned to the questionnaire. "Global Stage" is 
a ten-point scale that corresponds to "the developmental vicinity in which an SRMS is located" 
(Gibbs, Basinger and Fuller, 1992). Issues relating to "Global Moral Stage Status" ratings are taken 
up in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
2.4 METHOD 
2.41 Participants 
In total, 527 young people provided data for use in the current study. The participants were 190 male 
offenders, mean age 15.40 years (SO 1.24); 191 male non-offenders, mean age 14.97 years (SO 0.89); 
146 female non-offenders, mean age 14.76 years (SO 0.90). The offending sample was drawn from 
23 different settings in England (geographical range from Cornwall to County Durham). Of the 23 
settings, 16 were Youth Offending Teams, 3 were Local Authority Secure Units, 2 were Secure 
Training Centres and 2 were Young Offender Institutions. Of the 190 offenders completing 
questionnaires, 95 were in custody and 95 were following community sentences under the supervision 
of a YOT. The non-offending sample was drawn from 6 secondary schools in England - 3 in the 
North of England, and 3 in the Greater London area. The majority of the non-offenders completing 
SRM questionnaires came from school year groups 9, 10 and 11. 
2.42 Procedure 
Participation was voluntary, and young people were assured that any information supplied would 
remain anonymous and confidential. Due to literacy issues, approximately 65% of the young 
offenders completed the tasks as interviews on a one to one basis; the questionnaire administrator 
writing down the responses given. The remainder of the young offenders and all the non-offenders 
completed the questionnaire as a pen-to-paper task. 
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2.43 Prior Experience o/the Author in Coding SRM-SF Protocols and Inter-Rater Reliability 
As noted earlier, the SRM-SF was designed in part as a more user-friendly alternative to the MJI, and 
initial self-training in use of the measure may be accomplished within approximately 30 hours. Self 
training in use of the measure is accomplished in three phases: overall familiarisation with summaries 
of the moral stages and aspects within stages; scoring practice by sample item responses; and scoring 
practice of sample questionnaires (Gibbs et aI, 1992:45). In the manual, guidelines are given for self-
study and practice exercises taken from 50 SRM-SF questionnaires with annotated answer keys are 
provided. The current author has completed the self-training as set out in the SRM-SF manual. 
Furthermore, she has obtained additional familiarisation with the SRM-SF through her involvement 
with a number of research projects conducted in UK schools that have used the SRM-SF as an 
assessment tool. This has resulted in the author having experience of coding upwards of 1000 SRM-
SF questionnaires prior to analysing the data set used in the research project that is presented in the 
current thesis. 
Aside from successfully completing of self-training, demonstrating competence in use of the measure 
requires that the trainee is able to achieve minimum standards of inter-rater reliability with an 
experienced SRM-SF rater. Whilst it was not possible to obtain indices of inter-rater reliability with 
the data set used in the current study, satisfactory inter-rater reliability had previously been 
demonstrated between the current author and another experienced SRM-SF protocol coder using a 
related data set. Gibbs, et al (1992) consider that in order to establish inter-rater reliability, raters 
should independently score 20-30 SRM-SF questionnaires. The minimum standards for acceptable 
inter-rater reliability are considered to be as follows: SRMS correlation: r = .80; mean absolute SRMS 
discrepancy = 0.20 points (this is equivalent to 20 points when stage ratings are converted by 
multiplying by 100 for the purposes of statistical analysis); global stage agreement within one GMSS 
interval: 80%; exact global stage agreement 50% (Gibbs et ai, 1992: 56-57). 
When evaluating inter-rater reliability on the related sample of26 SRM-SF questionnaires, the current 
author and second experienced SRM-SF rater achieved the following standards: SRMS correlation: 
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n = 26, r=. 847, p<O. 001, two tailed test; mean absolute discrepancy = 0.138 points (or 13.8 points 
when multiplying stage ratings by 100); global stage agreement within one GMSS interval: 88%; 
exact global stage agreement 62%. It can be seen, then, that the standards achieved by the current 
author and the second rater more than adequately fulfilled the minimum requirements for inter-rater 
reliability on all criteria set out in the SRM-SF manual. 
2.44 Treatment of Data 
Typically, responses to the SRM-SF are scored questionnaire by questionnaire. For each participant, 
items 1 through 11 are coded, and summary moral reasoning scores calculated accordingly. There 
are certain advantages to treating the data in this way. Whilst extensive procedural guidelines are 
given in the SRM-SF manual for scoring questionnaires, scoring the SRM-SF is in part an inferential 
process (as is the case with any procedure involving textual analysis of open-ended questions). 
Moral justifications given by participants frequently do not match word-for-word with justifications 
given in the SRM-SF manual. Sometimes the wording of responses is ambiguous, and though the 
manual has guidelines for dealing with certain types of ambiguous responses (for example, where a 
moral justification appears to match equally well with protocols differing by two adjacent stage levels, 
the justification is scored at the higher level) these do not cover every eventuality. By referring other 
responses a participant has given, one may be able to get "more of a feel" for what the participant 
meant, and thus infer a stage rating. Treating the data in this way maximises the potential for internal 
consistency within participant questionnaires, and for building up a meaningful and valid moral 
profile for each individual. However, in terms of assessing global reliability of the SRM-SF, this 
method of treating the data is potentially problematic. For example, it raises the possibility that 
identical moral justifications by participants given to particular items are not given identical stage 
ratings. Furthermore, cues such as handwriting and spelling may unintentionally bias the rater 
towards reading in a greater or lower level of moral maturity from the questionnaire as a whole. 
It was felt that for the purposes of the current study, a more rigorous approach that would be more 
testing to the overall reliability of the SRM-SF would be to score responses item by item and then 
calculate SRM-SF summary scores. Responses to SRM-SF questions were typed out into Microsoft 
Word tables, each question forming a separate Word table. Spelling mistakes were corrected and 
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some minimal editing regarding the syntax of items was carried out. For example, occurrences of 
"it's" and "it is" were standardised to "it's". No alterations were made to the semantics of any 
response. The tables for each question were sorted by text, and scored accordingly. This helped to 
ensure internal consistency in scoring, as identical or highly similar justifications were given identical 
stage ratings. All other aspects of scoring and summarising the data for Study 1 were carried out 
according to the procedure already described above. 
2.45 "Unscorable" Items 
As has been mentioned earlier, certain types of responses are classed as unscorable. Questionnaires 
resulting in more than 4111 unscorable responses are excluded from analysis. Clearly, in a study of 
this nature, a certain amount of attrition is to be predicted simply due to non-completion of the 
questionnaire. All the non-offenders completed the task as pen-to-paper exercises in class and it was 
not possible to monitor for missing responses to items before the questionnaires were turned in. 
During interviews it was noted that some of the offenders were unable or unwilling to offer moral 
justifications to some of the items. Predictably, some participants gave responses that were 
ambiguous, or were not "moral justifications" as such - for example by repeating the question. 
Nevertheless, whilst scoring the items it was noted that 4 items in particular seemed to be generating a 
number of "unscorable" responses. The 4 items were: "Keeping a promise to a stranger", "Saving the 
life of a stranger", "Living even if you don't want to" and "Judges sending people to jail". The high 
level of unscorable responses to the items "Keeping a promise to a stranger" and "Saving the life of a 
stranger" can be partially explained by a number of participants responding "same as before". Both 
these items follow on from questions that ask about keeping a promise to a friend and saving the life 
of a friend. If one is scoring the questionnaire participant by participant, then according to the SRM-
SF manual, one could assign the same stage rating to this type of response as given to the previous 
question. However, in the current study, the questionnaire was being treated item by item, so it was 
felt that this would be an inappropriate scoring strategy to adopt. Therefore, responses of this type 
were classified as unscorable. The problem with the item "how important is it for judges to send 
people who break the law to jail?" may have been partly to do with the wording of the question. At 
least 40 participants (or about 8% of the participant sample) answered this item with the response "it 
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depends" or "it depends what they've done". Without further justification, it is unclear how this type 
of response should be scored. The high proportion of unscorable responses to the question "How 
important is it to live even if you don't want to" was partially explained by a number of participants 
giving answers like: "it's up to them" or "it's their choice" or "it's their life". Approximately 60 
participants - about 11 % of the sample, responded to the question in this way. There is in fact a 
discrepancy in the SRM-SF manual relating to this type of response, which may reflect a theoretical 
issue. The response "it's their life" to this item is given as an example ofa Stage 2, Aspect 3 
(freedoms) response on page 100. However, on page 106, when giving examples of Transition Stage 
3 /4 reasoning, this response is cited as being "unscorable". It seems that this type of un elaborated 
response could correspond equally well to two disparate moral stages - Stage 2 (Aspect 3, 
"Freedoms") and Transition 3 / 4 (which incorporates the style of reasoning known as "Relativism of 
Personal Values). 
2.46 Attrition Rate: 
Attrition rate was relatively high - out of an initial 527 questionnaires that were turned in by 
participants, 413 met the initial criteria for inclusion in the preliminary analyses of the SRM-SF. 
The high attrition rate was in part due to the issues regarding scoring discussed above. However, it 
appeared that age was also a factor accounting for attrition rate, as the mean ages of participant groups 
completing scorable questionnaires were somewhat higher than for the participant groups as a whole. 
For male participants the difference between mean ages of the participant sample as a whole and those 
left after attrition was approximately 6 months. For the female sample the difference in mean ages 
was approximately 5 months. 
The characteristics of participants providing "scorable" questionnaires according to the criteria were 
as follows: 147 male offenders, mean age 15.91 years, SO 1.30; 149 male non-offenders, mean age 
15.45 years (SD 0.89); 117 female non-offenders, mean age 15.13 years (SO 0.89). 
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2.5 RESULTS 
2.51. Comparison ofSRM-SF Means by Participant Group: 
The overall SRM-SF summary mean scores were as follows: offenders, mean = 222.59 (n=147, 
SO=30.11); male non-offenders mean = 264.36 (n=149, SO=44.79), female non-offenders mean = 
262.48 (n= 117, SO=29.88). Pearson correlations were carried out to test the prediction that there 
would be a positive relationship between age and mean scores on the SRM-SF. Results of I-tailed 
Pearson correlations confirmed this finding for the relationship between the SRM-SF measure and age 
for the participant sample as a whole (n=413, r=.108, p<O.05) and for each of the participant groups 
(for the offenders, n=147 r=.170, p<O.05; for the male non-offenders, n=149, r=.418, p<O.OOI; for the 
female non-offenders, n=117, r=.278, p<O.OI). 
Statistical comparisons of means of offenders, male non-offenders and female non-offenders on the 
SRM-SF measure were carried out by ANCOVAs, using age as a covariate. Results of the 
ANCOVAs revealed significant differences between offenders and male non offenders F (1,293) = 
111.49, p<O.OOl. The result of the ANCOVA comparing male and female non-offenders was not 
statistically significant: F (1,263) =0.50, os. 
2.52. Classification of Participants into Age Categories 
Participants were categorized according to age group categories as follows: Age Group 1: n = 103, 
mean age 14.13, SO 0.63; Age Group 2: n = 103, mean age 15.22, SO 0.20; Age Group 3: n = 207, 
mean age 16.37, SO 0.69. Initially 4 age group categories were created, corresponding to age 
quartiles - Age Group I and 2 as already described (being the lower two quartiles); Quartile 3, n= I 04, 
mean age 15.88, SD 0.17 and Quartile 4: n= 103 mean age 16.88, SD 0.62. However, due to age 
differences between offenders and non-offenders there were disproportionately high numbers of 
offenders in Quartile 4. Furthermore, due to differences in the sample size of male and female non-
offenders, there were comparatively few female non-offenders that were assigned to this quartile. 
Therefore, for the purposes of analysis the upper quartiles were combined into one larger category to 
form Age Group 3. Broadly speaking, the 3 age group categories used for analysis represent the 3 
school year groups from which the majority of the non-offending sample was drawn. Category 1 
approximates to Year 9 (13 to 14 year olds), Category 2 to Year 10 (14 to 15 year olds), Category 3 to 
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Table 2.3: Swumary Statistics for SRM-SF ANOVAs comparing between-group differences by Age Groups by participant 
type 
Age Group I & Age Group 2 & Age Group I & 
Age Group 2 Age Group 3 Age Group 3 
Participants F (dO 
SRM-SF Offenders 0.12(1,64) 2.63 (1,112) 1.81 (1,112) 
Male Non-Offenders 1O.11 (1,60)" 4.43 (1,115)· 35.51 (1,117)"· 
Female Non-Offenders 2.92 (1,76) 1.86(1,77) 11.23 (1,75)·· 
·p<O.OS, ··p<0.0 I, ···p<O.OO I 
From Table 2.3 it can be seen that offender SRM-SF mean scores did not differ significantly across 
any of the age group categories. For male non-offenders significant differences in SRM-SF means 
were found between Age Groups 1 and 2 and also between Age Groups 2 and 3 (in both cases older 
participants having significantly higher means). For female non-offenders, significant differences in 
SRM-SF means were found between Age Groups 1 and 3 only (again, with older participants having 
significantly higher means). 
2.54. Comparison ofSRM-SF "socio-moral values" and individual items by participant group: 
As described in the overview to the SRM-SF, the 11 questionnaire items represent the following 
sociomoral values: "Contract and Truth" (items 1 to 4), "Affiliation" (items 5 and 6), "Life" (items 7 
and 8), "Property & Law" (items 9 and 10) and "Legal justice" (item 11). Using the participant 
sample as a whole, Pearson correlations were carried out to investigate the relationship between the 
sociomoral values and also to investigate the relationships between each of the individual 
questionnaire items. The prediction was that there would be positive relationships between the 
variables being compared. Results of I-tailed Pearson correlations confirmed this for all the for all 
the inter-value correlations at p<O.OOland for all the inter-item correlations at p<0.05 (the vast 
majority of the inter-item correlations achieved statistical significance at p<O. 001). Correlation 
matrices giving Pearson r statistics and significance levels of the inter- variable comparisons may be 
found in Appendix 2. Having established that there were positive relationships between all the 
variables, ANCOV As were carried out, using age as a covariate, to compare the means of participant 
groups on each of the SRM-SF sociomoral values and individual questionnaire items within each 
value. Summary tables showing descriptive statistics and the results of ANCOV As are presented in 
Table 2.4 and 2.5 overleaf: 
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Table 2.4 SRM-SF sociomoral value and item means by participant group- descriptive statistics 
Offenders 0' Non-Offenders S! Non-Offenders Total 
Values & Items N Mean SD N Mean SO N Mean SO N Mean SO 
Contract & Truth 147 228.40 39.84 149 277.57 49.94 116 271.88 37.43 412 258.42 48.58 
Promising Friend 130 236.92 66.63 137 279.93 60.47 113 288.50 47.72 380 267.76 63.23 
Promising Stranger 113 225.22 54.33 105 266.67 71.95 93 267.74 54.50 311 251.93 63.98 
Promising Children 124 239.11 67.94 131 301.53 68.20 98 293.37 62.85 353 277.34 72.27 
Telling Truth 133 218.80 45.89 124 266.13 66.43 99 237.37 56.85 356 240.45 60. J J 
AffiUation 144 233.16 52.04 147 264.63 59.02 115 272.17 37.58 406 255.60 53.81 
Help Parents 129 234.50 55.83 130 268.85 60.71 103 269.90 43.35 362 256.91 56.87 
Saving Friend 127 236.22 66.87 121 261.16 76.51 92 279.35 39.33 340 256.76 66.73 
Life 134 239.37 41.63 129 260.08 60.56 102 269.12 48.64 365 255.00 52.29 
Saving Stranger 95 238.95 57.05 96 265.10 64.12 65 256.15 56.26 256 253.13 60.47 
Staying Alive 113 241.15 50.10 98 265.31 66.35 90 273.33 52.04 301 258.64 57.95 
Property & Law 145 192.59 49.84 145 245.86 76.67 111 244.37 59.23 401 226.18 67.94 
Stealing 126 194.05 57.83 125 216.80 81.80 98 231.63 63.97 349 212.75 70.42 
Obeying Law 116 194.83 63.38 116 282.33 89.26 90 257.78 70.68 322 243.94 84.48 
Legal Justice 104 195.67 58.75 115 249.57 86.47 86 228.49 59.18 305 225.25 74.02 
Table 2.5 SRM-SF sociomoral value and item means by participant group - ANCOVA statistics: 
Offender 0' Non-Offender 
0' Non-Offender <:j? Non-Offender 
Item F(dt) F (dt) 
Contract & Truth 101.27 (1,293) .. * 0.07 (1,262) 
Promise Friend 35.30 (1,264) ••• 3.62 (1,247) 
Promise Stranger 30.92 (1,215) ... 0.62 (1.195) 
Promise Children 59.27 (1,252) ••• 0.24 (1,226) 
Tell Truth 48.11 (1,254) ... 8.32 (1,220) •• 
AffiUation 35.17 (1,288) .. * 4.45 (1,259) * 
Help Parents 28.44 (1,256) ••• 0.87 (1,230) 
Save Friend 14.33 (1,245) ••• 7.60 (1,210) •• 
Life 15.91 (1,260) *** 4.02 (1,228) * 
Save Stranger 10.90 (1,188) •• 0.20 (1,158) 
Stay Alive 13.63 (1,208) ••• 2.22 (1.185) 
Property & Law 54.43 (1,287) * ** 0.16 (1,253) 
Not Stealing 8.25 (1,248) •• 3.23 (1,220) 
Obey Law 78.92 (1,229) ••• 2.17 (1.203) 
Legal Justice 31.72 (1,216) * .. 1. 76 (1,198) 
.. 
a Approaches statistIcal SIgnificance at p<O.052 
From Table 2.5 it can be seen that male non-offenders demonstrated significantly higher mean scores 
than offenders on all socio-moral values and items. Differences in the mean scores of male and 
female non-offenders were significant for two of the values: "Affiliation" and "Life", with female 
non-offenders having significantly higher means than male non-offenders. Differences between male 
and female non-offenders were also found on two individual items: "How important is it to tell the 
truth?" and "How important is it to save the life of a friend?" On the item "How important is it to tell 
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the truth?" male non-offenders demonstrated significantly higher means than female non-offenders. 
On the item "How important is it to save the life of a friend?" female non-offenders demonstrated 
significantly higher means than male non-offenders. 
2.55. SRM-SF socio-moral value and item means by participant group and age: 
SRM-SF item means for participant groups in each of the 3 age categories are summarised in Table 
2.6 overleaf. In line with analyses carried out for the overall SRM-SF means, two types of ANOVAs 
were carried out. Firstly, ANOVAs were carried out to compare the means between participant 
groups on SRM-SF socio-moral values and items within each of the 3 age group categories. 
Secondly, ANOVAs were carried out to compare the means across age group categories within 
participant groups. Summary statistics showing the results of the ANOVAs are presented in Tables 
2.7 and 2.8 on pages 45 & 46. Key fmdings of note from the analyses are described on page 47 
following the tables. 
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Table 2.6: Descriptive statistics for SRM-SF socio-moral values and items across age groups 
OtJenden ~ Non-Offenders (? Non-Offenders All Participants 
Values and Items N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Contract & Truth Age Group 1 33 225.38 32.45 32 241.02 51.27 37 260.36 42.75 102 242.97 44.78 
Age Group 2 33 227.40 38.61 30 277.78 43.40 40 275.94 32.24 103 260.92 44.00 
Age Group 3 81 230.04 43.26 87 290.95 45.07 39 278.63 35.33 207 264.79 51.04 
Promise Friend Age Group 1 29 234.48 73.32 29 236.21 66.68 36 281.94 53.66 94 253.19 67.52 
Age Group 2 30 246.67 45.36 29 279.31 59.04 39 291.03 44.24 98 273.98 52.38 
Age Group 3 71 233.80 71.60 79 296.20 50.49 38 292.11 45.81 188 271.81 65.43 
Promise Stranger Age Group 1 25 218.00 47.61 22 220.45 59.08 29 256.90 59.35 76 233.55 57.96 
Age Group 2 20 207.50 56.84 24 258.33 52.48 36 261.11 46.46 80 246.88 55.31 
Age Group 3 68 233.09 55.05 59 287.29 75.20 28 287.50 55.49 155 263.55 68.69 
Promise Children Age Group 1 28 233.93 57.82 25 266.00 68.80 31 279.03 68.04 84 260.12 67.12 
Age Group 2 30 236.67 78.71 26 303.85 67.71 34 301.47 52.92 90 280.56 72.94 
Age Group 3 66 242.42 67.51 80 311.88 65.24 33 298.49 66.71 179 283.80 73.36 
Tell Truth Age Group 1 32 218.75 27.68 23 236.96 48.19 32 218.75 61.89 87 223.56 48.13 
Age Group 2 32 212.50 47.52 24 264.58 63.38 35 251.43 56.21 91 241.21 58.97 
Age Group 3 69 221.74 51.79 77 275.32 70.07 32 240.63 48.26 178 248.31 64.42 
Affiliation Age Group 1 33 224.24 55.02 32 225.78 57.67 37 266.22 26.50 102 239.95 51.25 
Age Group 2 32 221.88 54.53 30 250.83 53.53 39 271.79 46.66 101 249.75 54.94 
Age Group 3 79 241.46 48.85 85 284.12 53.01 39 278.21 36.36 203 266.38 52.35 
Help Parents Age Group 1 32 223.44 55.34 25 236.00 36.86 34 260.29 36.41 91 240.66 46.50 
Age Group 2 28 225.00 39.67 27 274.07 64.12 34 270.59 46.25 89 257.30 54.64 
Age Group 3 69 243.48 60.58 78 277.56 62.75 35 278.57 45.83 182 264.84 61.0i 
Save Friend Age Group 1 26 228.85 75.06 26 215.38 83.39 31 275.81 36.22 83 242.17 70.92 
Age Group 2 28 223.21 79.91 27 233.33 69.34 31 275.81 48.08 86 245.35 69.72 
Age Group 3 73 243.84 57.70 68 289.71 63.81 30 286.67 31.98 171 269.59 60.72 
Life Age Group 1 30 231.67 34.07 30 230.00 64.46 33 250.76 44.85 93 237.90 49.67 
Age Group 2 28 234.82 38.09 23 251.09 63.73 35 277.14 47.89 86 256.40 52.61 
Age Group 3 76 244.08 45.25 76 274.67 53.46 34 278.68 49.29 186 262.90 51.68 
Save Stranger Age Group 1 20 242.50 40.64 21 245.24 72.29 22 240.91 45.35 63 242.86 53.77 
Age Group 2 18 225.00 52.16 19 242.12 65.11 23 276.09 42.29 60 250.00 56.75 
Age Group 3 57 242.11 63.24 56 280.36 56.95 20 250.00 74.34 133 259.40 64.59 
Stay Alive Age Group I 28 226.79 53.55 26 22U5 61.92 29 260.34 52.41 83 236.75 57.9~ 
Age Group 2 22 247.73 47.50 15 286.67 61.14 30 273.33 55.29 67 267.91 55.53 
Age Group 3 63 245.24 48.95 57 279.82 61.13 31 285.49 46.89 151 266.56 56.19 
Property & Law Age Group 1 32 186.72 43.53 32 226.56 68.38 38 228.29 41.98 102 214.71 54.99 
Age Group 2 33 181.06 51.17 30 239.17 66.53 36 237.50 67.48 99 219.19 67.27 
Age Group 3 80 199.69 51.02 83 255.72 82.02 37 267.57 60.05 200 235.50 73.04 
Not Stealing Age Group 1 28 192.86 53.94 31 198.39 79.04 35 228.57 53.26 94 207.98 64.47 
Age Group 2 26 188.46 58.83 25 216.00 64.10 29 222.41 71.45 80 209.38 66.13 
Age Group 3 72 196.53 59.53 69 225.36 88.13 34 242.65 67.57 175 216.86 75.34 
Obey Law Age Group 1 26 186.54 48.08 27 250.00 88.80 31 225.81 58.98 84 221.43 71.26 
Age Group 2 27 181.48 66.72 24 281.25 85.74 31 253.23 75.21 82 237.81 85.55 
Age Group 3 63 203.97 66.78 65 296.15 88.52 28 298.21 58.50 156 259.29 87.77 
Legal Justice Age Group 1 27 211.11 54.30 25 198.00 78.37 28 230.36 53.30 80 213.75 63.13 
Age Group 2 25 180.00 35.36 26 248.08 78.08 31 212.90 60.51 82 214.02 65.86 
Age Group 3 52 195.19 68.07 64 270.31 85.32 27 244.44 60.98 143 238.11 82.00 
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Table 2.7: Swnmary ANOVA Statistics for SRM-SF values and items between participants within Age Groups: 
Offender 0' Non-Offender 
0' Non-Offender ~ Non-Offender 
Item F (dt) F (dt) 
Contract & Truth Age Group 1 2.17 (1,63) 2.92 (1,67) 
Age Group 2 23.78 (1,61) .... 0.04 (1,68) 
Age Group 3 79.62 (1,166) ..... 2.28 (1,124) 
Promise Friend Age Group 1 0.01 (1,56) 9.40 (1,63) ... 
Age Group 2 5.70 (1,57) * 0.88 (1,66) 
Age Group 3 38.64 (1,148) *** 0.18 (1,115) 
Promise Stranger Age Group 1 0.03 (1.45) 4.74 (1.49) * 
Age Group 2 9.49 (1.42) ** 0.05 (1,58) 
Age Group 3 21.85 (1.125) *** 0.00 (1,85) 
Promise Children Age Group 1 3.40 (1.51) 0.50 (1,54) 
Age Group 2 11.54 (1.54) ** 0.020.58) 
Age Group 3 39.72 (1.144) *** 0.97 (1.111) 
Tell Truth Age Group 1 3.14 (1.53) 1.38 (1.53) 
Age Group 2 12.370.54) ** 0.70 (1,57) 
Age Group 3 27.09 (1.144) *** 6.54 (1.107) * 
Amnation Age Group 1 0.01 (1,63) 14.64 (1,67) .... 
Age Group 2 4.44 (1,60) .. 3.01 (1,67) 
Age Group 3 28.60 (1,162) ... 0.40 (1,122) 
Help Parents Age Group 1 0.96 (1.55) 6.34 (1.57) * 
Age Group 2 11. 75 (1,53) ** 0.06 (/,59) 
Age Group 3 11.16 (1,145) ** 0.01 (1.111) 
Save Friend Age Group 1 0.37 (1.50) 13.32 (1.55) ** 
Age Group 2 0.25 (1.53) 7.50 (1.56) ** 
Age Group 3 20.09 (1.139) *** 0.06 (1.96) 
Life Age Group 1 0.02 (1,58) 2.23 (1,61) 
Age Group 2 1.27 (1,60) 3.15 (1,56) 
Age Group 3 14.50 (1,IS0) "U 0.14 (1,108) 
Save Stranger Age Group 1 0.02 (1.39) 0.06 (1.41) 
Age Group 2 0.77 (1.35) 4.16 (1.40) * 
Age Group 3 11.40(1.111) ** 3.55 (1.74) 
Stay Alive Age Group 1 0.13 (1.52) 6.46 (1.53) * 
Age Group 2 4.75 (1.35) • 0.54 (1.43) 
Age Group 3 11.80 (1.118) ** 0.20 (1.86) 
Property & Law Age Group 1 7.73 (1,62) .... 0.02 (1,68) 
Age Group 2 15.26 (1,61) ...... 0.01 (1,62) 
Age Group 3 27.19 (1,161) ...... 0.61 (1,118) 
Not Stealing Age Group 1 0.10 (1.57) 3.38 (1.64) 
Age Group 2 2.56 (1.49) 0.12 (1.52) 
Age Group 3 5.22 (1.126) * 1.01 (1.101) 
Obey Law Age Group 1 10.350.51) ** 1.53 (1.56) 
Age Group 2 21.760.49) *** 1.66 (1.53) 
Age Group 3 44.03 (1.126) *** 0.01 (1.91) 
Legal Justice Age Group 1 0.50 (1,50) 3.15 (1,51) 
Age Group 2 15.87 (1,49) ...... 3.67 (1,55) 
Age Group 3 26.56 (1,114) ...... 2.04 (1,89) 
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Table 2.8: Swnmary ANOVA statistics for SRM-SF values and items between Age Groups within participant samples: 
Age Group Comparisons 
1&2 2&3 1&3 
F(dt) F (dt) F(dt) 
Contract & Truth Offenders 0.05 (1,57) 0.09 (1,112) 0.31 (1,112) 
c3 Non-Offenders 9.22 (1,60) • * 1.94 (1,115) 26.64 (1,117) *** 
'l! Non-Offenders 3.29 (1,75) 0.13 (1,77) 4.14 (1,74) * 
Promise Friend Offenders 0.59 (1.57) 0.83 (1,99) 0.00 (1,98) 
r3 Non-Offenders 6.79 (1,56) • 2.16 (1,106) 25.03 (1,106) ••• 
'l! Non-Offenders 0.64 (1,73) 0.01 (1,75) 0.77 (1,72) 
Promise Stranger Offenders 0.46 (1,43) 3.29 (1,86) 1.47 (1,91) 
r3 Non-Offenders 5.30 (1,44) • 2.96 (1,81) 14.09 (1,79) ••• 
'l! Non-Offenders 0.10 (1,63) 4.29 (1,62) • 4.04 (1,55) • 
Promise Children Offenders 0.020,56) 0.140,94) 0.34 (1,92) 
c3 Non-Offenders 3.92 (1,49) a 0.29 (1,104) 9.18(1,103) •• 
<f> Non-Offenders 2.22 (1,63) 0.04 (1,65) 1.33(1,62) 
Tell Truth Offenders 0.41 (1,62) 0.73 (1,99) 0.09 (1.99) 
r3 Non-Offenders 2.81 (1,45) 0.45 (1.99) 6.02 (1.98) • 
~ Non-Offenders 5.13 (1,65) • 0.71 (1,65) 2.49 (1,62) 
Affiliation Offenders 0.03 (1,63) 3.42 (1,109) 2.68 (1,110) 
r3 Non-Offenders 3.13 (1,60) 8.70 (1,113) u 28.83 (1,115) u. 
~ Non-Offenders 0.41 (1,74) 0.46 (1,76) 2.68 (1,74) 
Help Parents Offenders 0.02 (1,58) 2.21 (1,95) 2.52 (1,99) 
c3 Non-Offenders 6.750,50) • 0.06 (1,103) 9.84 (1,101) •• 
<f> Non-Offenders 1.04 (1,66) 0.52 (1,67) 3.35 (/,67) 
Save Friend Offenders 0.07 (1,52) 2.07 (1,99) 1.10 (1,97) 
c3 Non-Offenders 0.73 (1,5/) 14.36 (1,93) ••• 21.40 (1,92) ••• 
~ Non-Offenders 0.00 (/,60) 1.07 (1,59) 1.54 (1,59) 
Life Offenders 0.11 (1,56) 0.93 (1,102) 1.84 (1,104) 
r3 Non-Offenders 1.41 (1,51) 3.14 (1,97) 13.33 (1,104) *.* 
~ Non-Offenders 5.48 (1,66) * 0.02 (1,67) 5.87 (1,65) * 
Save Stranger Offenders 1.35 (1,36) 1.08 (1,73) 0.00 (1,75) 
r3 Non-Offenders 0.02 (1,38) 5.95 (1,73) • 4.99 (/,75) • 
~ Non-Offenders 7.25 (/,43) • 2.07 (1,41) 0.23 (1,40) 
Stay Alive Offenders 2.080,48) 0.04 (1,83) 2.600,89) 
c3 Non-Offenders 10.740,39) •• 0.15 (1,70) 16.31 (1,81) ••• 
'l! Non-Offenders 0.86 (1,57) 0.86 (1,59) 3.84 (1,58) < 
Property & Law Offenders 0.23 (1,63) 3.11 (1,111) 1.60 (1,110) 
r3 Non-Offenders 0.54 (1,60) 0.99(1,111) 3.19(1,113) 
~ Non-Offenders 0.50 (1,72) 4.05 (1,71) • 10.83 (1,73) .. 
Not Stealing Offenders 0.08 (1,52) 0.35 (1,96) 0.08 (1,98) 
c3 Non-Offenders 0.81 (1,54) 0.24 (1,92) 2.13 (1,98) 
~ Non-Offenders 0.16 (1,62) 1.33 (1,61) 0.93 (1,67) 
Obey Law Offenders 0.10 (1,5/) 2.14(1,88) 1.46 (1,87) 
r3 Non-Offenders 1.63 (1,49) 0.51 (1,87) 5.18 (1,90) • 
~ Non-Offenders 2.55 (1,60) 6.48 (1,57) • 22.34 (1,57) ••• 
Legal Justice Offenders 5.89 (I,SO) * (-ve) 1.10 (1,7S) 1.11 (1,77) 
c3 Non-Offenders S.22 (1,49) • 1.32 (1,88) 13.S0 (1,87) ... 
<f> Non-Offenders 1.37 (1,57) 3.89 (1,56) " 0.83 (1,53) 
a.b = Both approach statistical slgruficance at p 0.053 
C Approaches statistical significance at p =0.055 
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2.55i. Differences in SRM-SF Value and Item Means between Participants within Age Groups 
In Age Group 1, none of the differences between offenders and male non-offenders were statistically 
significant except for the "Property and Law" value and the individual item "Obeying the law" -
where male non-offenders had significantly higher means than offenders. Female non-offenders had 
significantly higher means than male non-offenders on the "Affiliation" value and on five of the 
eleven individual questionnaire items ("Keeping a promise to a friend", "Keeping a promise to a 
stranger", "Helping parents", "Saving the life of a friend" and living even if you don't want to). In 
Age Group 2, male non-offenders demonstrated significantly higher means than offenders on four of 
the five sociomoral values (All those except "Life") and on eight of the eleven individual 
questionnaire items (all those except "Saving the life of a friend", "Saving the life of a stranger" and 
''Not taking things that belong to others"). In this age group, differences between male and female 
non-offenders were statistically significant for one individual item only: "Saving the life of a friend" 
where female non-offenders demonstrated significantly higher means than male non-offenders. In 
Age Group 3, male non-offenders had significantly higher mean scores than offenders on all 
sociomoral values and all individual items save for "How important is it not to Steal?" No significant 
differences between male and female non-offenders were found except for the item "Telling the 
truth". On this item male non-offenders demonstrated significantly higher mean scores than female 
non-offenders. 
2.55ii. Differences in SRM-SF Value and Item Means across Age Groups by Participant Type 
From Table 2.8 it can be seen that for offenders, between age-group differences were not significant 
for any of the sociomoral values or individual items except for differences in the means of the "Legal 
Justice" value between Age Groups I and 2. For this value, means in Age group 2 were significantly 
lower than those in Age Group 1. For male non-offenders, significant between age-group differences 
were found between Age Groups 1 and 2 for the "Life" and "Legal Justice" values (in both cases 
older participants having higher means) and 5/11 individual questionnaire items ("Keeping a promise 
to a friend", "Keeping a promise to a stranger", "Helping parents", "Staying alive" and 'judges 
sending people to jail". Male non-offender mean scores differed significantly between Age Groups 2 
and 3 for the "Affiliation" value and for the items "Saving the life of a stranger" and "living even if 
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you don't want to" (with means in age Group 3 being significantly higher than those in Age Group 2). 
Male non-offender means differed significantly between Age Groups I and 3 for all of the values 
except "Property and Law" and for all items except "not taking things that belong to others". For 
female non-offenders significant differences were found between Age Groups 1 and 2 for one value 
only - "Life" (females in Age Group 2 having higher means than those in Age Group 1) and for the 
items "Telling the truth" and "Saving the life of a stranger" (in both cases females in Age Group 2 had 
higher means than those in Age Group 1). Differences between Age Groups 2 and 3 were found for 
the value "Property and Law" and for the items "Keeping a promise to a stranger" and "obeying the 
law" (with females in Age Group 3 having higher means than those in Age Group 2). Female non-
offender means differed between Age Group 1 and Age Group 3 on the values "Contract and Truth", 
"Life" and "Property and Law" and also on the items "Keeping a promise to strangers" and "Obeying 
the law" (females in Age Group 3 having higher means on these variables than those in Age Group 1). 
2.56. Comparisons between Values and Intra-Value Items within the SRM-SF, by Participant Group 
Paired t-tests were carried out to compare mean differences in scores between the SRM-SF socio-
moral values and also between the intra-value item comparisons for each of the participant groups. 
Summary statistics for the related t-tests groups are presented in Tables 2.9 and 2.10. Key findings of 
note from the analyses are described on page 50, following the tables. 
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Table 2.9 Summary statistics from SRM-SF inter-value comparisons using paired t-tests: 
Value Comparisons Participants t df Si~. 
Contract and Truth / Affiliation Offenders -1.078 143 ns 
Male Non-Offenders 2.919 146 p<0.01 
Female Non-Offenders -.185 113 ns 
Contract and Truth / Life Offenders -2.114 133 p<0.05 
Male Non-Offenders 3.446 128 p..:O.Ol 
Female Non-Offenders .721 100 ns 
Contract and Truth / Property and Law Offenders 8.004 144 p<0.001 
Male Non-Offenders 5.195 144 P<O.OOI 
Female Non-Offenders 4.929 109 p<0.001 
Contract and Truth / Le~al Justice Offenders 5.852 103 p<0.001 
Male Non-Offenders 3.444 114 p<0.01 
Female Non-Offenders 6.260 84 p<0.001 
Affiliation / Life Offenders -1.333 130 ns 
Male Non-Offenders 1.203 127 ns 
Female Non-Offenders 1.229 99 ns 
Affiliation / Property and Law Offenders 7.823 141 p<0.001 
Male Non-Offenders 2.625 142 0<0.01 
Female Non-Offenders 4.430 108 p<0.001 
Affiliation / Le~al Justice Offenders 5.753 101 i)<0.001 
Male Non-Offenders 1.853 112 ns 
Female Non-Offenders 6.234 83 p<0.001 
Life / Property and Law Offenders 8.979 131 0<0.001 
Male Non-Offenders .972 124 ns 
Female Non-Offenders 3.109 95 p<0.01 
Life / Le~al Justice Offenders 6.742 94 p<0.001 
Male Non-Offenders 1.091 96 ns 
Female Non-Offenders 5.026 71 0<0.001 
Pro~ and Law / Le~al Justice Offenders -1.035 103 ns 
Male Non-Offenders .000 III ns 
Female Non-Offenders 2.006 81 p<0.05 
Table 2.10: Swnmary statistics from SRM-SF intra-value item comparisons using paired t-tests: 
Values Item Comparisons Participants t df Sig. 
Contract and Truth Promise Friend / Promise Stranger Offenders 1.555 102 Ns 
Male Non-Offenders 2.370 99 »<0.05 
Female Non-Offenders 3.655 90 p<0.001 
Promise Friend / Promise Children Offenders -0.174 109 Ns 
Male Non-Offenders -3.502 119 p<0.01 
Female Non-Offenders -1.062 94 Ns 
Promise Friend / Tell Truth Offenders 2.639 117 0<0.01 
Male Non-Offenders 2.176 115 0<0.05 
Female Non-Offenders 6.627 95 p<0.001 
Promise Stranger / Promise Children Offenders -\,422 97 Ns 
Male Non-Offenders -4.244 91 -:P<O.OOI 
Female Non-Offenders -2.973 76 p<0.01 
Promise Stranger / Tell Truth Offenders 0.686 101 Ns 
Male Non-Offenders -0.213 87 Ns 
Female Non-Offenders 3.330 77 p<0.01 
Promise Children / Tell Truth Offenders 2.841 109 0<0.01 
Male Non-Offenders 4.959 110 p<0.001 
Female Non-Offenders 6.088 83 0<0.001 
Affiliation Help Parents / Save Friend Offenders -0.186 111 Ns 
Male Non-Offenders 0.614 103 Ns 
Female Non-Offenders -2.476 79 p<0.05 
Life Save Stranger / Stay Alive Offenders -0.351 73 Ns 
Male Non-Offenders -1.284 64 Ns 
Female Non-Offenders -2.261 52 p<0.05 
Property and Law NotStealing/Obe~gLaw Offenders -0.063 96 Ns 
Male Non-Offenders -5.641 95 p<0.001 
Female Non-Offenders -2.691 76 0<0.01 
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2. 56i. Findings from SRM-SF inter-value comparisons: 
For the offenders, paired comparisons of the SRM-SF socio-moral values revealed the following 
findings: "Contract and Truth had statistically higher means than "Life", "Property and Law" and 
"Legal Justice"; "Affiliation" had statistically higher means than "Property and Law" and "Legal 
Justice"; "Life" had statistically higher means than "Property and Law" and "Legal Justice". None of 
the other inter-value comparisons were statistically significant. Within the value of "Contract and 
Truth" the items "Keeping a promise to a friend" and "Keeping a promise to a child" both had 
significantly higher means than the item "Telling the truth". For the male non-offenders, paired 
comparisons of the SRM-SF socio-moral values revealed the following findings: "Contract and 
Truth" had significantly higher means than all other values under consideration; "Affiliation" had 
significantly higher means than "Property and Law". None of the other paired inter-value 
comparisons were statistically significant. Within the value of "Contract and Truth" the item 
"keeping a promise to a friend" had significantly higher means than all other intra-value items and the 
item "Keeping a promise to children had significantly higher means than "keeping a promise to a 
stranger". Within the "Property and Law" value, the item "Obeying the law had significantly higher 
means than the item "not taking things that belong to others". For the female non-offenders paired 
comparisons of the SRM-SF socio-moral values revealed the following findings: "Contract and 
Truth", "Affiliation" and "Life" all had significantly higher means than the "Property and Law" and 
"Legal Justice" values, the "Property and Law value had significantly higher means than the "Legal 
Justice" value. Within the "Contract and Truth" value "Telling the truth" had significantly lower 
means than all other items, "Keeping a promise to a friend" and "Keeping a promise to a child" had 
significantly higher means than "Keeping a promise to a stranger". Within the "Affiliation" value, 
"Saving the life of a friend" had significantly higher means than "Helping parents", within the "Life" 
value "Living even if you don't want to" had significantly higher means than "saving the life ofa 
stranger" and within the "Property and Law" value "Obeying the law" had significantly higher means 
than "Not taking things that belong to others". 
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2.57 Factor Analyses ofSRM-SFitems 
Some previous researchers have carried out investigations of the internal structure of the SRM-SF 
through the use of reliability analyses and Factor Analysis. Due to the high attrition rate on some of 
the SRM-SF items in this sample it was inappropriate to carry out a reliability analysis, as this would 
entail replacing a substantial number of missing values in the scale (please see the discussion for 
elaboration of this point). 
Investigation of the internal structure of the SRM-SF was carried out for the whole sample by Factor 
analysis using Alpha factoring (excluding missing values pair-wise) with Varimax rotation. This 
technique extracted two factors with Eigenvalues greater than 1.000 (Eigenvalue for Factor 1= 4.129 
accounting for 37.54% of variance; Eigenvalue for Factor 2=1.051, accounting for 9.56% of the 
variance). This technique was repeated for the non-offending sample only, also resulting in the 
extraction of two factors with Eigenvalues over 1.000 (Eigenvalue for Factor 1=3.900, accounting for 
35.46% variance; Eigenvalue for Factor 2=1.107, accounting for 10.06% variance). Finally, the 
technique was carried out for the male sample only (offenders and non-offenders) Once again the 
technique extracted two factors with Eigenvalues over 1.000 (Eigenvalue I = 4.362, accounting for 
39.65% of the variance, Eigenvalue 2 = 1.043, accounting for 9.48% of variance). Item loadings on 
the factors for each of the three analyses are presented in Tables 2.11 -2.13 below. Interpretation of 
the factors follows the tables. 
Table 2.11 Item loadings for factor analysis carried out amongst the participant sample as a whole: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Item Load Item Load 
Obeying the law .69 Keeping a promise to a stranger .72 
TeUing the truth .60 Keeping a promise to a friend .~9 
Judges sending people to jail .56 Not taking things that belong to others .46 
Living even if you don't want to .48 Saving the life of a friend .45 
Helping parents .43 Keeping a promise to a child .41 
Keeping a promise to a child .42 Helping parents .37 
Saving the life of a friend .35 Judges sending people to jail .32 
Saving the lifo of a stranger .33 Saving the life of a stranger .26 
Keeping a promise to a friend .24 Living even if you don't want to .25 
Keeping a promise to a stranger .23 Obeying the law .23 
Not taking things that belonKto others .19 Telling the truth .17 
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Table 2.12: Item loadings for factor analysis carried out amongst non-offenders only: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Item Load Item Load 
Keeping a promise to a stranger .68 Obeyin2 the law .85 
Saving the life of a friend .57 Judges sending people to jail .54 
Keeping a promise to a friend .53 Telling the truth .44 
Keeping a promise to a child .46 ,S'aving the life of a stranger .32 
Helping parents .44 Living even if you don't want to .32 
Saving the life of a stranger .44 Helping parents .31 
Not taking things that belong to others .42 Keeping a promise to a child .29 
Living even if you don't want to .41 Keeping a promise to a friend .23 
Judges sending people to jail .30 Not taking things that belong to others .J9 
Telling the truth .29 Saving the life of afriend .17 
ObeyinR the law .J2 KeepinR a promise to a stranRer .11 
Table 2.13: Item loadings for factor analysis carried out amongst males only: 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Item Load Item Load 
Obeying the law .66 Keeping a promise to a stranger .71 
Judges sending people to jail .64 Keeping a promise to a friend .62 
Telling the truth .59 Not taking things that belong to others .50 
Living even if you don't want to .54 Keeping a promise to a child .39 
Helping parents .48 Saving the lifo ofafriend .39 
Keeping a promise to a child .46 Judges sending people to jail .33 
Saving the life ofafriend .39 Helping parents .31 
Saving the life of a stranger .37 Obeying the law .24 
Keeping a promise to a stranger .31 Telling the truth .24 
Keeping a promise to afriend .25 Saving the life of a stranger .21 
Not taking things that belong to others .19 Living even if you don't want to .18 
Broadly speaking, interpretation of the factors seems to indicate some discrimination between a 
"truth, law and justice" domain and a "life and relationships" domain. The relative weights of these 
domains vary according to the participant sample being compared. Amongst the participant sample as 
a whole, and amongst the males only, the items that load highest on Factor 1 are "Obeying the law", 
"Judges sending people to jail" and "telling the truth". In contrast, amongst the non-offenders, items 
that load highest on Factor 1 are "Keeping a promise to a stranger", "Saving the life of a friend" and 
"Keeping a promise to a friend", with the "truth, law and justice" issues loading on Factor 2. There is, 
however, one item loading that would appear to conflict with this interpretation of the factors. The 
item "How important is it not to take things that belong to other people?" loads on the "life and 
relationships" domain rather than on the "truth, law and justice domain". 
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2.58. Evaluation of "Importance" Ratings ofSRM-SF Items: All Participants 
Counts were made of the ratings given by participants of the "importance" of each of the items - 1.e. 
whether the item was evaluated as "very important", "important" or not important". Previous studies 
that have carried out this task (e.g. Gregg, Gibbs & Basinger 1994; Palmer & Hollin 1998) have 
combined the "important" and "very important" counts into one category in order to be able to 
compare these ratings with the "not important" counts in a 2-by-2 Chi-Square analysis. In the current 
study, however, it was noted whilst tallying the importance ratings that a number of participants had 
chosen the "important" category as a way of expressing uncertainty about the importance of the item. 
For example, some participants had circled the "important" category but had then gone on to say "it's 
sometimes important" and sometimes not important". As in previous studies, the purpose of this 
exercise was to gain a measure of the levels of consensus amongst participants about the importance 
of the SRM-SF items - in order to establish that these items represent commonly held moral values. 
It was felt that only those responses where participants were unequivocal about the importance of the 
item should be categorised as representing consensus. Therefore, responses where participants 
expressed doubt were categorised as belonging to the "not important" category for the purposes of Chi 
Square analyses. The percentages of participants in each group rating items as unequivocally 
"important/very important" are presented in table 2.14 below: 
Table 2.14: Percentage mtings ofSRM-SF items as unequivocally "important" by participant group. 
All Ages Male Female 
Offenders Non-Offenders Non-Offenders Total 
(n=147) (n=149) (n=117) (n=413) 
Item n % n % n % n % 
Promise Friend 131 89.1% 147 98:]1110 116 99.1% 394 95.4% 
Promise Stranger 78 53.1% 119 79.9% 103 88.0% 300 72.6% 
Promise Children 138 93.9% 142 95.3% 112 95.7% 392 94.9% 
Tell Truth 104 70.7% 124 83.2% 106 90.6% 334 80.9% 
Help Parents 129 87.8% 138 92.6% 110 94.0% 377 91.3% 
Save Friend 144 98.0% 146 98.0% 112 95.7% 402 97.3% 
Save Stranger 116 78.9% 121 81.2% 99 84.6% 336 81.4% 
Stay Alive 94 63.9% 86 57.7% 74 63.2% 254 61.5% 
Gibbs Steal J31 89.1% 146 98.0% 117 100.0% 394 95.4% 
Obey Law 114 77.6% 129 86.6% 104 88.9% 347 84.0% 
Judges Jail 87 59.2% 109 73.2% 96 82.1% 292 70.7% 
A high proportion of participants rated most of the items unequivocally as "very important" or 
"important". However, the level of consensus for some items was lower than that reported in 
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previous studies (e.g. Gregg, Gibbs & Basinger, 1994, where a minimum of 88% from any participant 
group rated an item as important). There were some apparent differences between groups in the 
importance ratings of items. For most items, Female non-offenders had the highest percentage of 
participants rating items as unequivocally important, followed by male non-offenders, then male 
offenders. Chi Square analyses were carried out to compare between group differences in importance 
ratings for items. The results of the Chi Square analyses are presented in Table 2.15: 
Table 2.IS: Chi-Square statistics from comparisons of "importance" ratings of SRM-SF items by participant group: 
Item Offenders! Male non-offenders! 
Male Non-Offenders Female non-offenders 
Promising Friend '1 =11.80; df=l; p<0.01 i=0.14; df=l; ns 
Promising Stranger '1 -23.88; df -I; p<0.001 X'-3.17; df=l; ns 
Promising Child X = 0.29; df=l; ns i=0.27; df=l; ns 
Telling Truth i - 6.SI; df -I; p<O.OS i-3.0S; df -I; ns 
Helping Parents 't-1.98;df-l;ns 't-0.20; df=l; ns 
Saving Friend i= 0.00; df=l; ns x: = I.lS; df=l; ns 
Saving Stranger 't= 0.2S; df -I; ns i-0.47; df=l; ns 
Staying Alive i= 1.20; df=l; ns 1.'=0.84; df=l; ns 
Not Stealing X = 9.69; df=l; p<0.01 i=2.38; df=l; ns 
Obeying Law '1 -4.l0;df-l;p<0.OS 't-0.32; df -I; ns 
Judges Jailing '1 = 6.46; df=l; p<O.OS 't =2.94; df=l; ns 
Results of Chi Square analyses comparing the ratings of importance of items of offenders and male 
non-offenders were statistically significant for the following items: "Keeping a promise to a friend", 
"Keeping a promise to a stranger", ''Telling the truth", "Not taking things that belong to other 
people", "Obeying the law" and "Judges sending people to jail" (In all cases a higher proportion of 
non-offenders than offenders rating these items as "important"). None of the chi-square analyses 
comparing the importance ratings of male and female non-offenders were statistically significant. 
2.6 DISCUSSION 
The initial results comparing the participant groups correspond to the now established body of work 
that has identified differences between offenders and non-offenders on a variety of sociocognitive 
variables. Overall, offenders had significantly lower mean SRM-SF scores than male non - offenders. 
Furthermore, each of the SRM-SF items successfully discriminated between the offending and non-
offending males. Finally, offender mean scores were particularly low for those SRM-SF items 
relating to offending behaviour and to the item "Telling the truth". On the face of it then, the 
preliminary findings would apparently lend support to evidence which suggests that offenders are 
demonstrating developmental delay in moral reasoning in relation to their non-offending peers. On 
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further investigation, however, some interesting findings emerged that raised questions regarding the 
interaction between offence status, gender, age and the variables under consideration. 
When analysing the participant sample as a whole, no significant gender differences in SRM-SF mean 
scores were found among the non-offending sample. Comparison of individual SRM-SF sociomoral 
values and items across genders within the non-offender samples also failed to reveal significant 
gender differences favouring females to the extent that has been reported by some studies (e.g. Gregg 
et ai, 1994; Palmer & Hollin 1998). There were significant differences favouring females on the 
"Affiliation" and "Life" values, and also on the individual item "Saving the life of a friend". 
However, these differences did not seem to reflect a consistent gender pattern across the 
questionnaire; males had higher scores than females on about half of the SRM-SF items, and had 
significantly higher scores on the item 'Telling the truth". 
Although no gender differences were found in SRM-SF scores taking the participant sample as a 
whole, once the participants were categorised according to age groups, significant gender differences 
did emerge in the youngest age group category, with females demonstrating significantly higher 
SRM-SF means than the non-offending males. Gender differences in the overall SRM-SF scores 
favouring females were no longer evident in either of the older 2 age group categories. This 
corresponds with those previous findings (e.g. Gibbs et ai, 1992; Basinger et ai, 1995; Ferguson & 
Cairns, 1996) that have found that gender differences favouring females on the SRM-SF are present 
only in early adolescence. 
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2.61 Problems Discriminating between Offender and Male Non-Offender Means in Age Group 1 
In the youngest age group category, comparison of SRM-SF means failed to discriminate between the 
male offenders and non-offenders. Amongst the youngest males, there was little indication that the 
overall moral reasoning of offenders was "immature" in relation to that of non-offenders. By and 
large, the SRM-SF item means of offenders and non-offenders were very similar: both groups having 
item means that indicated a predominance of Kohlbergian Stage 2 reasoning. The one exception to 
this was to the SRM-SF item mean "Obeying the law", where non-offenders demonstrated 
significantly higher means than male non-offenders. Clear differences discriminating between male 
offenders and male non-offenders on the SRM-SF only emerged in the older age categories. 
The sample sizes in the younger age - group categories were comparatively small, so results relating 
to these groups should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, the failure to find differences 
between male offenders and non-offenders in SRM-SF means in Age Group 1 is potentially 
interesting. It is of course possible that the lack of differences in means of offender males and non-
offender males in the youngest age group category is idiosyncratic to the current study. Gregg et ai, 
(1994) in their comparison of the means of offenders and non-offenders, attempted to obtain a "clean" 
non-delinquent sample by eliminating those students perceived by teachers as exhibiting conduct 
disorders. No conscious attempt was made to "clean" the non-offending sample in the current study. 
It may have been the case that amongst the younger "non-offending" males in this sample there were 
a higher proportion of those who "had not yet offended" or "had not yet been caught" relative to ''true 
non-offenders" than in the older age groups. However, all of the non-offenders in the current study 
were in mainstream education at the time of the study and completed the SRM-SF in class as a 
voluntary exercise. A certain amount of "cleaning" of the non-offending sample would probably have 
occurred by default. Those pupils excluded or suspended from class for challenging behaviour at the 
time of the study were naturally eliminated from the sample - they were not present in school to carry 
out the task. It is also reasonable to assume that at least some persistent truants were absent from 
school at the time of the study. Furthermore, it is plausible that the youngest offenders in the current 
study may actually have been comparatively more "antisocial" in terms of persistent offending 
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behaviour than some ofthose in the older age group categories, bearing in mind that this group of 
adolescents had already been convicted by the courts at a very young age. 
Categorising both non-offenders and offenders according to age groups may have raised issues that 
have not been highlighted in previous research using the SRM-SF. As was reported when presenting 
the overview to the measures, researchers comparing scores of offenders and non-offenders on the 
SRM-SF have often used participant samples with rather broad age ranges. The typical findings are 
that adolescent offenders seem to be "immature" in terms of moral reasoning in comparison with their 
non-offending peers. These fmdings are generally accompanied by evidence indicate that adolescent 
non-offenders are demonstrating at least some use of mature "Stage 3" reasoning, whereas the 
offenders seem to be exhibiting a predominance of "Stage 2" reasoning. However, it is presumably 
the inclusion of older non-offending adolescents in samples that enable this distinction to be made. It 
is hardly surprising that amongst a group of younger adolescent males that both non-offender and 
offender groups' moral reasoning scores indicate a predominance of Kohlbergian Stage 2 reasoning -
this represents the norm for males in this age group, and previous work indicates that offenders' moral 
reasoning is best characterised by this Stage. On the other hand this then poses a problem when 
considering the utility of summary SRM-SF mean scores alone to discriminate between younger 
males. This issue is critical, especially when considering cognitive interventions with young people. 
Obviously, it is useful to be able to identify moral reasoning deficits amongst older offenders in order 
to point the way towards remedial interventions. Equally, it is apparent that older offenders typically 
have longer criminal histories than younger offenders and are more likely to be "well-established" 
within the criminal justice system. It stands to reason that interventions will stand a greater chance of 
success if the relevant cognitive risk factors are identified as early as possible, before a young person 
has become "entrenched" in offending behaviour. However, it seems from this sample at least that 
Global Moral Stage scores are not in themselves sufficiently sensitive for this purpose. 
Separating out the offenders into distinct Age Groups may have raised a potential issue regarding the 
"global" nature of moral reasoning deficits amongst younger offenders, which wasn't picked up on 
when the offenders were all "lumped together" in one category. The general assumption made by 
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researchers who have identified poor performance amongst offenders on the SRM-SF seems to have 
been that this represents a "pervasive cognitive structural immaturity" (e.g. Gregg et ai, 1994; Palmer 
& Hollin, 1998). However, on the basis of the findings from the current study, one would not be able 
to justify this claim in relation to the youngest offenders. As previously discussed, artefacts of the 
sample and lack of sensitivity of the measure may have created problems in this area. On the other 
hand it may be the case that younger offenders are not very different from non-offenders in terms of 
their overall moral reasoning, but are manifesting specific deficits that are in themselves risk factors 
in terms of global moral development. It was interesting to note that whilst younger offenders and 
male offenders seemed to be similar in SRM-SF scores across much of the questionnaire, the one area 
where non-offenders out-performed offenders was on the "Property and Law" value. Had one relied 
merely on summary SMR-SF mean scores amongst the younger adolescents, one would not have been 
able to identify this specific area of concern. This is of course the one domain that clearly 
differentiates between the two groups in behavioural terms. 
An early disparity in "reasoning about the law" and involvement in criminal activity may have 
considerable knock-on effects resulting in global divergence in moral reasoning in later years. There 
are several reasons why this may be so. For example, persistent offending behaviour is likely to 
reinforce Stage 2 reasoning already present and is not conducive to a progression towards the "Mutual 
and Prosocial" reasoning typical of Stage 3. Criminal activity is more easily justifiable to the offender 
ifhe/she focuses on the pragmatic considerations of the situation rather than on the feelings of the 
victim(s) involved. There is a considerable body of research stretching back decades that 
demonstrates the existence of certain "techniques of neutralization" (Sykes & Matza 1957) and / or 
"cognitive distortions" (see e.g. Goldstein et aI, 1998) that characterise the explanations given by 
offenders when seeking to rationalise or minimise their criminal behaviour. 
Continued involvement in offending behaviour is likely to hinder the development of those "normal" 
social relationships considered essential in order to attain one's potential in terms of moral maturity 
(see e.g. Kohlberg, 1984, pp74-78). There is a substantial body of research demonstrates that 
offending behaviour is associated with membership of deviant peer groups (reviewed in e.g. Rutter et 
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ai, 1998). Regardless of the controversy surrounding the potential causal link between "deviant peer-
groups" and "offending behaviour", one thing seems to be clear: the more that young people engage 
in offending behaviour the more likely it is that they will be interacting with deviant peers; conversely 
it is less likely that they will be forming strong social ties with young people who are part of 
"mainstream" adolescent society. Persistent involvement in offending behaviour is also likely to be 
damaging to existing social relationships, for example by creating conflict within a family 
environment. Finally, it is clear that prolonged participation as a "client" of the criminal justice 
system is itself potentially inhibiting in terms of moral maturation. Kohlberg and colleagues noted at 
a relatively early stage that traditional prisons were unlikely to provide an environment that would 
facilitate mature sociolegal thought (Kohlberg et ai, 1971; Scharf & Hickey, 1976). More recently, 
Taylor and Walker have provided empirical evidence that indicates that "moral climate" may serve as 
a mediating factor in terms of the relative success or failure of intervention programmes conducted in 
an institutional setting (Taylor & Walker, 1998). 
As was pointed out earlier, the failure of the current study to identify global differences in SRM-SF 
scores between younger offenders and non-offenders may well have been idiosyncratic. However it is 
also possible that by treating adolescents of disparate ages as a homogenous group one runs the risk of 
distorting the picture regarding younger offenders' relative performance on the SRM-SF compared to 
their non-offending peers. This issue is one that needs clarification in future research using the SRM-
SF. 
2.62 Patterns ojChange in SRM-SF Scores Observed across Age Groups 
The data obtained from the comparisons of SRM-SF means across Age Groups are cross-sectional, so 
any inferences regarding developmental trends of the participant groups are of course speculative. 
Nevertheless, the comparisons across Age Groups did reveal some interesting findings that are worth 
discussion. As would be predicted on the basis of previous research, non-offender SRM-SF means 
increased across age group categories. For both male and female non-offenders the increase in scores 
between Age Group 1 and Age Group 3 was statistically significant - indicating developmental 
advancement in terms of moral reasoning. This apparent advancement was not reflected amongst the 
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offending sample. Offender mean SRM-SF scores showed little change across the age group 
categories. However, this finding should not be taken as an indication that moral reasoning of 
offenders remains fixed across adolescence. For one thing, it should be remembered that correlations 
between age and SRM-SF scores were statistically significant for all participant groups in the current 
study, including the offenders. This would seem to suggest that at least some developmental 
progression in moral reasoning takes place amongst offending adolescents. Furthermore, the 
offending group demonstrated considerable diversity in a number of important respects (e.g. in terms 
of types and location of settings represented and range of offences committed by participants) that 
may have had differential impacts on SRM-SF scores in the Age Group categories. Nevertheless, the 
findings do seem to suggest that developmental progression in moral reasoning that occurs amongst 
offenders is sluggish in relation to that of non-offenders. 
Patterns of change amongst non-offenders across the age group categories were rather different for 
males than they were for females. Male non-offender SRM-SF means increased significantly across 
all age groups. The increase in male non-offender mean scores was particularly dramatic between age 
category 1 and age category 2 - by Age Group 2, male non-offender means were significantly higher 
than the offenders, and little different from those of the female non-offenders. The increase in scores 
for males non-offenders between Age categories 2 and 3 was also statistically significant. Whilst 
female scores also increased across the age categories, the pattern of increase was much steadier than 
for the males - significant differences were only found for the female scores between Age Group I 
and Age Group 3. 
On the face of it the differences in male and female rates of progression would seem to correspond to 
a pubescent growth spurt occurring in the males. However, this may not be the entire explanation for 
the patterns of gender differences observed. The dramatic rise in male scores between Age Group I 
and Age Group 2 resulted in the males "catching up" with the females~ however, for the males, the 
increase between the scores between Age Group 2 and Age Group 3 was also statistically significant. 
In contrast, the female scores seemed to level-off between Age Group 2 and Age Group 3. In fact, the 
increase in female non-offender scores and offender scores between these two categories was identical 
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in numerical terms (an increase from 262.93 to 272.41 for the female non-offenders, an increase from 
216.26 to 226.87 for the offenders). Male non-offender means were higher than female means in Age 
Group 3. Whilst the difference was only slight (278.74 v 272.41), the standard deviation of the males 
was also higher (4l.14 v 29.31). this might have been an indicator of differential patterns of "mature" 
stage use amongst the males and females. However, it should be noted that in Age Group 3, the 
samples were not well matched in terms of gender - there were much higher proportions of males 
(both offenders and non-offenders) in this category than females - and this may have resulted in a 
certain amount of distortion to the apparent age related trends. 
The finding that the change in mean scores of the male non-offenders increased so dramatically across 
Age groups 1 and 2 is certainly one that should be investigated further, preferably with longitudinal 
data. The fact that it was between these particular two Age Groups that the dramatic increase in moral 
reasoning scores occurred is particularly interesting in terms of a UK context, as it raises an issue 
regarding the role of culture in stimulating moral reasoning. It is possible that the change in males 
may have been partially related to peculiarities of the UK educational system. In terms of school year 
groups, Age Groups 1 and 2 correspond to Year 9 (13-14 year olds) and Year 10 (14-15) respectively. 
The transition from Year 9 to Year lOis a very important one for UK adolescents. At the end of Year 
9, young people have to choose those specialist subjects that they are planning to take for their GCSE 
(16+) exams. In Year 10, young people's school-work starts to "count" towards grades in these final 
exams. Young people are suddenly confronted with the need to make decisions regarding their long 
term future. 
2. 63 Characteristics of the Scale: 
Analysis of the inter-relationships of SRM-SF items revealed that all correlations were statistically 
significant, which may give some indication of the internal consistency of the scale. This was despite 
having subjected the SRM-SF to a blind "item by item" analysis and certain difficulties reported in 
scoring some items. As previously reported, some studies have tested the internal consistency of the 
SRM-SF by carrying out reliability analyses using Chronbach's alpha. Due to the high attrition rate 
on some items, it was felt that it would be inappropriate to carry out this procedure. The reasons for 
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this were as follows: In order to carry out a reliability analysis one would either have had to restrict 
the analysis to the relatively small (and not necessarily representative) subset of the data where every 
participant had provided scorable responses to every item, or one would have had to "replace the 
missing values" in some way. As the SRM-SF is a developmental measure, rather than a Likert scale, 
replacing missing values is problematic. The SRM-SF doesn't have the facility to include a mid-point 
"Not sure" category as many Likert scales do. If one replaced the missing values with an index of the 
item average, say the series median, one would potentially be distorting the picture regarding 
individual participants; if one replaced missing values with participant averages, one would 
potentially be distorting the picture regarding individual items. 
An indication of the relative homogeneitylheterogeneity of the SRM-SF may, however, be arrived at 
through the results of the paired t-tests comparing SRM-SF sociomoral values and items and also 
from the results of the factor analyses. The combined results of the factor analyses and the inter-item 
paired t-tests are interesting, as they indicate that for this sample at least, the SRM-SF was not 
functioning in quite the same way for females as it was for males. Comparisons of the SRM-SF 
scores of the sociomoral values revealed that the questionnaire as a whole appeared to represent a 
more homogenous domain for the male non-offenders than for the other two groups. Paired t-tests 
found fewer significant differences between the values for the male non-offenders than for the 
offenders or female non-offenders. The results of the factor analyses raise issues regarding the 
"unitary" nature of the domain of the SRM-SF. 
Results of the paired t-tests of the sociomoral values revealed that all groups tended to perform less 
well on the "Property and Law" and "Legal Justice" values than on the other values in the SRM-SF. 
This was particularly noticeable for the offenders and for the female non-offenders. The particularly 
low scores on "offence" related items amongst offenders is something that has been noted in previous 
research using the SRM-SF. For example, Gregg et al (1994) found that whilst "Non-delinquents" 
generally gave Stage 3 type reasoning responses to the area related to "Obeying the law", the 
"delinquent" sample generally employed Stage 2 reasoning. Gregg et al point to work by Gibbs et al 
(1984) who noted that although a Stage 2 reasoner may, in general, value law related norms, this 
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valuation is highly conditional. For example the young person may justify upholding the law by a 
reasoning structure such as "you might not get away with it". In the view of Gibbs et al (1984) 
adherence to the law is contingent in the respect that the young person may just as readily access 
instrumental considerations in order to justify law-breaking. On the other hand. the development of 
Stage 3 "Mutual and prosocial reasoning" acts as a "cognitive buffer" against anti-social behaviour. 
However, although the contingent valuation of Stage 2 reasoning may be more conducive to engaging 
in antisocial behaviour, it does not explain why - if "moral judgement" is assumed to represent a 
unitary domain - offenders should demonstrate poorer reasoning on "offence-related" issues than on 
other aspects of the domain. Gregg et al (1994) found evidence to indicate that a substantial minority 
of their predominantly "Stage 2" offending sample were applying "Stage I unilateral and 
physicalistic" reasoning to some of the offence related items in the questionnaire. They noted that 
there may have been a ··situational artifact" accounting in part for their findings as the young 
offenders in their study had been recently convicted and were in the initial assessment phase of a 
custodial sentence (Gregg et ai, 1994). Therefore there may have been an increased tendency to 
describe the consequences of law-breaking in terms of immediate and inevitable outcomes. However, 
Gregg et al (1994) go on to argue that this is unlikely to be the entire explanation, as poor 
performance on offence related items has also been identified amongst offenders who are not 
"incarcerated". They suggested that poorer performance amongst offenders on "law-related" items 
likely to be attributable in part to global deficits in moral reasoning (Gregg et al 1994). 
Unfortunately, they do not expand on this to explain why it should be the "law-related" items (rather 
than those concerning life and relationships) that act as particular identifiers of cognitive immaturity 
in moral reasoning. 
It is of course the case that situational artefacts that may be relevant to "incarcerated" offenders' 
greater tendency to apply "Stage 1" reasoning to law related items also apply to those convicted 
offenders who are not in custody. Any young person who is sentenced by the courts is going to be 
made aware of salient punitive consequences of law-breaking. For example, when a non-custodial 
sentence is imposed on a young person the message "If you do this again you will be sent to jail" is 
one that comes across loud and clear from the Magistrates' bench. It seems plausible, then that 
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situational factors relating to experience of the criminal justice system may have had an impact on the 
performance of the young offenders in the current study on the "law related" values in the SRM-SF. 
Whilst situational factors identified above may have accounted in part for offenders' poorer 
performance on the "law-related" values they fail to account for the comparatively poorer 
performance on these values that was demonstrated by the non-offenders, in particular by females. It 
seems likely that that due to the prevalence of youth crime, the immediate punitive consequences of 
law-breaking are made extremely salient to many adolescents by role models such as teachers and 
parents. One would, then, not be surprised if this impacted on SRM-SF scores even of non-offending 
adolescents. However, it is somewhat surprising that it was amongst the female-non offenders (rather 
than the males) that the greatest disparity in means between the law-related values and the other 
sociomoral values was observed. 
It is possible that some clues to the differential performance of males and females on the "offence -
related" values may be uncovered through examination of the relative variability demonstrated in 
SRM-SF scores by participant groups. Amongst all participants greater variability in SRM-SF scores 
tended to be found amongst those items relating to offending behaviour than to other SRM-SF items 
than to other items in the questionnaire. This greater variability may be an indication of minority 
"Stage 1" use amongst some participants due to situational factors already discussed. However, 
perusal of means and standard deviations ofSRM-SF scores across all items reveals that in general, 
greater variability was evident in male non-offender scores than the other two participant groups. 
It was noted when discussing the findings from Age Groups that the scores and standard deviations 
found for males and females in Age Group 3 may have indicated differential patterns of mature Stage 
3 and Stage 4 use. There may have been two confounding factors accounting for the females' 
apparent poorer performance on the offence related items. If it was the case that there was some 
evidence of minority Stage 1 use amongst all participants, but that a higher proportion of male non-
offenders were making use of "Stage 4" reasoning relative to "Stage 3" reasoning than females, then 
this might account in part for the disparity between the males and the females. However, in order to 
64 
ascertain whether this was indeed the case, one would have to analyse the data in terms of frequencies 
of Stage use, rather than by reference to mean scores alone. 
Inter-item comparisons within the socio-moral values raised some issues regarding the homogeneity 
of these so-called values. In particular, the inter-item comparisons amongst the "Contract and Truth" 
value called into question the validity of including the item "Telling the truth" as part of this domain, 
for adolescents at least. Participants tended to do less well on this item than on other items in the 
sociomoral value. This was particularly noticeable for the offenders and female non-offenders. This 
finding is hardly surprising when applied to the offender group - after all, a great deal of crime carried 
out by young people involves some form of deception. It would also not be terribly surprising if this 
finding applied to adolescents in general. After all, for many adolescents, the development of self-
awareness and independence is likely to involve experimentation with avenues of experience that may 
conflict directly with parental wishes. Therefore, when it comes to telling the truth, for this age 
group, circumstances may frequently arise where pragmatic considerations ride high. However, the 
gender differences amongst the non-offenders relating to the "Truth" item - with females doing 
significantly less well on this item than males - are intriguing as they conflict with those previous 
studies that have compared SRM-SF item scores between male and female non-offenders (c.f. Gregg 
et ai, 1994; Palmer & Hollin, 1998). 
In a comparatively early review of the literature concerning gender differences in honesty, Burton 
(1976) pointed out that whilst a common stereotype of girls was that they were more obedient and 
more "trustworthy" than boys (Burton, 1976, pl8l) the empirical evidence regarding gender 
differences in honesty were conflicting. Burton reviewed several studies that indicated that in certain 
circumstances girls were more likely to cheat than boys (Burton, 1976). More recently, in a study 
carried out by Bear and Stewart (1990) investigating gender differences in perceptions of disciplinary 
interventions for common classroom transgressions, it was found that boys perceived interventions to 
be more acceptable for "cheating" than for "talking and getting out of one's seat". Girls on the other 
hand, tended to rate disciplinary interventions for both types of transgressions as being equally 
acceptable. Bear & Stewart (1990) suggested from these findings that girls were perhaps more likely 
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to view "talking and getting out of one's seat" as being "significantly more wrong" than boys. 
Another possible explanation of course is that boys view "deception" as being comparatively "more 
wrong" than girls. Some indications that this might be the case may be found in the "bullying" 
literature. Bullying in schools is widespread amongst males and females; however, it is well-
documented that the nature of bullying tends to vary according to gender. Boys who bully are more 
likely to engage in overt physical bullying. Girls who bully are more likely to engage in indirect 
"relational aggression" using tactics of rum our, gossip and lies in order to socially exclude their 
victim (see e.g. Crick et ai, 1999). 
The results of the factor analyses differed from the previous finding obtained by Basinger et al (1995), 
who found when validating the measure that the factor structure of the SRM-SF was unidimensional. 
In the current study, Alpha factoring using the whole participant sample identified two factors with 
Eigenvalues over 1.00; this remained the case in Factor analyses carried out on the non-offending 
participant sample only, and also on the male participant sample only. Interpretation of the factors 
revealed that "life and relationship" issues had high loadings on one of the factors, and "truth, law and 
justice" issues had high loadings on the other. Whilst the same two factors emerged in all three factor 
analyses, their weightings were different according to the samples being compared. Amongst the 
participant sample as a whole, and amongst males only, scores on "truth, law and justice" issues 
accounted for much of the variance in the sample -loading high on factor one. This was perhaps 
predictable, as these were the issues where offenders' performance was particularly poor compared to 
their non-offending peers. However, amongst the male and female non-offenders, it was the "life and 
relationships" domain that loaded high on factor one and that accounted for much of the variance in 
the sample. Conversely, "truth, law and justice" issues were ones that loaded on the secondary factor. 
It was interesting to note that whilst few significant differences were observed on item means between 
the male and female non-offenders, the items that loaded high on the "life and relationship" factor 
were ones where females tended to do better than males; conversely, the items that loaded high on the 
"truth, law and justice" factor were ones where males tended to do better than females. 
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Relating the results of the factor analyses to previous research findings is problematic. Aside from the 
initial work carried out by Basinger et al (1995) when validating the SRM-SF, a review of the extant 
literature carried out by the author revealed only one other study (Krettenauer & Becker, 2001) where 
a factor analytic investigation of the SRM-SF had been undertaken. As in the current study, 
Krettenauer and Becker reported that they identified two factors with Eigenvalues over 1.00; however, 
their analysis was carried out on a shortened version of the measure (eliminating the items "Keeping a 
promise to a child", "Children helping their parents" and "Living even if one doesn't want to") and 
factor loadings for individual items were not reported. Neither of the aforementioned studies reported 
how the issue regarding the treatment of missing item responses was addressed. As noted earlier 
when discussing issues relating to the internal consistency of the measure, replacement of missing 
item responses (i.e. unscorable responses) for the purposes of a reliability analysis is problematic for a 
scale such as the SRM-SF. It was pointed out that if one replaced the missing values with an index of 
the item average, one would potentially be distorting the picture regarding individual participants; if 
one replaced missing values with participant averages, one would potentially be distorting the picture 
regarding individual items. Clearly this issue is also relevant when one is considering conducting a 
factor analysis on this type of data set. Whilst the author was unable to resolve this issue when she 
was considering carrying out a reliability analysis using the most recent version of SPSS, she was able 
to resolve the problem when it came to carrying out the Factor analyses by using the technique of 
"excluding missing values pair-wise" (this being an option offered by SPSS for Factor analyses, but 
not for reliability analyses). The studies by Basinger et al (1995) and Krettenauer and Becker (2001) 
present findings obtained from Factor analyses along with those obtained from reliability analyses; 
however, one cannot tell from these studies what "replacement of missing values" strategy was 
adopted for these sets of analyses. Without this information one is unable to draw direct parallels 
from the results of the factor analyses obtained in the current study, and previous research findings. 
As far as the author is aware, there appear to have been only two studies that have presented fmdings 
from factor analyses carried out on all II SRM-SF items (Basinger et ai, 1995, and the current study). 
Basinger et ai, 1995 identified one factor only in their analysis; their findings would need to be 
replicated in order to validate the claim that the SRM-SF is unidimensional. The findings obtained in 
67 
the current study conflict with those of Basinger et al (1995) in that two factors were identified, with 
items relating to offending behaviour (or justice related issues) apparently loading on a different 
factor to the other items in the questionnaire. This issue is one that needs to be clarified in future 
research. 
2.64 Importance Ratings of Items: 
A high proportion of participants evaluated most items as being "important" or "very important". 
However, the percentages rating items as "important" were not as high as ones given in previous 
studies (e.g. Gregg et a11994, Palmer & Hollin, 1998). Clearly, this finding almost certainly results 
from the way in which the "importance" ratings were coded in the current study - where particular 
attention was paid to ensure that only those ratings where participants had rated items as 
"unequivocally important" were assigned to the "important" category. However, it may be the case 
that as a result of coding the "importance ratings" in this way, a genuine difference between 
participants emerged that has not been identified in previous work. Female non-offenders had the 
highest percentages of participants rating items as important, followed by male non-offenders, then 
offenders. Differences between offenders and non-offenders were significant on a number of items, 
with a higher proportion of non-offenders rating items as important. Chi-Square analyses comparing 
male and female non-offenders were not statistically significant; nevertheless, magnitudes of the Chi-
Square Statistic tended to be greater when comparing offenders and female non-offenders than they 
were when comparing offenders and male non-offenders. Barriga et al (2001) point out that it is 
unlikely that moral judgement per se is the only cognitive influence on moral behaviour. They see 
"moral self relevance" as being a potentially important factor. Future studies might want to pay more 
attention to this within the context of the SRM-SF. Clearly evaluation of the "importance" ofa moral 
issue is not a direct or accurate indicator of personally relevant that issue is to an individual. However, 
modifications to the wording of the evaluative part of the SRM-SF item in such a way that does make 
it more personally relevant could be a way of shedding more light on this issue. 
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2.7 CONCLUSION 
The initial analyses carried out on the participant sample as a whole apparently corroborated previous 
results using this measure amongst a similar population sample. However, on further investigation -
with reference to specific Age Group categories- some conflicting findings emerged which are worthy 
of further exploration. Two main areas of concern emerged from the analyses presented in this 
chapter. Firstly, on the basis of the evidence from this sample, the discriminatory power of SRM-SF 
summary mean scores to identify differences in moral reasoning amongst younger male offenders and 
non-offenders was called into question. Secondly, issues were raised regarding the efficacy of overall 
SRM-SF scores to identify potential gender differences within this type of sample. 
Gibbs et al (1992) consider Stage 3, Transition 3-4 and Stage 4 justifications as all representing 
examples of so-called "mature" reasoning. However, when comparing means between groups, Stages 
3, Transition 3-4 and Stage 4 are treated as ascending points along a continuous scale. 
By comparing SRM-SF scores amongst non-offending adults, it might be considered to be relatively 
straightforward to identify potential gender differences in Stage use with reference to summary mean 
scores alone - if one assumed that the majority of adults were using "mature" moral stages. One 
would expect that gender differences in Stage 3 versus Stage 4 reasoning corresponding to the 
Gilligan 1982 hypothesis would be reflected in significantly higher scores amongst males than 
females. However, even amongst adults, reliance on a summary mean score is not necessarily an 
accurate indicator of actual Stage use. It is of course hypothetically possible for someone to have a 
summary mean SRM-SF score that indicates a predominance of Stage 3 reasoning, without having 
given a Stage 3 response to any item in the questionnaire (e.g. by having an equal distribution of 
"Stage 2" and "Stage 4" responses). Amongst adolescents, where intuitively one would predict less 
consistency in "Stage use" than amongst children or adults, this may pose a particular problem. 
Reference to Standard Deviations of mean scores may give one additional clues to the variation of 
Stage use within samples; however, these are merely clues and are hardly satisfactory as a means of 
uncovering accurate patterns of Stage use. 
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Reliance on summary SRM-SF means to compare Stage use between offending and non-offending 
adolescent samples of disparate ages would seem to be particularly suspect. Use of a summary mean 
score amongst this type of population will say little about age related trends within the sample. As 
was pointed out in the overview to the SRM-SF, whereas some researchers have sought to identify 
age related trends amongst non-offending adolescents (e.g. Basinger et ai, 1995), comparatively little 
attention has been paid to the identification of age-related trends amongst offending adolescents. As 
far back as 1990, Nelson et al highlighted the need for longitudinal studies to shed light on the 
question of whether the moral reasoning of offenders is "fixated" or whether it progresses at slower 
rates than that of non-offenders. Clearly, longitudinal studies may represent the "ideal-case" scenario 
in terms of establishing developmental trends amongst young people; however, setting up and 
maintaining longitudinal studies presents considerable practical difficulties that may not be easily 
resolved by the researcher - for example in terms of attrition rates during the course of the study (see 
e.g. Rutter, et al 1998:282-285). Not surprisingly, as in the current study, the bulk of the research that 
has sought to provide insight regarding "cognitive-deficit" versus "developmental-lag" in young 
offenders' reasoning has relied on cross-sectional data. However, it is remarkable to note that in a 
number of studies researchers have apparently failed to notice that the age-range of their offending 
sample may be a potentially relevant - and confounding - factor when seeking to shed light on this 
issue (e.g. Gregg et ai, 1994; Palmer & Hollin, 1998). The results obtained from comparing the males 
in the current study illustrate this problem: - the apparent "immaturity" of offenders being restricted 
to the older Age Group categories. As was pointed out when presenting the results, sample sizes in 
the Age Groups may have had an impact on the findings in the current study. However, potential age 
confounds amongst offending samples would seem to be an area requiring further investigation in 
studies using the SRM-SF. 
It became apparent during the course of the analyses that reliance on mean scores alone may have 
been inadequate in identifying potential gender differences in patterns of "mature" moral stage use. 
Regardless of the controversy surrounding the Gilligan (1982) hypothesis, differences in "mature" 
stage use within a non-offending adolescent sample may present one with a confound that has been 
neglected in the previous research. For example, if, for one reason or another, there are differences 
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within a non-offending adolescent sample in types of "mature" stage use, it will be difficult to 
establish an accurate measure of the relative maturity-immaturity of non-offenders to offenders. One 
could see how this could be particularly problematic if patterns of moral judgement of male and 
female non-offenders conform to the Gilligan (1982) hypothesis. Differences in Stage 3 / Stage 4 
usage would result in inflated means (in terms of moral reasoning maturity) for males compared to 
females and also for male non-offenders compared to male offenders. This, clearly, is an issue that 
requires further investigation. 
As a result of analyses carried in Chapter 2, it became clear that there were issues surrounding the 
SRM-SF requiring attention that were not adequately resolved by treating the measure as a continuous 
scale. In order to clarify some of these issues, it was felt necessary to carry out further statistical 
investigations of the SRM-SF, treating the data in categorical terms. Findings from these analyses are 
presented in Chapter 3, which follows. 
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CHAPTER 3: SUBSEQUENT ANALYSES OF SRM-SF DATA USING ALTERNATIVES TO 
SUMMARY MEAN SCORES 
3.1 Overview 
It will be recalled that in the discussion at the end of Chapter 2, issues were raised about the utility of 
relying on summary mean scores as the sole source of reference for information about patterns of 
moral reasoning between and within participant groups. The further analyses and findings presented 
in this chapter attempt to address some of those issues. The first part of this chapter reviews various 
alternative methods that researchers have commonly used in order to analyse moral reasoning data. 
Some potential advantages and disadvantages of these methods are described, and issues relating to 
the interpretability of some of the associated findings are presented. 
The second part of this Chapter presents the results from the additional analyses that were carried out 
on the SRM-SF data set. Brief overviews of the rationale for and the aims of each of the additional 
analyses are given before presenting the results of the findings. The results are then discussed with 
reference to the findings obtained in Chapter 2 and also with reference to previous research. 
3.11 Issues regarding the use of a "Global Stage Status" Scale as a summary index: 
In Chapter 2, the bulk of the analyses were carried out with reference to SRM-SF mean scores. Gibbs 
et al (1992) consider the summary mean over all SRM-SF items to be the primary index for 
assessment of the SRM-SF. However, as pointed out in the overview to the measure in the 
introduction to this thesis, Gibbs et al (1992) provide an additional index to summary mean scores in 
the form of a "Global Moral Stage Status" scale (GMSS). The GMSS allows one to map the 
summary mean scores onto differential "developmental levels" of moral reasoning. As one finds that 
researchers using the SRM-SF typically relate findings obtained from summary means to "Global 
Moral Stages" it is worth exploring the properties of the GMSS in some detail. 
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The GMSS is a ten-point scale that represents the "developmental vicinity" in which an SRM-SF 
mean score may be located (Gibbs, Basinger & Fuller 1992). Table 3: I shows the relationship 
between SRM-SF protocol scores and GMSS categories. 
Table 3: 1. Relationship between SRM-SF scores and GMSS categories: 
Corresponding Summary Mean 
SRM-SF Protocol Ratings Numerical Score GMSS Categories Point Boundaries 
"Stage 1" 100 Stage 1 100-125 
Transition I (2) 126-149 
''Transition 1-2" 150 Transition 2 (I) 150-174 
"Stage 2" 200 Stage 2 175-225 
Transition 2 (3) 226-249 
''Transition 2-3" 250 Transition 3 (2) 250-274 
"Stage 3" 300 Stage 3 275-325 
Transition 3_(4) 326-349 
''Transition 3-4" 350 Transition 4 (3) 350-374 
"Stage 4" 400 Stage 4 375-400 
Note: Whereas the SRM-SF protocol rating schema only has one "Transitional" category between 
each major stage, the GMSS incorporates two transitional levels between each major stage. The 
application of the term "Transition" to describe intermediate levels between major stages in both 
typologies is perhaps unfortunate and requires further clarification. In the GMSS, "transitional levels" 
are named by the major stage first with the "minor" stage represented in parentheses (Gibbs et aI, 
1992:40). Thus, a GMSS rating of ''Transition 3 (2)" is deemed to represent majority use of Stage 3 
reasoning with minority use of Stage 2 reasoning. 
From Table 3: 1 it can be seen that the range of SRM-SF scores encompassed by the GMSS categories 
are not the same for all developmental levels. The "Stage 2" and "Stage 3" category boundaries have 
twice as large a range as the other GMSS levels. Broadly speaking, aside from "Stage 2" and "Stage 
3", the point boundaries of each GMSS category correspond to quartiles between the major Stages, 
each category having a range of approximately 25 points. For example, the point boundaries of the 
category ''Transition 2(1)" span the range ofSRM-SF scores from 150-174. In terms of proportions 
of pure or major Stage use, this would correspond to a Stage "mix" ranging from 50% Stage 1 use and 
50% Stage 2 use to 26% Stage 1 use and 74% Stage 2 use. The "Stage 2" category spans the range of 
SRM-SF scores from 175-225, and the "Stage 3" category spans the range of SRM-SF scores from 
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275-325. Using the "Stage 3" category as an example, this would correspond to a pure stage mix 
ranging from 75% Stage 3 and 25% Stage 2, to 75% Stage 3 to 25% Stage 4. 
It is also worth noting when considering the point boundaries of the GMSS the way in which scores 
corresponding to Transitional Stages in the SRM-SF typology (i.e. Transition 1-2, Transition 2-3 and 
Transition 3-4) have been assigned to GMSS categories. In each case, scores corresponding to a 
Transitional Stage in the SRM-SF typology are assigned to the higher of the two GMSS Transitional 
levels between each major stage. So, for example, an individual who gives Transition 2-3 responses 
to every item in the SRM-SF would be assigned a mean score of 250, which would correspond to a 
GMSS level of Transition 3(2). By implication then, a 'Transitional Stage" moral justification in 
response to an SRM-SF item is more representative of the higher major Stage than the lower - rather 
than representing an exact mid-point between the two stages. 
On the face of it the GMSS would seem to be a useful tool when seeking to explore differential styles 
of moral reasoning. However, on further examination it appears that representing patterns of moral 
stage use in terms of Global Stage Status may be problematic for a number of reasons. 
Essentially, the utility ofa "Global Stage Status Scale" as an additional summary index depends on its 
potential in terms of representing proportions of "major" and "minor" stage usage. Gibbs et al (1992) 
rationalised their use ofGMSS point boundaries for the SRM-SF as "replicating" those used in their 
earlier Sociomoral Measure. In an article describing the construction and validation of the original 
SRM Gibbs et al (1982) justified their choice of point boundaries as follows: 
"This boundary pattern was selected because it seemed to optimize the construction sample age 
trend" (Gibbs et al' 1982:900) 
However, application of GMSS categories used in the original SRM to represent proportions of stage 
use from SRM-SF data may be inappropriate. In the manual for the SRM-SF, the original SRM from 
which the SRM-SF is described as consisting of "15 items and two moral dilemmas" (Gibbs, et al' 
1992:38). But if one refers back to Gibbs et al (1982) one finds that: 
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"Overall protocol ratings represent the mean stage level of subjects ' scores on eight sociomora/ 
norms" (Gibbs et ai, 1982: 900, emphasis added). However, overall SRM-SF scores represent 
averages over eleven items. It will be recalled that (aside from the broader range GMSS categories of 
"Stage 2" and "Stage 3") the GMSS categories represent percentage quartiles of adjacent major stage 
use. Clearly, percentage quartiles are more meaningful when applied to "averages out of eight 
responses" than they are when applied to "averages out of eleven responses". For example, the 
combinations of either six "Stage 3" responses and two "Stage 2" responses or four "Stage 3" 
responses and four "Transition Stage 2-3 responses would result in a score of 275 if averaged over 
eight norms. This score corresponds to the lower boundary of the GMSS category "Stage 3" (275-
325) which in tum is inclusive of those scores that correspond to at least 75% Stage 3 use. On the 
other hand, the closest one can get to this score using combinations of either Stage 3 and Stage 2 
responses or Stage 3 and Transition Stage 2-3 responses over eleven items is 272.7 (eight Stage 3 
responses and three Stage 2 responses or six Stage 3 responses and three Transition Stage 2-3 
responses), which corresponds to a GMSS of Transition 2(3). The next score up from this attainable 
by using a combination of either "Stage 3" and "Stage 2" responses or "Transition Stage 2-3 and 
Stage 3 responses is 281.8 (combination of either nine Stage 3 responses and two Stage 2 responses 
or seven Stage 3 responses. The shift from an eight norm scale to an eleven item scale also 
potentially impacts in theoretical terms on the interpretation of Transitional ratings. For example, in 
an eight norm scale a score of 250, which represents the lower end of Transition 2(3), relates to either 
four Stage 2 and four Stage 3 responses or to eight Transition 2-3 responses. However, in an eleven 
item questionnaire, this score is unattainable using a pure combination of Stage 2 and Stage 3 
responses, corresponding merely to eleven Transition 2-3 responses. 
It follows from the discussion above that the number of valid responses individuals supply to the 
SRM-SF becomes relevant when considering Global Stage Status. All questionnaires resulting in at 
least seven out of eleven scorable responses are considered valid for analysis and are assigned overall 
scores and GMSS ratings on the basis of overall averages. However, the weightings of individual 
responses to items vary according to the total number of responses given - greater weight being 
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attached to each individual response when seven valid responses are given than when eleven valid 
responses are given. 
Gibbs et al (1982) defined Global Stage Status as follows: 
" .... the global score does not reflect any stage that accounts for less than 25% of the total number ~l 
scoring points assigned to the subject" (Gibbs et ai, 1982:899) 
As was pointed out by Jadack et at (1995) the concept of Global Stage Status relies on the assumption 
that individuals demonstrate relative consistency in moral reasoning across questionnaire items. 
Global Stage Status does not allow for individuals that are demonstrating disparate levels of moral 
reasoning in their questionnaire responses. For example, two Stage 1 responses and six Stage 4 
responses over eight items would result in a score of325, which corresponds to GMSS "Stage 3". 
Over eleven items, two "Stage 1" responses and nine "Stage 4" responses results in a score of 345.5 
corresponding to a GMSS of ' 'Transition 3(4)". Both GMSS ratings indicate a predominance of Stage 
3 reasoning; however, in neither case has a Stage 3 response been offered. The possible response 
pattern described above is not entirely implausible when one considers that the SRM-SF is designed 
to be a group-administerable "pen-to-paper" task and that - as in the current study - test 
administrators may not always be in a position to monitor or probe every individuals' moral 
justifications. 
Aside from the issues discussed above, the broader ranges of the "Stage 2" and "Stage 3" GMSS 
category boundaries relative to the other GMSS levels in the SRM-SF are rather curious bearing in 
mind the potential problems they pose in terms of discriminating patterns of Stage use between 
participant groups. The range of scores encompassed by the "Stage 2" boundary (175-225) makes it 
impossible to discriminate between those who may be "consolidating" Stage 2 reasoning and those 
who may be demonstrating upward transition away from this Stage. The category lumps together 
individuals who "need not" have given any evidence of mature moral reasoning (scores from 175-
200) with those who have "necessarily" started to show at least limited evidence of moral maturity 
(scores from 201-225). In a similar vein, the broad range of the "Stage 3" category boundary (275-
325) does not allow one to discriminate between those who may be consolidating Stage 3 reasoning 
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and those who are demonstrating upward Transition towards Stage 4. Clearly this creates additional 
problems when seeking to explore potential gender differences in patterns of mature stage usc. 
It is clear that there are a number of factors one should consider when using GMSS ratings to 
characterise SRM-SF data. These factors include the relative variance around the summary SRM-SF 
mean, the number of scorable responses supplied to the questionnaire and the appropriateness of the 
point-boundaries of the various GMSS levels. GMSS ratings are commonly presented as reference 
points to accompany SRM-SF summary means in the published research; however, as far as the 
author is aware, none of the issues raised above have, to date, received any attention of note. 
3.12 Use of Modal Stages to Profile Moral Reasoning amongst Participants 
A summary index that Gibbs et al (1992) suggest as an alternative to the summary SRM-SF mean is 
the modal protocol score attained by an individual over the eleven SRM-SF items. 
A clear advantage of the mode over the mean in theoretical terms is, of course, that it allows one to 
treat SRM-SF data in categorical terms rather than as points on a continuous scale. This enables one 
to address issues raised by Gilligan (1982) and others, that Stage 3 and Stage 4 are best thought of as 
different styles of reasoning rather than as occupying different positions in a hierarchical typology. 
Furthermore, by using the mode as a summary index one is ensuring that one is profiling participants' 
moral reasoning with reference to actual scores that individuals have attained, rather than with 
reference to a hypothetical average. However, one of the disadvantages in using the mode is that its 
power as a discriminator of between-group differences in patterns of moral reasoning is rather limited. 
One is restricted to comparisons of the most frequently occurring stage categories between groups. 
Clearly, the observation that two groups have the same or different modal moral stages says little 
about the actual proportions of stage use within and between groups. It follows from this that as with 
the mean, the utility of the mode as a summary representation of participants' moral reasoning styles 
relies in part on the assumption that participants are being relatively consistent in their patterns of 
stage use across questionnaires. For example, if a participant group has a modal response of 
Transition Stage 2-3 but is also demonstrating high variability across questionnaire items then it is 
difficult to make the claim that this group's moral reasoning is "at" Transition Stage 2-3. For one 
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thing, the higher the variability in patterns of Stage use, the higher the likelihood is that the majority 
of participants are using styles of moral reasoning that fall outside the modal stage. 
3.13 Intra-Individual Variation in Patterns of Stage Use 
It has already been noted that the utility of a summary index such as the mean or the mode to 
characterise the moral reasoning ofa participant group may be compromised if there is high inter-
individual variability in scores within that group. Equally, when considering use ofa summary index 
to characterise individuals' moral stage use, patterns of intra-individual variation are relevant. 
Walker & Taylor (1991:330) point out that the "caricature" of the Kohlbergian model implies "a 
strong notion of structural wholeness combined with the notion of sudden radical stage transitions" 
However, it will be recalled from the introduction to this thesis that this "caricature" represents 
Kohlberg's conceptualisation of moral competence, not of moral performance. As Krebs et al (1991) 
note, no stage theory expects all individuals to base all their judgements on one Stage only. 
Furthermore, whilst Kohlberg made claims about structural universalities in moral reasoning, he 
himself acknowledged the potential influence of a variety of mediating factors when considering 
differences in moral reasoning. For example Nisan & Kohlberg (1982), in their longitudinal study of 
moral reasoning in Turkey presented evidence indicating variability in moral reasoning according to 
the type of dilemma being discussed. They found that younger participants from both their "village" 
and "city" samples tended to do less well on dilemmas relating to law and punishment issues than to 
other issues under consideration. Nisan and Kohlberg suggested that lack of familiarity with a formal 
legal system may have partially accounted for their findings. It is also worth noting that the "Just 
Community" approaches that Kohlberg and colleagues applied to their moral reasoning interventions 
in prisons (e.g. Kohlberg, et ai, 1971; Kohlberg et al 1975; Scharf & Hickey, 1976) schools (e.g. Blatt 
& Kohlberg 1975) and the kibbutz (e.g. Snarey et al 1985a; Snarey et ai, 1985 b; Snarey, 1987) relied 
on the assumption that an individual's moral development may be moderated by certain 
environmental, social and educational factors. 
Walker (1989) carried out a longitudinal study designed to test both the Kohlberg and Gilligan models 
of moral reasoning. Walker found no evidence to support Gilligan's hypothesis that Kohlberg's 
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typology was biased against females in terms of Stage 3 versus Stage 4 levels of reasoning. However. 
Walker did find some evidence to indicate that moral orientation (or content of moral judgements 
within stages) may differ according to whether dilemmas involved "real-life" or "hypothetical" 
considerations. Walker found that hypothetical dilemmas elicited more of the so-called "rights" type 
("normative and fairness") orientations and that real life dilemmas elicited more of the "response" 
type ("utilitarian and perfectionism"). Carpendale & Krebs (1992) compared responses of young men 
to typical Kohlbergian moral reasoning dilemmas and dilemmas relating to business decisions. 
Whilst Carpendale & Krebs (1992) found considerable homogeneity within participant scores on two 
Kohlbergian dilemmas, far less internal consistency was demonstrated in terms of participants' moral 
reasoning when comparing scores on the Kohlbergian dilemmas and on the "business" oriented 
dilemmas. Carpendale & Krebs (1992) also found that average moral reasoning scores on the 
"business" dilemmas were lower than on the Kohlbergian dilemmas. 
In a questionnaire such as the SRM-SF where a variety of different issues are under consideration one 
might predict that participants would be less internally consistent than when responding to standard 
Kohlbergian dilemmas. Furthermore, in the current study, there was some evidence from the item 
analyses presented in Chapter 2 to indicate that the nature of the issue under consideration may have 
impacted on response styles to SRM-SF items. For example, results of the paired t-tests of the SRM-
SF sociomoral values presented in Chapter 2 revealed that in general participants tended to perform 
less well on those items relating to offending behaviour. However, one finds when reviewing the 
literature that exploration oftrends in intra-individual variation in moral stage use across the SRM-SF 
is an area that, so far, appears to have been overlooked by researchers. When patterns of variation in 
Stage use have been investigated, these have generally been carried out as inter-item analyses to test 
the internal consistency of the scale, and / or as test / re-test conditions to establish that participants 
demonstrate relative stability in response set over time (e.g. Ferguson et al, 1994; Basinger, et ai, 
1995; Krettenauer & Becker, 2001). Given that one of the basic tenets of the Kohlbergian model is 
that individuals are comparatively structurally consistent in patterns of moral reasoning, it is perhaps 
hardly surprising that researchers testing the SRM-SF have focused their attention on establishing 
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reliability in the measure, rather than on possible sources of variation within individuals: however, 
this is an issue that is worthy of further investigation. 
Information about patterns of intra-individual variation in stage use across different types of 
questionnaire items is useful if one is seeking to explore situational factors that may impact on moral 
reasoning. It is also of relevance when one is attempting to gain insight into potential intrinsic 
mediators of moral reasoning. Thoma & Rest (1999) point out that whilst the bulk of the moral 
reasoning research has focused on a wide range of external environmental factors that may be 
predictive of global changes in moral reasoning, more recently greater attention has started to be paid 
to intra-individual variations in patterns of moral judgement that may be predictive of developmental 
change. Thoma and Rest (1999) draw from earlier work carried out by e.g. Walker & Taylor (1991) 
that has explored intra-individual variations in moral Stage use with reference to patterns of 
"consolidation" and "transition". Walker & Taylor (1991) note in their discussion of Stage transitions 
in moral reasoning that there is some difficulty in the Kohlbergian research in reconciling the concept 
of "Structure" - associated with consistency in moral reasoning and consolidation of an existing Stage 
- with "disequilibrium" - associated with inconsistency in moral reasoning and transition between 
Stages. Walker and Taylor suggested on the basis of findings from their longitudinal (1991) study 
that most individuals' progression in terms of moral development can be characterised as a cyclical 
pattern involving greater or lesser internal consistency in terms of Moral Stage use (Walker & Taylor 
1991:336). This may be assessed with reference to intra-individual variability in stage use with 
reference to their modal stage. High internal consistency is indicated when there is little variability in 
intra-individual stage use across moral reasoning items; this coupled with a negative skew in terms of 
proportion of responses below the mode is seen as being indicative of "consolidation" of an 
individual's modal moral stage. Lesser internal consistency is reflected by high stage "mixture"; this 
combined with a positive skew in terms ofa majority of "subdominant stage responses" being above 
the modal stage (Walker and Taylor, 1991; Thoma & Rest, 1999) is seen as being predictive of 
transition towards a higher stage of moral development. Thoma and Rest (1999) also suggest that 
participants' reliance on a Kohlbergian moral framework as a means of interpreting sociomoral 
situations may vary according to whether they are in a period of "consolidation" or "transition". 
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Thoma and Rest (1999) found evidence to indicate that participants reliance on a Kohlbergian 
framework seemed to be highest when participants were in periods of apparent consolidation rather 
than transition (Thoma & Rest, 1999). Bearing in mind the nature of the sample in the current study 
(adolescents of differing ages rather than adults of similar ages) one would anticipate that at least 
some individuals would be exhibiting developmental progression between one stage and the next and 
that this progression might be reflected in terms of intra-individual variation in Stage use across SRM-
SF items. 
Information about patterns of intra-individual variation in stage use is clearly useful when exploring 
the "situational" impacts on moral reasoning and / or when investigating developmental trends within 
a participant sample. However, such information may also be useful when seeking to gain insight into 
the impact of factors such as gender as mediators on moral reasoning Stage use. For example, in a 
study carried out by Wark and Krebs (1996) where the nature of the moral issue was manipulated, it 
was found that whilst both males and females demonstrated lack of consistency across different types 
of moral dilemmas, females overall tended to be more consistent in their use of moral stage. 
More recently, Haviv & Leman (2002) investigated the relationship between the nature of the moral 
dilemma, gender, gender role and moral reasoning. Haviv & Leman found no significant effect for 
gender per se on moral reasoning stage; however, they did find differences in the strength of pull 
towards 'justice" and "care" content focus according both to the nature of dilemma and according to 
apparent gender role. It would seem then, that investigation into potential between-group differences 
in levels of consistency across the SRM-SF is an avenue worthy of exploration. 
As was pointed out in Chapter 2, a recent meta analysis carried out by Jaffee & Hyde (2000) 
comparing gender differences in moral reasoning found that overall there were only small differences 
between males and females in terms of Stage 3 and Stage 4 reasoning. However, they also noted that 
certain factors appeared to moderate the magnitude of gender differences. These included the age of 
the participants, characteristics of the moral reasoning measure and treatment of data. Jaffee and 
Hyde found that that gender differences increased from childhood to adolescence but decreased 
sharply thereafter. They also noted that "moderately large" gender differences were found for those 
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measures - such as the SRM-SF - that did not make use of a dilemma. Finally, gender differences 
were apparently greatest when moral reasoning data was treated as a "categorical instead of a 
continuous outcome" (Jaffee and Hyde, 2000:720). It would appear then, that treating SRM-SF data 
in categorical rather than continuous terms would give one the greatest opportunity to identify 
underlying gender differences in moral stage use. One of the main areas of concern raised as a result 
of the analyses presented in Chapter 2 was of course, related to the effectiveness of the SRM-SF as an 
overall discriminator of gender differences in stages of moral reasoning. 
3.2 Aims of the Empirical Research Presented in this Chapter 
It is clear that aside from use of summary means there are a variety of alternative methods available 
that may be useful when investigating patterns of moral reasoning amongst young people. However, 
it is also clear that there are several theoretical and methodological factors that one needs to bear in 
mind when considering use of these alternatives. The analyses presented in the next section attempt 
to address some of the issues that have been raised in the overview presented above. As with the 
analyses presented in Chapter 2, one of the overall aims of the following section is to explore 
differences in patterns of moral reasoning with reference to offence status. The general prediction 
relating to differences in offence status is that through use of analyses involving alternatives to the 
summary mean one should be able to uncover patterns of between-group differences that correspond 
to those presented in Chapter 2. That is, through use of these alternative techniques one will find 
evidence that offenders are comparatively "immature" in terms of patterns of moral reasoning in 
relationship to their non-offending peers. 
Another of the main aims of the following section is to explore differences in patterns of moral 
reasoning with reference to gender. Here, the overall objective is to seek to shed light on the Gilligan 
/ Kohlberg debate by comparing findings obtained using alternatives to the summary mean with those 
presented in Chapter 2. A key prediction is that by use of categorical techniques one should be able to 
uncover gender differences in patterns of mature stage use that were not identified when treating 
SRM-SF as points on a continuous scale. More specifically, one would expect to find evidence that 
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females are demonstrating greater use of Stage 3 reasoning than males, and that males are 
demonstrating greater use of Stage 4 reasoning than females. 
3.2 RESULTS OF SUBSEQUENT ANALYSES USING ALTERNATIVES TO SUMMARY 
MEAN SCORES 
3.21 Exploration of between and within group differences in moral type with reference to Global 
Moral Stage Status (GMSS) ratings: 
From the analyses carried out in Chapter 2 it was found that the summary mean SRM-SF scores of 
each of the participant groups were as follows: Offenders, mean = 222.59 (n = 147, S.D. = 30.11); 
male non-offenders 264.36 (n=149, S0=44.79); female non-offenders, mean = 262.48 (n=117, SO 
=29.88). In terms of corresponding "Global Moral Stage Status" (GMSS) ratings the offender mean 
would correspond to GMSS "Stage 2" (point boundaries encompassing mean scores ranging from 
175-225), and both the male non-offender and the female non-offender means would correspond to 
GMSS ''Transition Stage 3(2)" (point boundaries encompassing mean scores ranging from 250-274). 
On the basis of the mean scores and GMSS ratings given above, it would appear that offenders as a 
group are showing a predominance of "Stage 2" reasoning, whereas non-offenders are showing 
greater evidence of use of "Stage 3" reasoning. 
As was pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, the GMSS categories used in the SRM-SF 
replicate those used in an earlier measure where moral reasoning summary scores represented means 
over eight sociomoral norms. It was noted that it is easier to relate GMSS levels to numbers of item 
responses over an eight item scale than it is to an eleven item scale such as the SRM-SF. 
Nevertheless, if one were to represent the GMSS scores in terms of ratios of "Stage 2" to "Stage 3" 
use over eleven items the following response profiles would be achieved: For the offenders the 
response profile over eleven items would be best represented by either a combination of nine "Stage 
2" responses and two "Stage 3" responses, or seven "Stage 2" responses and four ''Transition Stage 2-
3" responses (both combinations result in a score of 218.18); for the non-offenders the response 
profile over eleven items is best represented by either a combination of four "Stage 2" responses and 
seven "Stage 3" responses, or eight ''Transition Stage 2-3" responses and three "Stage 3" responses. 
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The applicability of GMSS ratings to characterise a particular participant group relies on the 
assumption that there is relative consistency in moral reasoning within the group; it follows from this 
that if one is to make meaningful comparisons between participant groups in terms of GMSS ratings 
that samples should not be heterogeneous in terms of variance. However, in this data set, some 
variability in SRM-SF scores - as evidenced by Standard Deviations around the means - is present 
within groups. Furthermore, some heterogeneity in variance between groups is evident from 
differences in the magnitudes of the Standard Deviations. For example, whilst the male and female 
non-offender SRM-SF means are practically identical (264.36 for the males, 262.48 for the females) 
and correspond to the same GMSS rating - ''Transition 3(2)"- the magnitudes of the Standard 
Deviations are different, with males having a somewhat higher Standard Deviation (44.79) than the 
females (29.88). For the female non-offenders the SRM-SF scores encompassed by one Standard 
Deviation either side of the mean range from approximately 232 to 292, or GMSS levels 'Transition 
2(3)" to "Stage 3". However, for the male non-offenders the SRM-SF scores encompassed by one 
Standard Deviation either side of the mean range from approximately 219 to 309, or GMSS levels 
"Stage 2" to "Stage 3". It may be questionable, then, to characterise both male and female non-
offenders as reasoning predominantly at GMSS level "Transition 3(2). 
Aside from the issues mentioned above, representation ofGMSS scores in terms of typical response 
profiles over eleven items (as presented earlier) is meaningful only if the majority of participants have 
supplied valid responses to all eleven items. However, it will be recalled that all SRM-SF 
questionnaires resulting in "seven or more" scorable protocols are considered "valid" in terms of data 
analysis. In order to investigate this issue further, the proportions of scorable responses provided to 
"valid" SRM-SF questionnaires was tabulated. Table 3:2 overleaf shows the breakdown of numbers 
of "scorable" responses supplied to valid SRM-SF questionnaires by participant group. 
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Table 3:2 Proportion of "scorable" responses supplied to the SRM-SF by participant group 
Offenders Male Non-Offenders Female Non-Offenders Total 
Responses N % N % n % N % 
7/11 21 14.3% 35 23.5% 26 22.2% 82 19.9% 
8/11 38 25.9% 25 19.5% 25 21.4% 92 22.3% 
9/11 40 27.2% 45 30.2% 28 23.9% 113 27.4% 
lO/ll 29 19.7% 24 16.1% 25 21.4% 78 18.9% 
11111 19 12.9% 16 10.7% 13 11.1% 48 11.6% 
From Table 3:2 above it can be seen that relating the GMSS levels to proportions of adjacent "Stage 
mix" over eleven SRM-SF items is problematic. Less than 12% of the total sample gave scorable 
responses to every item in the SRM-SF. The modal number ofscorable responses given to SRM-SF 
items was nine out of eleven items. However, as this response pattern by no means typifies the 
response pattern of the participant groups, (representing as it does less than 30% of the total sample) 
relating GMSS ratings to a "standardised average" of nine out eleven responses would be 
inappropriate. 
On the basis of the evidence in this sample it seems that there may be considerable difficulties when 
attempting to "match" SRM-SF response patterns to GMSS categories. This calls into question the 
utility of the GMSS as a frame of reference for characterising the moral reasoning stages of those 
responding to the SRM-SF. Bearing in mind that the GMSS scale is a device that is supposed to 
enable one to locate SRM-SF scores within moral reasoning "developmental vicinities" (Gibbs, 
Basinger & Fuller, 1992: 55), practical difficulties in applying the GMSS to SRM-SF data raise a 
number of non-trivial theoretical issues (for example, by raising issues regarding the potential 
"arbitrariness" ofGMSS categories). These issues are taken up in the discussion at the end of this 
chapter. 
Referring back to the data in Table 3:2 it can be seen that proportions ofthose giving only seven 
scorable responses out of eleven items appear to be somewhat higher amongst non-offenders than 
offenders. It will be remembered that whilst many of the offenders who supplied SRM-SF data were 
interviewed on a one to one basis, all the non-offenders completed the SRM-SF as a written task in a 
group setting, where it was more difficult to monitor for missing responses. However, the results of 
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Chi-Square analyses comparing between group differences in proportions of responses supplied were 
not statistically significant either when considering the participant sample as a whole (-l = 7.36; df 
=8; ns) or when comparing participant groups individually (offenders v male non-offenders: -l = 5.72, 
df=4, ns; male non-offenders v female non-offenders X2 = 2.10, df=4, ns; offenders v female non-
offenders X2 = 3.39, df=4, ns). 
Spearman correlations were carried for the participant sample as a whole and for each of the 
participant groups to investigate the relationship between number of scorable responses given and 
SRM-SF scores and also to investigate the relationship between age and number of scorable responses 
given. Investigations of these relationships were primarily of interest to the researcher for the 
following reasons: Firstly, on the basis of the questionnaires supplied in this sample it appeared that 
those providing only seven out of eleven "scorable" responses may have been producing less in terms 
of overall verbal output than those supplying "scorable" responses to all eleven items (for example it 
was noted in Chapter 2 when describing attrition rate in the initial sample that a substantial proportion 
of the "unscorable" responses supplied had arisen through participants leaving the item blank, or 
giving answers such as "don't know" or "same as before"). As the SRM-SF is a "production" 
measure rather than a "recognition" measure, identifying a relationship between verbal output and 
overall performance is relevant - particularly amongst those who have completed the task as a written 
exercise - as it may indicate a task-oriented confound relating to literacy skills. Secondly, age had 
originally been implicated as one of the factors accounting for overall attrition rate in the proportion 
of valid SRM-SF questionnaires supplied. The SRM-SF was devised in part in order to provide a 
practical alternative to the MJI that was suitable for use with children and young adolescents: The 
initial validation of the SRM-SF indicated that in the US it was suitable for use with children as young 
as 10 years old (Gibbs et al (1992), with overall attrition rate amongst this age group actually being 
lower than amongst high school students (Gibbs et ai, 1992:42.). However, in the current study it was 
noted when describing treatment of data in Chapter 2 that the mean age of those supplying valid 
SRM-SF questionnaires was higher by approximately six months than the mean age of the original 
participant sample. Identifying a relationship between number of scorable responses supplied and 
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SRM-SF scores amongst valid questionnaires might point the way towards a potential confound 
between the nature of the task and SRM-SF performance for the younger participants. 
Results of the correlations revealed significant positive relationships between number of valid 
responses given and SRM-SF scores for the participant sample as a whole (n=413, Spearman's rho = 
0.l2, p<0.05), for the offenders (n=147, Spearman's rho = 0.12, p<0.05) and for the male non-
offenders (n=149, Spearman's rho r=0.27; p<O.OI). However, for the female non-offenders, no 
significant relationship was found between the number of valid responses given and SRM-SF scores. 
Thus it appeared that the overall "amount of verbal output" produced may have been more of a factor 
accounting for males' performance on the SRM-SF than it was for the female participants. 
Difficulties associated with interpreting these findings are taken up in the discussion at the end of this 
chapter. No significant correlations between chronological age and number of scorable responses 
given were found for any of the individual participant groups. 
If one disregards those questions regarding the appropriateness of applying single GMSS ratings to 
represent the moral reasoning of participant groups, a tool such as the GMSS may still provide one 
with a useful framework in order to explore the characteristics of the sample. Even ifnothing else, 
the "levels" given in the GMSS scale should allow one to categorise SRM-SF means in a relatively 
systematic way. However, it was noted earlier in this chapter that the broader point boundaries 
encompassed by the "Stage 2" and "Stage 3" levels were potentially problematic in this respect. 
Therefore, Table 3:3 below, which summarises the proportions of participants "at" various GMSS 
levels also categorises those at "Stage 2" or "Stage 3" according to one of two subdivisions of these 
levels. The "Stage 2" category (scores ranging from 175-225) is further subdivided into "Stage 2a" -
scores ranging from 175-200, and "Stage 2b" - scores ranging from 201-225. The theoretical 
justification for selecting the point boundaries for these subdivisions is that these subdivisions allow 
one to discriminate between those who "need not" have evidenced reasoning above Stage 2 when 
responding to any item in the SRM-SF - those assigned to Category 2a, from those who necessarily 
have given at least one response to an SRM-SF item that is scored higher than "Stage 2" - those 
assigned to Category 2b. This is clearly a useful distinction to be able to make when considering 
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differences in patterns of "immature" and "mature" stage use amongst offending and non-offending 
adolescents. In this sample, the GMSS of the offenders is given as corresponding to "Stage 2". 
Nevertheless, the overall mean - 222.59 - coupled with a Standard Deviation of 30.11 suggests that 
substantial proportion of this group were providing at least some evidence of reasoning above "Stage 
2", which in itself is suggestive of at least some potential for a matumtional shift in moral 
development. In line with the subdivisions made for the "Stage 2" category, the "Stage 3" category 
(scores ranging from 275-325) is further subdivided into "Stage 3a"-scores mnging from 275-300 and 
"Stage 3b" - scores ranging from 301-325. This subdivision allows one to distinguish between those 
who "need nof' have used reasoning above Stage 3 and those who necessarily have used reasoning 
above Stage 3 (by giving at least one response that is scored at either "Tmnsition Stage 3-4" or Stage 
4). Being able to make a distinction of this nature is clearly of relevance when seeking to explore 
potential gender differences in patterns of mature Stage use. 
Table 3:3 Proportions of respondents "at" different GMSS levels according to participant group. 
Male Female 
Offenders Non-Offenders Non-Offenders 
GMSS levels n % n % n % 
Stage I = 100 - 125 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Transition 1(2) = 126 - 149 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Transition 2(1) = 150 - 174 7 4.8 4 2.7 0 0.0 
Stage 2 = 175 - 225 81 55.1 26 17.4 14 12.0 
Stage 2 a: Scores 175-200 29 19.7 13 8.7 3 2.6 
Stage 2 b: Scores 201-225 52 35.4 13 8.7 11 9.4 
Transition 2(3) = 226 - 249 28 19.0 17 11.4 25 21.4 
Transition 3(2) = 250 - 274 24 16.3 41 27.5 38 32.5 
Stage 3 = 275 - 325 6 4.1 50 33.6 38 32.5 
Stage 3a: Scores 275-300 6 4.1 29 19.5 29 24.8 
Stage 3b: Scores 301-325 0 0.0 21 14.1 9 7.7 
Transition 3(4) = 326 - 349 1 0.7 6 4.0 2 1.7 
Transition 4(3) = 350 - 374 0 0.0 5 3.4 0 0.0 
Stage 4 = 375 - 400 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
From Table 3:3 it can be seen that the non-offenders are apparently showing that far greater evidence 
of "mature" Stage 3 ("mutual and prosocial") reasoning than offenders, whereas offenders are 
showing greater evidence of "immature" Stage 2 ("exchanging and instrumental") reasoning than 
non-offenders. Greater proportions of offenders have mean scores corresponding to GMSS level 
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"Stage 2" than non-offenders. For the offenders, "Stage 2" is the modal GMSS level, with 55.1 % of 
the sample having means corresponding to this stage, whereas only 17.4% of male non-offenders and 
12.1 % of female non-offenders have means corresponding to this stage. Conversely, greater 
proportions of non-offenders have means corresponding to GMSS levels ''Transition 3(2)" or "Stage 
3" than offenders. For the male non-offenders the modal GMSS level is "Stage 3" with 33.6% of the 
sample having means corresponding to this stage. For the female non-offenders the modal GMSS 
levels are ''Transition 3(2)" and "Stage 3" with equal proportions of participants - 32.5% - having 
means corresponding to these stages. However, only 16.3% of the offending sample have means that 
correspond to ''Transition 3(2)" and even fewer (4.1 %) have means that correspond to "Stage 3". 
The creation of subcategories for GMSS levels Stage 2" and "Stage 3" has provided some potentially 
useful additional information regarding the characteristics of the sample. For example, whereas the 
modal stage of the offenders is "Stage 2" the majority of this group - 52/81 or 64% - are assigned to 
the subcategory "Stage 2b" which encompasses mean scores ranging from 201-225. In fact, one finds 
when taking the offending sample as a whole that whilst the group mean corresponds to GMSS level 
"Stage 2", the majority of these participants (75%) actually have means above 200, indicating at least 
some evidence of moral reasoning above this stage. This proportion is, however, still somewhat 
lower than that of the non-offenders (in the male non-offending group 89% have mean scores above 
200, in the female non-offending group 97% have mean scores above 200). 
The creation of sub-categories "3a" and "3b" reveal some apparent gender differences not readily 
identifiable when comparing groups assigned to the larger GMSS "Stage 3" category. Although the 
proportions of male and females assigned to GMSS level "Stage 3" are practically identical, (33.6% 
and 32.5% respectively), somewhat higher proportions of males (21150 or 42%) have mean scores 
above 300 than females (9/38 or 24%). If one takes the non-offending sample as a whole, one finds 
that whereas approximately 22% of males have mean scores in the range 301-400, only 9% of females 
fall into this category. This would seem to suggest that evidence of Stage 4 "Systemic and Standard" 
reasoning (the ')ustice" orientation in Gilligan's terminology) may be greater amongst males than 
females. 
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Chi-Square analyses were carried out to compare between-group differences in the proportions of 
participants at varying GMSS levels . Due to low frequencies of participants being assigned to upper 
and lower ends of the GMSS scale, and in order to fulfil "expected" cell value" requirements, 
categories were combined in order to form a contingency table for Chi-square analyses as shown in 
Table 3:4 below. 
Table 3:4. Categories used for Chi-Square analyses to compare proportions of participants at varying 
moral reasoning "developmental levels". 
Male Female 
Offenders Non-Offenders Non-Offenders 
Moral Stages Range of Scores n % n % n % 
Stage 1 to Stage 2a 100 - 200 36 24.5 17 11.4 3 2.6 
Stage 2b 201 - 225 : ~~ : .... :35;4 13 8.7 II 9.4 
Transition 2(3) 226 - 249 28 19.0 17 11.4 25 21.4 
Transition 3(2) 250 - 274 24 16.3 Ai: . .. 27;$ $ 8 32.5, . . . : .. 
Stage 3a 275 - 300 6 4.1 29 19.5 29 24.8 
Stage 3b to Stage 4 301 - 400 I 32 21.5 I L 9.4 
Chi-Square analyses revealed statistically significant differences between offenders and male non-
offenders (X: = 81.57, df=5 , p<O.OO I) . The differences between offenders and non-offenders are 
mainly attributable to higher proportions of offenders than non-offenders being assigned to categories 
corresponding to lower levels of moral reasoning and to higher proportions of non-offenders than 
offenders being assigned to categories corresponding to higher levels of moral reasoning. The results 
of the Chi-Square analyses comparing offenders and non-offenders are in line with results of the 
ANCOV As comparing overall means that were presented in Chapter 2 (these revealed significant 
differences between offenders and male non-offenders with offenders having lower means than non-
offenders) . 
Results of a Chi-Square analysis comparing differences between male and female non-offenders was 
also statistically significant ("l = ] 8.28, df = 5, p<O.O I). This finding contrasts with the results of the 
ANCOV A presented in Chapter 2 which did not reveal any significant differences in the overall 
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means of the two groups. The differences established by the Chi-Square analysis arc mainly 
attributable to higher proportions of males than females having scores in the 301-400 range, indicating 
that males may be making greater use of Stage 4 reasoning than females. However, it should be noted 
that differences between the two groups are also attributable in part to higher proportions of males 
than females having mean scores of 200 or below. It appears that when carrying out the ANCOVA 
presented in Chapter 2 that the higher variability in male scores and higher proportions of males being 
represented at the lower ends of the GMSS may have acted as confounds precluding the identification 
of gender differences in the use of Stage 3 and Stage 4 reasoning. 
3: 22 Exploration of Between and Within Group Differences in Moral Reasoning Styles Using 
Categorical Techniques 
The analyses carried out in Section 3:21 above provide some useful additional information regarding 
the characteristics of the sample that was not revealed when carrying out the comparisons of group 
means that were presented in Chapter 2 (for example by revealing potential gender differences in use 
of Stage 3 and Stage 4 reasoning). However, the indices used as the bases for these analyses have still 
been participants' summary mean scores over the eleven items of the SRM-SF. As pointed out 
earlier, use of mean scores as summary indices relies on the assumption that differences in moral 
reasoning scores are best thought of as different points on a hierarchy - rather than as discrete 
categories or styles of moral reasoning as posited by Gilligan (1982) and others. The analyses in this 
section attempt to address this issue by exploring the different types of moral reasoning justifications 
given by participants using categorical techniques. 
3. 23 Between Group-Differences in Modal SRM-SF Stages: 
Modal stage use across SRM-SF items was tabulated for each participant. An investigation of the 
relationship between age and modal stage was carried out, using Spearman correlations. The result of 
this analysis was statistically significant (n=413, r=.135, p<O.OI). This finding is in line with that 
obtained when comparing the relationship between age and SRM-SF mean scores that was presented 
in Chapter 2. Table 3:5 below shows the proportion of respondents modally "at" varying SRM-SF 
stages. It should be noted that the stages presented in this table relate to the actual protocol ratings 
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given when scoring SRM-SF items (i .e. "Stage I", ' 'Transition 1-2", "Stage 2" ' 'Transition 2-3" 
"Stage 3", ' 'Transition 3-4" and "Stage 4") and not the GMSS developmental levels relating to mean 
scores used in Section 3:21. In order to see how protocol rating scores relate to GMSS levels please 
refer back to the description that was given on page 73 and Table 3: I . 
Table 3:5 Modal SRM-SF Responses by Participant Group 
Male Female 
Offenders Non-Offenders Non-Offenders Total 
Protocol Ratings (n) % n % N % n % 
Stage 1 100 (2) 1.4 (5) 3.4 (0) 0.0 (7) 1.7 
Transition Stage 1-2 150 (3) 2.0 (1) 0.7 (0) 0.0 (4) 1.0 
Stage 2 200 (51) 34.7 (19) 12.8 (16) 13.7 (86) 20.8 
Transition 2-3 250 (5&) :3,9,.5 (38) 25.5 (4~I · 35~9 (138) 33.4 
Stage 3 300 (29) 19.7 )(47):' ):y.·.:.:3t;$. (37) 31.6 (I13) 27.4 
Transition Stage 3-4 350 (4) 2.7 (31) 20.8 (22) 18 .8 (57) 13 .8 
Stage 4 400 (0) 0.0 (8) 5.4 (0) 0.0 (8) 1.9 
Note : where bimodality was found, higher of two modes was used. 
From Table 3:5 above it can be seen that the majority of respondents have modal protocol ratings that 
correspond to stages ranging from "Stage 2" to ' 'Transition Stage 3-4" inclusive. Very few 
participants have modal scores corresponding to "Stage 1", ' 'Transition '' 1-2" or "Stage 4". The low 
frequencies of respondents represented at upper and lower ends of the SRM -SF create problems for 
using Table 3:5 as the basis for overall Chi-Square analyses in terms of fulfilling "expected cell" 
requirements . Clearly, the most practical way to overcome this problem is to "collapse" the 
categories at the upper and lower ends of the SRM-SF (as was done when comparing proportions of 
participants at vruying GMSS levels) . However, this then potentially raises a question regarding the 
"contamination" of a discrete "Stage 2 category by including information relating to discrete 
categories "Stage 1" and ' 'Transition Stage 1-2" (and the "contamination" of Stage 3-4 by including 
data relating to "Stage 4) . A way of maintaining the integrity of the categories and to fulfil the 
"observed" and "expected" frequency requirements of the Chi-square analyses would be to treat those 
respondents represented in the "Stage 1 ", ' 'Transition Stage 1-2" and "Stage 4" as "outliers". 
However, thjs potentially creates another problem as one then loses information regarding proportions 
of participants having modal scores at the upper and lower ends of the scale. Neither method then, is 
ideal. However, it was considered that by carrying out Chj-Square analyses using two different 
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methods (the first set adopting the technique of "collapsing" categories, the second set adopting the 
technique of eliminating "outlying" data) and comparing the findings obtained from both methods 
one should be able to make plausible inferences regarding group differences. 
Results of the Chi-Square analyses comparing offenders and non-offenders were similar for both 
methods ("collapsing categories" and "eliminating outliers") that were adopted. Between group 
differences between offenders and male non-offenders were statistically significant (when "collapsing 
categories 'i=48.77, df=3, p<O.OOI; when "eliminating outliers" X2=43.74, df= 3, p<O.OOl). The 
differences between offenders and non-offenders are mainly attributable to higher proportions of 
offenders than non-offenders being modally "at" Stage 2, whereas higher proportions of non-
offenders than offenders are modally "at" Stage 3 or Transition Stage 3-4. The position regarding 
Transition Stage 2-3 is unclear. Whilst somewhat higher proportions of offenders than male non-
offenders are modally "at" this stage, the observed difference between the two groups is not as great 
as it is for the other Stage categories. Broadly speaking, though, the results of the Chi-Square 
analyses comparing offenders and non-offenders replicated the findings presented in Section 3 :21 
above which established significant differences in the proportions of offenders and non-offenders 
represented at varying GMSS levels. In contrast to the findings obtained in Section 3 :21, the results 
of Chi-Square analyses comparing male and female non-offenders failed to reveal significant 
differences between the groups for either method of analysis that was adopted ("collapsing 
categories" X2=4.32, df=3, os; "eliminating outliers" i=1.90, df=3, ns). 
3.24 Investigation o/patterns o/intra-individual variability in SRM-SF stage use. 
As reported earlier in this chapter, there is a conflict in the moral reasoning literature associated with 
reconciling "structural consistency" in moral reasoning that is fundamental to the original 
Kohlbergian model (and a requirement if one is to make meaningful comparisons between groups), 
with the need to account for a process of "disequilibrium" or "mechanism of change" that 
characterises an individual's progression from one stage to the next (e.g. Walker and Taylor 1991b). 
Amongst an adolescent sample one would expect to find that at least some of the participants were 
exhibiting "disequilibrium" in stage use predictive of developmental change; one might also expect 
that an adolescent sample would be less stable in terms of structural consistency than an adult sample 
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(assuming that for the majority of the adolescents moral potential is yet to be achieved and that for the 
majority of adults moral potential has been reached). However, researchers using moral reasoning 
measures amongst adolescents have typically made gross comparisons between groups on the basis of 
summary scores obtained from the averages of individual responses to several questionnaire items. 
Little attention has been paid to examining patterns of intra-individual variation in questionnaire 
responses which clearly may have an impact on findings obtained from group analyses. 
The analyses presented in this section attempt to address this issue by investigating patterns of intra-
individual variability with reference to range of stages used by participants, frequencies of non-modal 
judgements provided by participants, patterns of "positive" and "negative" skew around modal stage 
and also with reference to the chronological age of participants. 
3.24i Variability in range of moral stages used across SRM-SFitems by participant group 
Table 3:6 below shows proportions of variability in the ranges between highest and lowest protocol 
scores obtained across SRM-SF items by participant group. To elaborate further, the higher the range 
of SRM-SF scores, the greater the disparity is between highest and lowest moral stage response 
evidenced across questionnaire items. 
Table 3:6 Variability in range of moral stage scores by participant group 
male offender male non-offender female non-offender 
range Count Col % Count Col % Count Col % 
50.00 7 4.8% 2 1.3% 5 4.3% 
100.00 27 18.4% 27 18.1% 30 25.6% 
150.00 56 38.1% 52 34.9% 50 42.7% 
200.00 48 32.7% 33 22.1% 22 18.8% 
250.00 7 4.8% 23 15.4% 10 8.5% 
300.00 2 1.4% 12 8.1% 0 0.0% 
From Table 3:6 it can be seen that there is evidence of intra-individual variability in patterns of stage 
use across the SRM-SF. None of the participants are completely consistent in using the same stage 
across all SRM-SF items and very few (less than 5% in any group) have a range of scores restricted to 
adjacent levels (i.e. 50 points) of the scale. The modal range of scores is 150 points. This 
corresponds to a stage mix of one and a half major stages, or, as an example, use of the range of 
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stages from Stage 2 to Transition Stage 3-4. Intra-individual variability appears to be higher amongst 
male non-offenders than in the other two groups. Higher proportions (24%) of male non-offenders 
have a range of scores of250 points or higher than either the female non-offenders (8.5%) or the 
offenders (5.3%). 
Chi-Square analyses were carried out to compare between-group differences in range of scores. 
Results of the analyses revealed significant differences between offenders and male non-offenders ('l 
= 21.37, df= 5, p<O.Ol) and also between male and female non-offenders (X2=17.20, df=5. p<O.OI). 
The result of a Spearman correlation comparing the relationship between age and range of scores was 
not statistically significant (n=413, rho = .066, ns). 
3.24ii Investigation offrequencies of non-modal judgments by participant group 
Patterns of variability in stage use were also compared by examining frequencies of non-modal 
judgements by participants - that is by comparing between-group differences in proportions of 
judgements made to questionnaire items that fell outside an individual's modal stage. The mean 
number of non-modal judgements for each of the participant groups was as follows: for offenders 
mean (n=147, SD=1.18)= 4.90, for male non-offenders mean (n=149, SD=1.l4) = 4.91 and for female 
non-offenders (n= 117, SD= 1.26) = 4.68. The result of a one-way ANOVA comparing between 
group differences in mean number of "non-modal" judgements made by participants was not 
statistically significant (F (2,410) = 1.503, ns). The result ofa Spearman correlation investigating the 
relationship between age and frequency of non-modal judgements was not significant (n=413, rho =-
.049, ns). Finally, results ofa Spearman correlation comparing the relationship between "range of 
scores" and "frequency of non-modal judgements" was found to be statistically significant (n=413, 
rho = .365, p<O.OOI) indicating that those demonstrating higher ranges in patterns of stage use were 
also making a greater number of non-modal judgements. 
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3. 24iii Investigation of Patterns of Skew around Modal Stage 
In order to explore patterns of intra-individual variability further, patterns of skew around modal stage 
were investigated by participant groups. For each modal stage, participants were classified as 
exhibiting "negative skew" if a higher proportion of their non-modal judgements fell below the mode, 
as exhibiting "positive skew" if a higher number of their non-modal judgements fell above the mode 
and as demonstrating "no skew" if equal proportions of non-modal judgements fell both above and 
below the mode. Patterns of skew surrounding modal stages are presented in Table 3:7 below. 
Table 3:7 Patterns of "Skew" surrounding modal stages by participant group 
Male Female 
Offenders Non-Offenders Non-Offenders Total 
Modal Stage Pattern of Skew n % n % N % N % 
Stage 1 Negative Skew 0 0.0 0 0.0 - - - -
No Skew 0 0.0 0 0.0 - - - -
Positive Skew 2 100.0 5 100.0 - - 7 100.0 
Stage 1-2 Negative skew 0 0.0 0 0.0 - - - -
No skew 0 0.0 0 0.0 - - - -
Positive skew 3 100.0 1 100.0 - - 4 100.0 
Stage 2 Negative Skew 14 27.5 2 10.5 I 6.3 17 19.8 
No Skew 9 17.6 4 21.1 I 6.3 14 16.3 
Positive Skew 28 54.9 13 68.4 14 87.5 55 64.0 
Stage 2-3 Negative Skew 43 74.1 16 42.1 16 38.1 75 54.3 
No Skew 2 3.4 7 18.4 9 21.4 18 13.0 
Positive Skew 13 22.4 15 39.5 17 40.5 45 32.6 
Stage 3 Negative Skew 29 100.0 36 76.6 32 86.5 97 85.8 
No Skew - - 1 2.1 3 8.1 4 3.5 
Positive Skew - - 10 21.3 2 5.4 12 10.6 
Stage 3-4 Negative Skew 3 75.0 30 96.8 22 100.0 55 96.5 
No Skew - - 1 3.2 - - 1 1.8 
Positive Skew 1 25.0 - - - - 1 1.8 
Stage 4 Negative Skew - - 8 100.0 - - 8 100.0 
No skew - - - - - - - -
Positive Skew - - - - - - - -
All Stages Negative Skew 89 60.5 92 61.7 71 60.7 252 61.0 
No Skew 11 7.5 13 8.7 13 11.1 37 9.0 
Positive Skew 47 32.0 44 29.5 33 28.2 124 30.0 
From Table 3:7 it can be seen from the overall totals that there are higher proportions of those 
demonstrating "negative skew" around the mode than those demonstrating "no skew" or "positive 
skew" in all participant groups. This finding may be partially attributable to the way bimodality was 
tackled in the current study - by using the highest mode - which would bias the sample towards 
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greater evidence of negative skew. It can also be seen from the overall totals that the differences 
between participant groups in proportions of those demonstrating positive, negative or no skew are 
negligible; indeed, the results of a Chi-Square analysis comparing these between groups differences 
was not statistically significant ('l = 1.32, df = 4, ns). 
If one examines Table 3.7 one can also see that despite the overall tendency towards negative skew in 
the sample, the overall proportions of those demonstrating positive and negative skew vary according 
to modal stage. Proportions of those demonstrating positive skew apparently decrease as modal stage 
increases in level. For example, when one examines the total proportions of positive, negative and no 
skew for those modally at Stage 2, one sees that 64% of those modally at this stage are demonstrating 
positive skew, whereas for those modally at transition Stage 3-4 less than 2% of those modally at this 
stage are demonstrating positive skew. It is possible that artefacts of the SRM-SF scale may have 
impacted on proportions of positive and negative skew that are observed in the sample. Clearly if an 
individual is modally at Stage 4 (the top end of the scale) one cannot be characterised as 
demonstrating positive skew around the modal stage. Transition Stage 2-3 represents the mid-point of 
the SRM-SF scale, a priori, then, one would predict that there would be greater evidence of negative 
skew amongst those modally at Stages above Transition Stage 2-3 than those modally below 
Transition Stage 2-3. To investigate this potential confound further, Spearman correlations were 
performed to investigate the relationship between "modal stage" and frequencies of judgments faIling 
below and above the mode. Results of the Spearman correlations revealed a significant positive 
relationship between modal stage and frequencies of judgements falling below the mode (n=4l3, rho= 
.634, p<O.OO I) and a significant negative relationship between modal stage and judgements falling 
above the mode (n=413, rho= -.617, p<O.OOI). Finally, investigations of the relationships between 
age and ')udgements falling below the mode" and ')udgements falling above the mode" using 
Spearman correlations were carried out. However, no significant relationships were revealed between 
age and either of the variables under consideration (for the comparison between age and judgements 
falling below the mode rho (413) =.009, os; for the comparison between age and judgements falling 
above the mode rho (413) = -.035, ns). 
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According to the "consolidation and transition" model (see e.g. Walker & Taylor, 1991, Walker et al. 
2001) the pattern of stage use that is considered to be indicative of disequilibrium is characterised by 
positive skew coupled with high stage mix. However, when comparing differences in the range of 
stage use and frequencies of non-modal judgements amongst those demonstrating positive and 
negative skew in this sample, there was no evidence of such a relationship. Indeed, if anything, the 
pattern that emerged was contra to theory. Those demonstrating negative skew had a slightly higher 
mean stage range (mean (n=252, SD = 54.47) =164.48) than those demonstrating positive skew (mean 
(n=124, SD=57.95) = 162.50). Those demonstrating negative skew also had a slightly higher mean 
number of judgements falling outside the mode (mean (n=252, SD=1.24) = 4.96) than those 
demonstrating positive skew (mean (n=124, SD= 1.12) =4.77). 
The findings obtained from comparisons of the proportions of positive and negative skew with degree 
of stage-mix were apparently contra to theory, and there would seem to be problems in applying the 
consolidation and transition model to SRM-SF data. Potential theoretical and methodological issues 
that may help to account for these findings are raised in the Discussion at the end of this chapter. 
3.25 Comparisons of between-group differences infrequencies of stage use across the SRM-SF 
In the discussion at the end of Chapter 2, the view was expressed that use of summary indices such as 
SRM-SF mean scores to characterise the moral stage of participants may have the effect of masking 
heterogeneity in patterns of stage use. The analyses presented in this section address this issue by 
comparing between-group differences in frequencies of moral stage use across the SRM-SF as a 
whole and also across individual SRM-SF items. 
3.25i Comparisons of between-group differences in overall patterns of stage use 
As a preliminary step towards summarising SRM-SF data in order to make meaningful between-group 
comparisons in patterns of stage use, frequency tables were drawn up for each individual major and 
transitional stage. Counts were made of frequencies of Stage category use - i.e. how many times 
participants gave responses corresponding to a particular stage category across all eleven SRM-SF 
items. However, it was found whilst tallying frequencies of stage use that few participants could be 
98 
considered to be making consistent use of one stage only (this finding is, of course, hardly surprising 
when one considers the patterns of intra-individual variation that emerged from the analyses presented 
in the previous section). For example, even for Transition Stage 2-3 use - the modal stage for 
participants as a whole - a very small percentage (2.9%) of participants gave six or more responses of 
this type across the whole questionnaire. It was also found that far less use was made of Stage 
Categories at the upper and lower ends of the SRM-SF (i.e. Stage 1, Transition 1-2 and Stage 4) -both 
in terms of proportions of participants using these stages and in terms of "consistency" of use within 
participants - than the mid-range Stage Categories. For example, only 13% of the total participant 
sample made any use of Stage 4 reasoning. Of those 13%, the majority (38/54 participants) used this 
Stage once only. To see the preliminary frequency table that was originally drawn up, please refer to 
Appendix 3. 
For the purposes of statistical analysis, raw frequency data relating to Stage use was re-tabulated and 
is presented in Table 3.8 overleaf. For the mid-range stages (i.e. Stage 2, Transition Stage 2-3, Stage 
3 and Transition Stage 3-4) the following categories were created in order to compare proportions of 
Stage use: ''Not used", "Used once", "Used twice", "Used three times" and "Used four times or 
more". Whilst these categories are clearly hardly ideal in terms of comparing "high" and "low" use of 
individual stages, they do allow one to make at least some discrimination between lesser and greater 
use of the mid-range stages. For "Stage 1", "Transition Stage 1-2" and "Stage 4" (where it was not 
feasible to discriminate between greater and lesser stage use) data was merely tabulated according to 
whether participants had "used" or "not used" each individual stage. 
For each of the individual stages Chi-Square analyses were carried out to compare between-group 
differences in patterns of stage use. For all stages 2-by-2 analyses were carried out to compare 
between-group differences in those "using" or "not using" a particular stage. For the mid-range 
stages separate Chi-Square analyses were carried out to compare between-group differences in greater 
or lesser stage use (using the categories ''Not used", "used once", "used twice" "used three times" and 
"used four times or more"). For the comparisons between offenders and male non-offenders, the main 
predictions were that significantly higher proportions of offenders would use "immature" Stages of 
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moral reasoning than non-offenders, and that significantly higher proportions of non-offenders would 
use the "mature" Stages of moral reasoning than non-offenders. 
Statistical comparisons exploring between group differences in patterns of stage usc amongst male 
and female non-offenders were carried out in the same way as for the offender and male non-offender 
groups. For the comparisons between male and female non-offenders, a key area of interest was to 
establish whether there was evidence to support the Gilligan's (1982) claim that the differences 
between Stage 3 and Stage 4 correspond to differences in parallel female and male "voices" of moral 
reasoning rather than a developmental progression from one stage to the next. In order to provide 
support for this hypothesis one would predict that a significantly higher proportion of males would 
make use of "Stage 4" than females. Conversely, one would predict that a significantly higher 
proportion offemales would make use of "Stage 3" reasoning than males. Summary statistics 
presenting the results of the analyses are presented in Table 3.9 on page 102. Key findings of note arc 
described on page 102 after the Tables 3.8 and 3.9. 
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Table 3:8 Summary frequency data used to compare between-group differences in patterns of stage 
use 
Not 1x 2x 3x 4x 
Used Used 
(n) % (n) % (n) 0.4 (n) % (n) % (n) 0.4 
Stage 1 Offenders (72) 49.0 (75) 51.0 
MNs (51) 34.2 (98) 65.8 
FN (17) 15.5 (100) 85.5 
All (140) 33.9 (273) 66.1 
Stage 1.5 Offenders (87) 59.2 (60) 40.8 
MNs (57) 38.3 (92) 61.7 
FN (40) 34.2 (77) 65.8 
All (184) 54.6 (229) 55.4 
stage 2 Offenders (138) 93.9 (9) 6.1 (26) 17.7 (34) 23.1 (36) 24.5 (42) 28.6 
MNs (104) 69.8 (45) 30.2 (38) 25.5 (31) 20.8 (23) 15.4 (12) 8.1 
FN (92) 78.6 (25) 21.4 (39) 33.3 (26) 22.2 (16) 13.7 (11) 9.4 
All (334) 80.9 (79) 19.1 (103) 24.9 (91) 22.0 (75) 18.2 (65) 15.7 
Stage 2.5 Offenders (137) 93.2 (10) 6.8 (22) 15.0 (37) 25.2 (35) 23.8 (43) 29.3 
MNs (123) 82.6 (26) 17.4 (36) 24.2 (36) 24.2 (26) 17.4 (25) 16.8 
FN (113) 96.6 (4) 3.4 (24) 20.5 (34) 29.1 (22) 18.8 (33) 28.2 
All (373) 90.3 (40) 9.7 (82) 19.9 (107) 25.9 (83) 20.1 (101) 24.5 
Stage 3 Offenders (109) 74.1 (38) 25.9 (45) 30.6 (31) 21.1 (23) 15.6 (10) 6.8 
MNs (123) 82.6 (26) 17.4 (30) 20.1 (28) 18.8 (35) 23.5 (30) 20.1 
FN (108) 92.3 (9) 7.7 (14) 12.0 (38) 32.5 (31) 26.5 (25) 21.4 
All (340) 82.3 (73) 17.7 (89) 21.5 (97) 23.5 (89) 21.5 (65) 15.7 
Stage 3.5 Offenders (20) 13.6 (127) 86.4 (12) 8.2 (6) 4.1 (0) 0.0 (2) 1.4 
MNs (102) 68.5 (47) 31.5 (37) 24.8 (33) 22.1 (14) 9.4 (18) 12.1 
FN (68) 58.1 (49) 41.9 (33) 28.2 (16) 13.7 (9) 7.7 (10) 8.5 
All (190) 46.0 (223) 54.0 (82) 19.9 (55) 13.3 (23) 5.6 (30) 7.3 
Stage 4 Offenders (4) 2.7 (143) 97.3 
MNs (42) 28.2 (107) 71.8 
FN (8) 6.8 (109) 93.2 
All (54) 13.1 (359) 86.9 
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Table 3:9 Results of Chi-Square analyses comparing stage use across participant groups 
Offenders I Male I Female 
Male Non-Offenders Non-Offenders 
Stage 1: "count" Not computed Not computed 
Stage 1; "binary" 'l= 6.63; df= 1; p<0.05 'l= 13.36; df=l; p<O.OOl 
Stage 1-2: "count" Not computed Not computed 
Stage 1-2; "binary" 'l= 12.97; df= 1; p<O.OOI 'l= 0.47; df= 1; ns 
Stage 2: "count" "l= 45.91; df= 4; p<O.OOI "l= 3.67; df= 4; ns 
Stage 2; "binary" X2= 28.77; df= 1; p<O.OOI X2= 2.64; df= 1; ns 
Stage 2-3: "count" X2= 16.58; df= 4; p<O.OI X2 = 16.42; df = 4; p<O.O 1 
Stage 2-3: "binary" X2= 7.85; df= 1; p<O.OI X2= 12.89; df= 1; p<O.OOI 
Stage 3: "count" X2= 17.87; df= 4; p<O.OI X2 = 12.62; df = 4; p<O.O 1 
Stage 3: "binary" X2= 3.08; df= 1; ns X2= 5.46; df= 1; p<O.05 
Stage 3-4: "count" X2= 75.86; df= 4; p<O.OOI X2= 5.78; df= 4; ns 
Stage 3-4: "binary" X2= 91.89; df= 1; p<O.OOl X2= 3.04;df= l;ns 
Stage 4: "count" Not computed Not computed 
Stage 4: "binary" X2= 36.56; df= 1; p<O.OOI X2= 19.57; df=l; p<O.OOI 
o = Offenders, MN = Male Non-Offenders, FN = Female Non-Offenders 
Note: "binary" analyses are those that merely compared whether participants had used or not used a 
particular stage using 2-by-2 Chi-Square analyses; "count" analyses are those that compared greater 
or lesser stage use. 
3. 25tt Results of statistical comparisons of stage use between offenders and non-offenders. 
From Table 3:9 it can be seen that the majority of analyses comparing between group differences in 
patterns of stage use amongst offenders and male non-offenders were statistically significant. 
Comparisons of between-group differences amongst offenders and male non-offenders were 
statistically significant for all analyses except for the "Stage 3" analysis comparing proportions of 
participants "using" or "not using" this stage. In general, the between-group differences may be 
attributed to higher proportions of offenders than non-offenders making greater use of immature 
stages of moral reasoning (i.e. Stages 1 to Transition Stage 2-3) and higher proportions of non-
offenders than offenders making greater use of mature stages of moral reasoning (i.e. Stage 3, 
Transition Stage 3-4 and Stage 4). Broadly speaking, then, the results of the analyses comparing 
offenders and non-offenders corroborate previous findings and might be taken as providing further 
with to the claim that offenders are immature in terms of moral reasoning compared to their non-
offending peers. However, on further inspection one finds that characterising offenders and non-
offenders in terms of relative immaturity or maturity may be an over-simplistic way of representing 
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differences between these groups. For example, between-group comparisons in patterns of Stage 2 
use were statistically significant with higher proportions of offenders making greater use of this stage. 
However, if one refers back to the frequency data presented in Table 3:9 one finds that the majority of 
all participants - including the non-offenders - are apparently evidencing a certain degree of "moral 
immaturity" through the spontaneous production of at least one Stage 2 response. Similarly, between-
group differences in patterns of Stage 3 use were statistically significant, with higher proportions of 
non-offenders making greater use of this stage. However, by referring back to the frequency data one 
finds that the majority of participants - including the offenders - are apparently able to access moral 
maturity with 74% of the offending sample using Stage 3 at least once (indeed, between-group 
differences amongst offenders and male non-offenders were not statistically significant for the Stage 3 
used / not used analysis). 
3.25iii Results of statistical comparisons of stage use between male and female non-offenders 
The results of Chi-Square analyses confirmed the predictions that there were gender differences in 
patterns of mature Stage use in accordance with the Gilligan (1982) hypothesis. These findings 
contrast with those obtained in Chapter 2 where no significant differences were found in the overall 
SRM-SF means of male and female non-offenders. Chi-Square analyses revealed that between group 
differences in patterns of Stage 3 and Stage 4 use were statistically significant. Higher proportions of 
females used Stage 3 reasoning than males and higher proportions of males used Stage 4 reasoning 
than females. In terms of greater or lesser proportions of Stage use, between group differences for 
Stage 3 were also statistically significant, with females demonstrating a tendency to make greater use 
of this stage than males. 
In addition to the gender differences described above, between group differences were also found for 
Stage 1 and Stage 2-3 binary comparisons of those "using" or "not using" these stages. A 
significantly higher proportion of males used Stage 1 reasoning than females; conversely, a 
significantly higher proportion of females used Transition Stage 2-3 reasoning than males. Between 
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group differences in greater or lesser Stage 2-3 use were also statistically significant, with females 
making more consistent use of this stage than males. 
3.25iv Comparisons of stage use across SRM-SF items between participant groups 
Between-group differences in frequencies of moral stage use across SRM-SF items were tabulated, 
and a frequency table summarising these differences may be found in Appendix 4. Statistical 
comparisons using 2-by-2 Chi Square analyses were carried out to investigate differences in Stage use 
between participant groups for each of the SRM-SF items. Carrying out the analyses required a large 
number of separate Chi-Square tests. For ease of reference a summary table - Table 3: 10 - has been 
drawn up which indicates where significant differences were found. Chi-Square statistics for each of 
the separate analyses may be found in Appendix 5. Key findings of note from the analyses are 
described after Table 3: 10 which is presented overleaf. 
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Table 3: 10 Summary of results obtained from Chi-Square analyses of between group differences in 
stage use across SRM-SF items. 
Moral Sta~ es 
Items Comparisons I 1-2 2 2-3 3 34 4 
Promise Friend Offenders / Male Non-Offenders O· 0" N··· 
Male & Female Non-Offenders 9· 
Promise Stranger Offenders / Male Non-Offenders 0·· N··· N· 
Male & Female Non-Offenders 
Promise Child Offenders / Male Non-Offenders 0" 0·· o· N·" N·· 
Male & Female Non-Offenders 0·· 
TeD Truth Offenders / Male Non-Offenders 0··· N·· N··· 
Male & Female Non-Offenders 9·· (~. o· 
Help Parents Offenders / Male Non-Offenders 0" N·· 
Male & Female Non-Offenders g .. 
Save Friend Offenders / Male Non-Offenders 0·· N· N· N· 
Male & Female Non-Offenders 0·· ef· 2· 2· (f· 
Save Stranger Offenders / Male Non-Offenders 0" N·· 
Male & Female Non-Offenders 
Stay Alive Offenders / Male Non-Offenders O· N··· 
Male & Female Non-Offenders g. 
Not Steal Offenders / Male Non-Offenders 0·· O· N··· 
Male & Female Non-Offenders 0' •• g ... 
Obey Law Offenders / Male Non-Offenders O· 0·· 0·· O· N··· N··· N··· Male & Female Non-Offenders 9·· 0·· 
Legal Justice Offenders / Male Non-Offenders 0" NU. N· 
Male & Female Non-Offenders 2·· o· o· 
.p<O.05, ··p<O.OI, ···p<O.OOI 
Note: For the offender and non offender comparisons, asterisks indicate statistically significant 
differences; the letter "0" indicates that offenders were making greater use of the corresponding 
stage, the letter "N" indicates that non-offenders were making greater use of the corresponding stage. 
For the male and female non-offender comparisons, asterisks indicate statistically significant 
differences; symbols "c3" and "~" indicate which gender demonstrated greatest use of the 
corresponding stage. 
3.25v Results of Comparisons of Stage Use across SRM-SF Items Between Offenders and Non-
Offenders 
From Table 3: 10 it can be seen that significant differences were found between offenders and male 
non-offenders for each of the SRM-SF items. In the main, where significant differences were found 
in stage use, higher proportions of offenders were using immature stages and a higher proportion of 
male non-offenders were using mature stages. There is some evidence from Table 3:10 that some 
items were more effective in discriminating between offenders and male non-offenders than others. 
For example, comparisons of stage use for the item "Obeying the law" revealed significant differences 
between offenders and male non-offenders for all stages. On the other hand between group 
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3. 26 Recoding SRM-SF Protocols to Create a Unitary "Mature Stage" 
As was discussed earlier, regardless of which stance one adopts in the Gilligan/Kohlberg debate, there 
is potentially a methodological problem associated with treating the "Mature Stages" as points on a 
continuous scale. Whilst Gibbs et al (1992) consider Stage 3, Stage 3-4 and Stage 4 judgements all to 
be representative of moral maturity, in terms of data analysis these stages are non-equivalent. Clearly, 
if one is seeking to explore potential gender differences in patterns of moral reasoning, it is useful to 
be able to discriminate between these levels in numerical terms. However, if one is seeking to 
compare populations in terms of relative overall maturity, then use of these differential levels may be 
problematic. From the results presented above it appears that male non-offenders were demonstrating 
greater evidence of Stage 4 reasoning than either the offender or the female non-offenders. This may 
have had an impact on the overall summary SRM-SF means by artificially inflating the male non-
offender means relative to the other two participant groups. 
In order to address this issue data from all SRM-SF protocols were recoded in order to impose 
arithmetical homogeneity on the differing mature levels. All protocols that had been assigned SRM-
SF scores of Stage 3, Stage 3-4 or Stage 4 were recoded as "Stage 3" only. Table 3: II compares the 
mean scores obtained using this method with the original summary mean scores presented in Chapter 
2. Exploratory ANCOV As using age as a covariate were carried out to compare between group 
differences on the recoded SRM-SF data. The results of these ANCOVAs, and comparisons with the 
original findings presented Chapter 2 are presented in Table 3: 12. Comparisons of findings obtained 
using the different coding schemes are presented below Table 3: 12 on page 109. 
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comparisons for the items "Saving the life of a stranger" and "Living even if you don't want to" - the 
items that make up the "life" value - only revealed significant differences for two stages. 
From Table 3: 10 it can be seen that the greater use of immature stages amongst offenders was most 
pronounced when comparing between patterns of Stage 2 use. For the majority of SRM-SF items 
between group differences were statistically significant for this stage, (higher proportions of offenders 
using Stage 2 than male non-offenders). Comparisons of Stage 1 and Transition Stage 1-2 reasoning 
amongst offenders and non-offenders revealed fewer between group differences overall than those 
obtained for Stage 2. This finding is hardly surprising when one considers that in general far less use 
was made of Stage Categories at the upper and lower ends of the SRM-SF than the mid-range 
categories. 
Comparisons of patterns of mature Stage use between offenders and male non-offenders revealed that 
between group differences were most pronounced for Stage 3 and Transition Stage 3-4. These stages 
discriminated between offenders and male non-offenders for the majority of items - with higher 
proportions of non-offenders exhibiting mature reasoning. An exception to this was found for the 
item "keeping a promise to children" where a significantly higher proportion of offenders 
demonstrated Stage 3 reasoning than male non-offenders. However, it should be noted that on this 
item, modal Stage use for the non-offenders was particularly high - being Transition 3-4 for the male 
non-offenders. Finally, comparisons of patterns of Stage 4 use revealed significant differences 
between offenders and male-non-offenders on five items, with significantly higher proportions of 
male non-offenders making use of this Stage. 
3. 25vi Statistical Comparisons Between Male and Female Non-Offenders of SRM-SF Item Stage Use 
Gender differences were found for patterns of Stage use on the majority of SRM-SF items (all save 
"Keeping a promise to a stranger" and "Saving the life of a stranger"). These findings contrast with 
those obtained in Chapter 2 when comparing mean scores of SRM-SF items, where gender differences 
were found for two items only. As was found when comparing Stage use across the questionnaire as a 
whole, there was some evidence to indicate that males were making greater use of Stage 4 reasoning 
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and females were making greater use of Stage 3 reasoning. When comparing patterns of mature 
stage use, between group differences were most marked for Stage 4 with significantly higher 
proportions of males demonstrating Stage 4 reasoning on five of the eleven SRM-SF items. When 
comparing patterns of Stage 3 use, it was found that significantly higher proportions of females 
demonstrated Stage 3 use on three of the eleven SRM-SF items. Finally, comparisons of patterns of 
Transition Stage 3-4 use revealed significant differences for two items - ''Telling the truth" and 
"Judges sending lawbreakers to jail" with higher proportions of males using this stage on these items. 
Comparisons of patterns of immature Stage use across SRM-SF items also revealed some gender 
differences. When comparing patterns of Stage I use it was found that a significantly higher 
proportion of males used this stage for two items - "Saving the life of a friend" and "Not taking 
things that belong to others". Gender differences in Stage 2 use were found for three items: on two of 
these items "Telling the truth" and "Judges sending people to jail" significantly higher proportions of 
females used this stage, on the item "Saving the life of a friend" higher proportions of males used 
Stage 2. Comparisons of Transition Stage 2-3 use revealed significant differences for four items-
"Helping parents", "Saving the life of a friend", "Not taking things that belong to others" and 
"Obeying the law". On all of these items, higher proportions of females than males used this stage. 
The results of the chi-square analyses indicated that gender differences appeared to relate not only to 
overall stage use, but also to the nature of the issue under consideration. As described above, 
comparisons of Stage use across SRM-SF items revealed some differences in patterns of Stage use 
corresponding to the Gilligan (1982) claim that Stage 3 reasoning is more prevalent amongst females 
and Stage 4 reasoning is more prevalent amongst males. However if one refers to Table 4: 10 it can be 
seen that there is some evidence to suggest that males were also exhibiting greater moral maturity in 
terms of SRM-SF stage use than females on the "Justice" related items in the questionnaire. For 
example, on the items "Telling the truth", "Obeying the law" and "Judges sending people to jail" 
gender differences that were found indicated that females were making more use of an immature stage 
(either Stage 2 or Transition 2-3) where males were making greater use of one or more of the mature 
stages (Transition 3-4 and/or Stage 4). 
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T bl 3 11 D a e escnptlve Stat' . IStlCS companng " .. 1" SRM SF ongma - mea ns with re-coded means 
Original Upper Limit = Stage 3 
SRM-SF SRM-SF 
Participant Group N Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Offenders 147 222.59 (30.11) 220.92 (27.43) 
Male Non-Offenders 149 264.36 (44.79) 250.60 (33.57) 
Female Non-Offenders 117 262.48 (29.88) 254.86 (22.99) 
Total 413 248.96 (40.97) 241.24 (32.43) 
Table 3: 12 Comparison of results obtained using ANCOV As on "original" SRM-SF means and 
recoded means 
Offenders and Male and Female 
Male Non-Offenders Non-Offenders 
F(df) F(df) 
Original 
SRM-SF ANCOV As 111.49 (1,293)*** 0.50 (1,263) 
Upper Limit = Stage 3 
SRM-SF ANCOVAs 86.94 (1,293)*** 5.45 (1,263)* 
From Table 3: 12 it can be seen that recoding the data changed the outcome that emerged when 
comparing male and female non-offenders. In the original findings, whilst male non-offenders had 
slightly higher means than female non-offenders, between group differences were not statistically 
significant. However, once the data had been recoded, the position was reversed, with females having 
significantly higher mean scores than males. 
3. 26i Comparisons of Recoded Individual SRM-SF Items by Participant Group 
Exploratory ANCOV As (using age as a covariate) were carried out using the recoded data to compare 
between group differences in mean scores on each of the individual SRM-SF items. Summary 
statistics showing mean scores of items using the original and modified coding schemes and showing 
the results of ANCOVAs carried out on the original and recoded data are presented in Tables 3: 13-
3: 16. Key findings of note from the ANCOVAs are described after Table 3: 16 on page Ill. 
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T bl 3 13 I b . d a e tern means 0 tame usmg G'bb B . 1 s, asmger & F 11 (1992) u er d d stan ar d sconng procc urc 
Original Offenders o Non-Offenders <j? Non-Offenders Total 
Values & Items N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Promising Friend 130 236.92 66.63 137 279.93 60.41 Il3 288.50 47.72 380 267.76 63.23 
[promising Stranger 113 225.22 54.33 105 266.67 71.95 93 267.74 54.50 311 251.93 63.98 
!Promising Children 124 239.11 67.94 131 301.53 68.20 98 293.37 62.85 353 277.34 72.27 
Telling Truth 133 218.80 45.89 124 266.13 66.43 99 237.37 56.85 356 240.45 60.11 
iJ-Jelp Parents 129 234.50 55.83 130 268.85 60.71 103 269.90 43.35 362 256.91 56.87 
Saving Friend 127 236.22 66.87 121 261.16 76.51 92 279.35 39.33 340 256.76 66.73 
Saving Stranger 95 238.95 57.05 96 265.10 64.12 65 256.15 56.26 256 253.13 60.47 
Staying Alive 113 241.15 50.10 98 265.31 66.35 90 273.33 52.04 301 258.64 57.95 
Stealing 126 194.05 57.83 125 216.80 81.80 98 231.63 63.97 349 212.75 70.42 
Obeying Law 116 194.83 63.38 116 282.33 89.26 90 257.78 70.68 322 243.94 84.48 
Judges Jailing 104 195.67 58.75 Il5 249.57 86.47 86 228.49 59.18 305 225.25 74.02 
Table 3: 14 Item means obtained when imposing an "upper limit" of Stage 3 
Upper Limit = Stage 3 Offenden o Non-Offenders <;! Non-Offenders Total 
Values & Items N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Promising Friend 130 233.85 62.32 137 267.15 47.53 113 277.43 35.98 380 258.82 53.46 
Promising Stranger 113 223.01 49.57 105 251.43 53.01 93 258.61 42.11 311 243.25 50.98 
Promising Children 124 237.50 65.53 131 273.28 46.12 98 272.45 46.60 353 260.48 56.31 
Telling Truth 133 218.05 43.67 124 252.42 48.50 99 233.33 50.00 356 234.27 49.27 
Help Parents 129 231.79 51.13 130 257.31 46.22 103 263.11 32.05 362 249.86 46.56 
Saving Friend 127 235.83 66.34 121 253.31 67.31 92 277.72 37.33 340 253.38 62.37 
Saving Stranger 95 237.89 55.41 96 259.38 56.81 65 253.85 53.26 256 250.00 56.01 
Staying Alive 113 239.82 47.79 98 253.06 51.18 90 265.00 40.68 301 251.66 47.93 
Stealing 126 193.25 55.98 125 212.40 74.77 98 228.57 59.20 349 210.03 65.54 
Obeying Law 116 191.81 55.93 116 255.17 63.38 90 247.78 58.02 322 230.28 65.86 
Judges Jailing 104 193.27 52.63 115 231.74 63.98 86 223.26 49.53 305 216.23 58.69 
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Table 3: 15 Results of inter-item ANCOV As obtained from original item means 
Original Offender 6 Non-Offender 
6 Non-Offender Cj? Non-Offender 
Item F (df) F (df) 
Promise Friend 35.30 (1.264) ... 3.62 (1.247) 
Promise Stranger 30.92 (1.215) ... 0.62 (1.195) 
Promise Children 59.27 (1.252) ... 0.24 (1.226) 
Tell Truth 48.11 (1.254) ••• 8.32 (1.220) •• 
Help Parents 28.44 (1.256) ••• 0.87 (1.230) 
Save Friend 14.33 (1.245) ••• 7.60 (1.210) •• 
Save Stranger 10.90 (1.188) •• 0.20 (1.158) 
Stay Alive 13.63 (1.208) ••• 2.22 (1.185) 
Not Stealing 8.25 (1.248) .. 3.23 (1.220) 
Obey Law 78.92 (1.229) ••• 2.17 (1.203) 
Legal Justice 31.72 (1,216) *** 1.76 (1,198) 
Table 3: 16 Results of inter-item ANCOV As using recoded SRM-SF data 
Recoded SRM-SF data Offender 6 Non-Offender 
6 Non-Offender Cj? Non-Offender 
Item F (df) F (df) 
Promise Friend 27.14 (1.264) ••• 6.89 (1.247) •• 
Promise Stranger 22.09 (1,215) ••• 2.76 (1.195) 
Promise Children 28.61 (1.252) ••• 0.04 (1,226) 
Tell Truth 38.06 (1.254) ... 5.55 (1.220) • 
Help Parents 22.59 (1.256) ••• 3.45 (1.230) 
Save Friend 9.29 (1.245) •• 14.24 (1,210) ••• 
Save Stranger 8.52 (1.188) •• 0.03 (1.158) 
Stay Alive 6.29 (1,208) • 5.24 (1.185) • 
Not Stealing 6.80 (1.248) • 4.29 (1,220) • 
Obey Law 67.10 (1,229) ... 0.11 (1,203) 
Legal Justice 25.51 (1,216) ••• 0.17 (1,198) 
By comparing Tables 3: 15 and 3: 16 it can be seen that once the data were re-coded a greater number 
of significant differences between male and female non-offenders on SRM-SF items were revealed 
than were when using the original coding scheme. When using the original coding scheme, males and 
females had significantly different means on two items only: "Telling the truth" and "Saving the life 
ofa friend" (with males having significantly higher means on the item "telling the truth" and females 
having significantly higher means on the item "Saving the life of a friend". Using the modified 
coding scheme additional differences were found between male and female non-offenders for the 
items "Keeping a promise to a friend", "living even if you don't want to" and "not taking things that 
belong to others" - in all cases females having significantly higher means than males. 
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3:3 DISCUSSION 
The analyses presented in this chapter sought to address a number of theoretical and methodological 
concerns. Some of these concerns had emerged as a result of findings obtained in Chapter 2, other 
issues emerged when considering the relative merits of alternative techniques of analysis in Section 
3: l. Furthermore, the results of some of the analyses raised questions that in themselves may be 
worthy of investigation in future research. The first part of this section presents a broad summary of 
the overall outcomes and issues to emerge from the main body of findings presented in this chapter. 
The second part of this section considers each individual set of analyses in more detail, discussing the 
key findings that emerged, and, where relevant, relating these findings to those presented in Chapter 
2. 
3:31 Overall outcomes: 
One of the most striking impressions that emerges from the results of the analyses carried out in this 
chapter is that the technique of analysis that one adopts may have a critical impact on the findings that 
are obtained. This impression is particularly salient when one examines the results of the findings 
obtained with reference to gender differences in this chapter and compares them with those presented 
in Chapter 2. The majority of the findings relating to offence status were, broadly speaking, 
comparable to those presented in Chapter 2 (providing evidence to indicate that offenders were 
comparatively immature in terms of moral reasoning in relation to their non-offending peers). 
However, the findings relating to gender differences in this chapter were in contrast to those obtained 
when making comparisons with reference to SRM-SF summary means. Whereas in Chapter 2, 
comparisons of overall SRM-SF means revealed no significant differences between male and female 
non-offenders, gender differences materialised from a number of analyses that were presented in this 
chapter. Furthermore, whilst the overall picture regarding offenders' moral reasoning was, in general, 
indicative of lesser use of mature levels of moral reasoning when compared to non-offending peers, it 
became clear during the course of the various findings that were presented that this comparative 
immaturity was manifested in terms of degrees of performance rather than in terms of overall global 
competence. 
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3. 32 General Observations Regarding Variability in the Sample 
The point was made in the overview to this chapter that in order to accurately represent the moral 
reasoning patterns of participant groups one needs to pay careful attention to inter-individual and 
intra-individual variation in Stage use. It was clear in the current study that both inter-individual 
variability in SRM-SF means within groups and intra-individual variability in stage use across SRM-
SF items were indeed factors that had acted as confounds when representing moral reasoning patterns 
in terms of SRM-SF summary means. 
It is not entirely clear from the previous SRM-SF research whether the level of inter-individual 
variability in mean scores in the current study is a typical phenomenon. Firstly, not all studies using 
the SRM-SF have presented Standard Deviations alongside summary means (e.g. Krcmar & 
Valkenburg, 1999); secondly, the scoring method adopted in the current study (scoring questionnaires 
by item rather than by participant) increased the potential for introducing heterogeneity of intra-
individual variance in Stage use. Finally, due to the age range of the participant groups one would 
predict a certain level of variability in mean scores as a result of differences in maturational 
development. However, from a perusal of the literature it seems that whilst the overall standard 
deviation of the non-offending sample is somewhat higher than that cited in some studies (e.g. Barriga 
et al who reported a standard deviation of25.00 around their summary mean of305) it is comparable 
to findings obtained in others (e.g. Palmer and Hollin, 1998 who reported a standard deviation of 
41.26 around a summary mean of285.57 for male non-offenders and a standard deviation of35.19 
around a summary mean of 304.06 for female non-offenders). Therefore, it would appear that despite 
the scoring method adopted, the overall level of variability observed in the current study is by no 
means aberrant. 
Differences in the magnitude of variability were observed between participant groups, with male non-
offenders having somewhat higher standard deviations than either the female non-offenders or the 
male offenders. As with the overall standard deviations it is difficult to tell whether this apparent 
gender difference in the magnitude of variability is typical - in some studies where gender 
comparisons have been made, the individual means for males and females have not been presented 
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(e.g. Palmer & Hollin, 1997; Palmer & Hollin 2001; Ferguson et ai, 1994; Mason & Gibbs, 1993; 
Mizuno, 1999; van Ijzendoorn & Zwart-Woudstra, 1995; Ferguson et ai, 2001). In some others where 
individual means of males and females are reported, the Standard Deviations are not presented (e.g. 
Gibbs et ai, 1992; Basinger et ai, 1995; Comunian & Gielen, 1995). From the information that is 
available the findings are inconclusive. Some studies report near identical Standard Deviations for 
both groups (e.g. Humphries et ai, 2000; Ferguson & Cairns, 1996; Barriga et ai, 2001). Garmon et al 
(1996) present means and standard deviations of males and females from a variety of age groups, their 
findings regarding standard deviations are mixed. Some studies do present findings indicating that 
males have higher variability than females (e.g. Comunian & Gielen, 2000; Krettenauer & Beckcr, 
2001, Gregg et ai, 1994; Palmer & Hollin, 1998); however, the magnitude of the difference bctween 
the males and the females in these studies is not quite as great as the difference observed in this one. 
3.33 Intra-Individual Variation in Stage Use 
Comparisons of the differences in ranges of moral reasoning scores revealed that all participants were 
demonstrating a certain amount of stage mix in their questionnaire responses. No participant was 
completely consistent in stage use across all items in the questionnaire; furthermore very few 
participants demonstrated ranges of scores corresponding to use of adjacent stages only. 
Bearing in mind that to the author's knowledge this is the first time that a systematic attempt has been 
made to compare patterns of intra-individual variation with this sample type using SRM-SF data, it is 
not clear how one should interpret the above finding in theoretical terms. As reported earlier, much of 
the published work using alternatives to the SRM-SF has focused on between-group differences in 
moral reasoning rather than on intra-individual variations in patterns of moral reasoning. The 
tendency has been to assume the structural consistency compatible with the Kohlbergian model rather 
than to examine it. Furthermore, as Krebs et al (1991) point out, the scoring systems used for 
Kohlbergian moral reasoning measures (Colby & Kohlberg 1987) may mask underlying heterogeneity 
in stage use (Krebs et al, 1991:1014-1015). The SRM-SF scoring system may be similarly 
problematic. Whilst the item-by-item scoring approach adopted in the current study maximised the 
potential for introducing intra-individual heterogeneity in one respect; the treatment of "ambiguous 
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response units" (Gibbs et al 1992:50) to individual items was carried out with rigorous adherence to 
the rules set out in the SRM-SF manual. The applications of the rules potentially reduce 
heterogeneity as follows: Firstly, if a moral justification matches equally well with protocols 
disparate by two developmental levels (e.g. Transition Stage 2-3 and Stage 3) then the justification is 
scored at the higher of the two levels; secondly, if a justification matches protocols disparate by three 
developmental levels (e.g. Stage 2, Transition Stage 2-3 and Stage 3) then the justification is to be 
scored at the intermediate level (i.e. Transition Stage 2-3); thirdly, if a justification matches protocols 
disparate by more than three developmental levels (e.g. Stage 2 and Transition 3-4) then the item is 
deemed unscorable and excluded from analysis. It is entirely plausible, then, that the actual level of 
intra-individual variation in moral stage use in the current study was higher than the results of the 
analyses would suggest. 
In many of the studies where intra-individual structural (in)consistency in moral reasoning has been 
explored, the focus has been on situational factors considered to be influential on moral reasoning. In 
some cases investigations of internal consistency have been carried out in experimental conditions 
where the nature of the moral dilemmas has been manipulated comparing levels of structural 
consistency between Kohlbergian dilemmas and real-life dilemmas (e.g. Haviv & Leman, 2002: Wark 
& Krebs, 2000; Krebs et al, 1997; Wark & Krebs, 1996; Jadack et al 1995; Krebs et al 1994; 
Carpendale & Krebs 1992; Krebs et a11991; Walker & Taylor 199Ia). The findings from these 
studies is that participants do not demonstrate structural consistency in Stage use across different 
types of dilemmas (but see e.g. Walker et ai, 1987; Walker, 1989; Walker & Moran, 1991; for studies 
indicating intra-individual consistency in moral stage use across different dilemma types). 
It is possible that the overall pattern of intra-individual variability in stage use across the SRM-SF 
partially results from differences in the nature of the moral issues under consideration in the 
questionnaire items. For example it will be remembered from the findings presented in Chapter 2 that 
in general all participants tended to have lower scores on the "theft" item than to other items in the 
questionnaire. Conversely, scores on the item "How important is it to keep promises to children" 
were higher in all participant groups than to other items in the questionnaire. However, the fmding 
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that there were between-group differences in levels of internal consistency is not easily reconcilable 
merely with reference to disparities in the type of moral issue under consideration. Furthermore, the 
finding that male non-offenders showed significantly greater amount of intra-individual variation in 
range of stage use than both the offenders or the female non-offenders conflicts with what one would 
expect to find if moral reasoning performance differed as a function of external situational variables 
such as task conditions. Male and female non-offenders all performed the task under similar 
conditions as a written exercise in a classroom setting; whereas many of the offenders were 
interviewed on a one-to-one basis in a criminal justice setting. 
As was pointed out in the introduction to this chapter, evidence of intra-individual variation in Stage 
use within an adolescent sample is perhaps hardly surprising if one invokes the concept of 
disequilibrium (see e.g. Snyder & Feldman, 1984; Thoma & Rest, 1999; Walker et ai, 200 I; Walker, 
1991 b) as helping to account for developmental progression from one moral stage and the next. 
Taken on its own, the finding that there was greater evidence of intra-individual variability in terms of 
range of stage use amongst the male non-offenders than in the other two groups could be 
accommodated with reference to potential differential maturational patterns between the three groups. 
One could relate the differences between male and female non-offenders to known gender differences 
in early adolescence, and could argue that some of the younger males were exhibiting a growth-spurt 
previously experienced by at least some of the females. One could relate the differences between the 
offenders and male non-offenders to the concepts of "Structural cognitive deficit" and I or 
"developmental lag", perhaps by arguing that the comparatively flatter patterns of variation amongst 
the offenders was indicative either of global fixation at lower levels of moral reasoning or of 
maturational delay. However, had the between-group differences in intra-individual variation been the 
result of differential maturational patterns, one would have expected to have found that a greater 
proportion of male non-offenders were classified as exhibiting positive skew than either offenders or 
female non-offenders. Conversely, in the current study, no significant between-groups differences 
were found in the overall proportions of positive skew, no skew and negative skew. 
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The findings obtained from the comparisons of overall patterns of positive skew and negative skew 
pose problems when seeking to reconcile the differential levels of intra-individual variation in 
developmental terms. According to the consolidation / transition model (Snyder & Feldman, 1984; 
Walker & Taylor, 1991; Walker et aI, 2001) the pattern of stage use that is considered to be indicative 
of disequilibrium is characterised both by a high level of stage mix and positive skew. In this sample, 
however, the overall distribution of stage use seemed to be characterised by relatively high stage mix 
coupled with negative skew. Very few participants restricted their stage use to adjacent stages only, 
and a far greater proportion of participants (approximately 61 %) were exhibiting negative skew in 
terms of their pattern of stage use around the mode than positive skew (approximately 30%). 
Furthermore, when investigating between-group differences in intra-individual variability amongst 
those categorised as exhibiting positive and negative skew a pattern emerged that was contra to 
theory. Slightly higher intra-individual variability was found amongst those demonstrating negative 
skew rather than those demonstrating positive skew. 
It was noted when presenting findings relating to the modal stage use by participant groups that when 
bimodality was found, the higher of the two modes was selected for use in analysis. The theoretical 
justification for doing this is that this a) fits in with the general acknowledgement by Kohlberg and 
others that people do not always perform at their optimum level of moral reasoning (see e.g. Colby & 
Kohlberg 1987:7-8) and b) it is in accordance with one of the SRM-SF ambiguous response unit rules 
that the higher oftwo adjacent moral levels is the preferred stage (Gibbs et ai, 1992:50). However, 
depending on the level of bimodality in the sample, adopting this strategy clearly has the potential to 
bias the sample towards exhibiting negative skew - the characteristic bias that is indicative of 
"consolidation" (associated with low stage mix) rather than "transition" (which is associated with high 
stage mix). Whilst no attempt was made in the current study to investigate the frequency of 
bimodality within the sample, it does seem plausible that where there is relative high intra-
individuality in stage use (as there seemed to be in this sample), there is also a greater likelihood of 
bimodality. It is not clear from some of the previous studies that have investigated patterns of 
consolidation and transition how this potential confound has been addressed. 
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Thoma & Rest (1999), using the DIT investigated patterns of stage distribution amongst participants 
that they had defined as being consolidated reasoners. They found little evidence of bimodality 
amongst this subset of their sample (Thoma & Rest, 1999: 327-328); however, they did not 
investigate the proportions of positive and negative skew within the sample as a whole (Thoma & 
Rest, 1999: 332). Walker et aI, (2001) using the MJI derived their modal scores from percentage 
usage at each stage (Walker et aI, 2001: 190). They reported approximately equal proportions of 
positive and negative skew (Walker et ai, 2001:191), but make no mention of whether there was any 
evidence of bimodality in their sample. Furthermore, the sample size in the Walker et al (2001) study 
was considerably smaller (64 participants) than that of the current study (413 participants). 
Where an individual's mode falls in terms of its position on the SRM-SF scale has in any case the 
potential to exert bias on whether the individual is categorised as exhibiting positive skew or negative 
skew. It goes without saying that using the parameters of the SRM-SF, an individual who is modally 
"at" Stage 4 (the highest level of the scale), and is demonstrating some variation in Stage use can only 
be characterised as demonstrating negative skew. Equally, an individual who is modally "at" Stage I 
(the lowest level of the scale) and is demonstrating some variation in stage use can only be 
characterised as exhibiting positive bias in their pattern of stage response. An individual whose modal 
score is above the mid-point of a parametric scale with finite boundaries is more likely, a priori to 
demonstrate negative skew - there is, of course, a greater probability that a random non-modal "hit" 
will fall below the mode rather than above the mode. It was interesting to note from the current study 
when investigating the relationship between modal stage and frequencies of judgements above or 
below the mode that the directions of skew followed this apparent a priori pattern. A significant 
positive relationship was observed between modal stage and frequencies of judgements made below 
the mode, conversely a negative relationship was found between modal stage and judgements made 
above the mode. In the current study, then, overall findings relating to positive and negative skew may 
be a statistical artifact resulting from characteristics of the scale, rather than an indication of 
differential developmental states. 
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When comparing patterns of negative and positive skew one is presented with a confound that may 
not be straightforward to resolve. The direction of skew relating to the relevant modal stages is what 
would be predicted merely with reference to the parametric characteristics of the scale; however, 
clearly, it is also what one would predict from developmental theory. One would expect amongst an 
adolescent sample, if positive skew is predictive of developmental change, that there would be greater 
evidence of positive skew amongst those reasoning at the immature Stages than those reasoning at the 
so-called mature stages. Bearing in mind that Gibbs et aI (1992) consider those modally "at" Stage 3, 
Transition Stage 3-4 and Stage 4 to have already attained a level of moral maturity one would 
therefore predict that those at Stage 3 and Transition Stage 3-4 would in any case be more likely to be 
consolidating existing moral reasoning than to be in a transitional shift. Clearly, one would also 
predict according to developmental theol)' and as a result of the findings presented in Chapter 2 that 
there would be a significant relationship between age and modal stage. Therefore, one would predict 
to find positive relationships between age, modal stage and number of judgements falling below the 
mode. Taking the sample as a whole, a significant relationship was found between age and modal 
stage; however no relationships were found between age and range of stage use, neither were there 
any apparent relationships between age and patterns of directional skew as measured by frequencies 
of non-modal judgements falling above or below the mode. 
The current study was cross-sectional - one would need to carry out a longitudinal study using the 
SRM -SF exploring developmental trends in terms of patterns of intra-individual variation in order to 
clarify some of the issues raised above. Furthermore, as far as the author is aware, none of the 
currently available empirical research using the SRM-SF has explored patterns of intra-individual 
variation. Therefore the findings obtained in the current study are not directly comparable with 
previous work in this field. However, on the basis of the evidence from this sample, it does seem that 
there may be problems reconciling intra-individual variation in SRM-SF scores with reference to the 
developmental consolidation / transition model. Further work is needed in this area. 
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3.34 Issues relating to Global Moral Stage Status Ratings: 
In the introduction to this chapter some concerns were expressed about the appropriateness of 
assigning Global Stage Status ratings to SRM-SF data. It was noted that the Global Stage Status point 
boundaries had originated from an earlier moral reasoning measure where the summary index 
represented an average over eight sociomoral norms; it was not clear how these boundaries could be 
meaningfully applied to a questionnaire containing eleven items. It also appeared that issues relating 
to variations in numbers of scorable responses supplied and intra-individual disparity in patterns of 
stage use had not been adequately addressed when considering the validity of using Global Stage 
Status ratings to summarise SRM-SF data. Finally, the broader point boundaries encompassing the 
Stage 2 and Stage 3 categories relative to the other categories in the Global Moral Stage Status Scale 
were considered potentially problematic, particularly in terms of potentially masking heterogeneity in 
stage use. 
From the evidence of the fmdings in the current study it became apparent that the concept of Global 
Stage Status as it stands may be of limited use as a frame of reference to characterise SRM-SF data. 
On the face of it, the initial observations from between group comparisons of Global Stage Status 
ratings gave the impression that the offender group was characterised by a predominance of Stage 2 
reasoning, whereas the non-offending group was characterised by a predominance of Stage 3 
reasoning. Offender overall mean scores corresponded to a Global Stage Status rating of Stage 2, 
mean scores of both the male non-offenders and female non-offenders corresponded to Global Stage 
ratings of Transition 3(2). When examining proportions of participants "at" the original levels of the 
GMSS scale it was found that the modal GMSS level for offenders was Stage 2, whereas for the male 
non-offenders the modal GMSS level was Stage 3 and for the female non-offenders modal levels were 
tied at Stage 3 and Transition 3(2). However, on further investigation it was found that the picture 
regarding the relationship between Global Stage Status ratings and actual proportions of Stage use 
was far less straightforward. 
Trying to apply the GMSS levels with reference to proportions of whole number of item responses 
was problematic. As pointed out earlier, part of the problem seemed to stem from the fact that the 
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SRM-SF is an eleven item questionnaire. Whilst it is not immediately obvious why Gibbs et al (1992) 
fixed on eleven as the number of items that were to be included in the SRM-SF (some further issues 
relating to the number of questions in the SRM-SF are raised in the next chapter), it is clear that 
having done so the GMSS point boundaries should be meaningfully applicable to the number of items 
in the questionnaire. This would seem to be essential when considering using the SRM-SF as an 
assessment tool/outcome measure in a longitudinal study and / or moral reasoning intervention, 
especially where global shifts in overall SRM-SF means may be slight. 
One could, of course, tweak the point boundaries of the GMSS scale so that they are more 
meaningfully applicable to an eleven item questionnaire; however, this still leaves one with the 
problem of how to tackle variations in the numbers of "scorable" responses supplied to the SRM-SF. 
It will be recalled that all questionnaires eliciting at least seven scorable responses are considered 
valid for analysis purposes. In the current study, the full range of seven to eleven scorable responses 
was found amongst participants, with less than 12% of the total sample supplying scorable responses 
to all eleven items. The modal number of scorable responses supplied to questionnaire items was nine 
out of eleven; however, this response pattern only characterised 30% of the overall sample. Thus, 
using "nine scorable responses" as a benchmark would seem to be inappropriate. Furthermore, it is 
not clear from the previous research whether the level of variation in the proportion of scorable 
responses observed in the current study is a typical response pattern. As far as the author is aware, 
there is no currently available published information in the SRM-SF literature that specifically 
addresses this issue. When attrition rates are discussed in the research, they are discussed with 
reference to proportions of valid questionnaires supplied by participants. 
There is in an additional potential problem in applying GMSS levels to SRM-SF data that is 
associated with the scoring procedure of the questionnaire. This problem may have been overlooked 
in the original research on construction and validation of the measure. As reported earlier, the use of 
global stage ratings to characterise patterns of moral reasoning dates back to former work using moral 
reasoning measures such as Kohlberg's MH. If one assumes a relative degree in structural 
consistency in moral reasoning, then a GMSS scale that relates to percentage stage mix is 
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theoretically coherent when one considers the scoring procedure in instruments such as the MJI. 
Typically, in the MJI, overall scores are calculated with reference to varying percentages of major and 
minor stage "mix" demonstrated in response to a series of probe questions for each ofa number of 
moral dilemmas. Typically, each moral dilemma in the MJI will elicit more than one type of moral 
justification and -issues regarding the treatment of anomalous justifications notwithstanding-the 
weighted score for each dilemma reflects this. However, in the SRM-SF, each item is coded as being 
at a discrete moral-reasoning level. Scores for each item are allocated according to the highest stage 
response unit, regardless of the number of separate moral justifications elicited for each issue under 
consideration. Quite aside from any issues associated with the potential loss of information involved 
in adopting this scoring procedure, applying a scale previously used for the essentially analogue data 
of the MJI to SRM-SF data may be questionable. Whilst Gibbs et al. (1992) found "acceptable 
concurrent validity between the SRM-SF and the MJI" (Gibbs et al. 1992:39), it is not clear from the 
original work validating the SRM-SF (e.g. Basinger et ai, 1995) whether typical response sets 
associated with GMSS levels were explored. This would seem to be an issue requiring further 
attention in the research. 
From the evidence of the current study, the wider point boundaries originally allocated to Stage 2 and 
Stage 3 in the GMSS scale did seem to have the effect of masking between-group heterogeneity in 
patterns of Stage use. The creation of sub-categories "2a" and "2b" for GMSS level Stage 2 and "3a" 
and "3b" for GMSS level Stage 3 revealed some between-group differences that were not identifiable 
when using the original scale. This was perhaps most striking when comparing gender differences 
amongst non-offenders whose mean scores corresponded to GMSS level Stage 3. Whilst the 
proportions of male and female non-offenders assigned to Stage 3 were practically identical, there 
were clear between-group differences in the proportions of those assigned to "Stage 3a" and those 
assigned to "Stage 3b". Higher proportions of males than females were assigned to the category "3b". 
This category had as its point boundaries mean scores ranging from 301-325; thus, those in this 
category had necessarily demonstrated some evidence of reasoning at above Stage 3, i.e. had given at 
least one moral reasoning justification corresponding to either Transition Stage 3-4 or Stage 4. Whilst 
the actual patterns of distribution observed in the current study may be idiosyncratic, these findings do 
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have implications for researchers using the SRM-SF in terms ofthe "justice / care" debate. As 
reported earlier, there is little evidence from the available SRM-SF literature to suggest that overall, 
males are using more Stage 4 reasoning than females. However, it may be the case that use of the 
broad category boundaries for GMSS level "Stage 3" hampers the identification of underlying trends 
of this nature. 
As has previously been noted, the validity of summary mean scores and / or GMSS ratings to 
characterise moral reasoning patterns lies in theoretical premise that individuals are relatively 
consistent in their patterns of stage use. However, on the basis of the evidence from the current study 
it would appear that a substantial minority ofthe participants, especially male non-offenders. were not 
demonstrating the required structural internal consistency for either mean scores or GMSS ratings to 
accurately profile their patterns of stage use. Much of the work using moral reasoning measures 
presents findings with reference to these summary indices; however, in many studies little attention 
has been paid to sources of underlying variability in the sample. It seems clear that this lack of 
attention to variability may call into question some of the previously published research findings. 
Ideally, one would want to explore this issue further - for example through the use of meta-analytic 
techniques. However, as pointed out earlier, even within the SRM-SF literature, Standard Deviations 
around the means are not always reported. Furthermore, as Thoma & Rest (1999) point out, it is only 
relatively recently that researchers have turned their attention towards sources of intra-individual 
variation in patterns of stage use. Therefore, it may be difficult to get an accurate gauge of how this 
issue may have impacted on prior research. It seems imperative, then, that in future empirical studies 
using moral reasoning measures researchers take careful account of potential sources of variation 
before interpreting their findings with reference to mean scores and / or GMSS ratings. 
3.35 Between-Group Differences in Proportions of "Scorable Responses" Supplied by Participants 
Between group differences in proportions of scorable responses provided by participants were not 
statistically significant. Quite aside from considerations relating to the validity of Global Stage Status 
Ratings this was in any case a useful finding to establish. It will be remembered that the majority of 
offenders were interviewed on a one-to-one basis and that all the non-offenders performed the SRM-
SF as a written task. On the face of the above findings it would appear that differences in the way the 
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task was carried out had no major impact on the proportion of scorable responses that was supplied by 
participants. However, the results of the Pearson correlations comparing the relationships between the 
numbers of scorable responses and overall SRM-SF scores gave an indication that the amount of 
verbal information supplied by males in their questionnaire responses - whether oral or written - may 
have been more of a factor accounting for overall performance on the measure than it was for females. 
Significant positive relationships between proportions of scorable responses supplied and overall 
SRM-SF scores were found for both the offenders and the male non-offenders. This relationship was 
not found amongst the female non-offenders. It may have been the case that amongst males who were 
supplying lower numbers of scorable items there was a greater propensity to supply short word 
responses corresponding to Stage 1 reasoning than there was amongst females. It would not be 
feasible within the remits of the current study to check if that actually was the case. Even if it was 
feasible to do this it is not clear how one would interpret the findings. especially as no significant 
relationships were found between age and proportions of scorable responses supplied by any of the 
participant groups. In a study carried out by Gaiotti et al (1991) where males and females were asked 
to carry out an open ended essay task giving examples of personally relevant moral issues it was 
found that females tended to respond more thoroughly to the task and provide more examples of 
moral themes than males. However, Gaiotti, et al (1991) were unclear as to whether this could be 
explained by greater cognitive complexity amongst females or whether females were demonstrating 
greater compliance with the task. Furthermore, it follows from Kohlbergian theory that cognitive 
complexity and relative conscientiousness towards completion of a task are not independent of one 
another when considering moral development. 
3.36 Between group differences in patterns of Stage use: comparisons of offenders and non-offenders 
Broadly speaking, results of the analyses comparing overall patterns of Stage use between offenders 
and non-offenders revealed predictable differences that were comparable to those findings presented 
in Chapter 2. Results of the binary Chi-Square analyses comparing offenders and non-offenders 
found that a significantly greater proportion of non-offenders made use of mature stages than non-
offenders; the results of the chi-square analyses comparing greater or lesser use of each stage revealed 
that non-offenders were making more frequent use of the mature stages than offenders. However, it 
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was interesting to note that whilst fewer offenders than non- offenders gave mature justifications. and 
made less consistent use of mature stages than the non-offenders; the majority of offenders (74.1 %) 
managed to give a Stage 3 response to at least one item in the questionnaire. Thus, whilst the 
offenders were apparently performing less well than offenders in terms of producing mature moral 
justifications, the support for the claim that offenders demonstrate an overall cognitive deficit in terms 
of moral development was, at best, weak. It was clear on the basis of the evidence from this sample 
that the majority of offenders were able to access moral maturity by providing at least one Stage 3 
response to an item in the SRM-SF. 
3.36i Between-group differences: comparisons of male andfemale non-offenders: 
The results of the analyses presented in this chapter identified some clear gender differences between 
male and female non-offenders. A greater proportion of male non-offenders gave Stage 4 
justifications than female non-offenders; a greater proportion of female non-offenders gave Stage 3 
justifications than male non-offenders. Comparisons of patterns of positive and negative skew also 
revealed gender differences amongst those who were modally at Stage 3, with greater proportions of 
males than females demonstrating positive skew. 
In this sample at least, there was some evidence to suggest that there were gender differences in the 
patterns of mature stage use that correspond to the Gilligan (1982) hypothesis. However, it should be 
noted that whilst "Stage 4" use was primarily restricted to the male non-offending sample, this style of 
reasoning was no means typical of this group. It can be seen that only 28% male non-offenders used 
this stage, this compares to 7% female non-offenders and 3% offenders. In contrast, whilst there was 
greater evidence of Stage 3 reasoning among female non-offenders than male non-offenders, high 
proportions of both males (83%) and females (92%) used this stage. 
Comparisons of immature Stage use between male and female non-offenders also revealed some 
interesting gender differences, most notably in patterns of Stage 1 use. Significantly higher 
proportions of males used Stage 1 than females. From the findings obtained in the current study, then. 
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it would seem that males were making greater use of Stages at the extreme ends of the SRM-SF scale 
than females. Clearly, this would in part account for the failure to identify differences in the overall 
means of male and female non-offenders. 
3. 37 Item related Findings: Comparisons of Offenders and Non-Offenders 
By and large, the results of the analyses comparing between-group differences in patterns of stage use 
amongst offenders and non-offenders across SRM-SF items corroborated the findings relating to 
overall patterns of stage use. All SRM-SF items managed to discriminate between offenders and non-
offenders; in general, where differences were found, there was greater evidence of immature stage usc 
amongst offenders and greater evidence of mature reasoning amongst the non-offenders. There were, 
however, some apparent differences in the levels of effectiveness of the various SRM-SF items to 
discriminate between groups. For example, whilst items relating to offending behaviour 
discriminated between groups for the majority of the individual stage comparisons, the items "Saving 
the life ofa stranger" and "Living even if you don't want to" (Items that make up the "life" value) 
only discriminated between offenders and non-offenders for two out of a possible seven stage 
comparisons. 
3.37i Item Related Findings: Comparisons o/Male and Female Non-Offenders 
As with the findings obtained from comparisons of overall patterns of stage use, some gender 
differences emerged when investigating between-group differences in patterns of Stage use across 
SRM-SF items. Between-group differences were found for the majority of SRM-SF items, these 
findings contrast with the fmdings obtained when comparing between-group differences in item 
means using ANCOV As where gender differences were found for two items only. When comparing 
between-group differences in patterns of mature stage use, differences were most noticeable for 
patterns of Stage 4 use, with males demonstrating significantly higher use of this stage on five items. 
However, comparisons of Stage 3 use were less conclusive in demonstrating a contrasting bias 
towards females - differences favouring females in this respect were found on three items only. 
Comparisons of Transition Stage 3-4 use revealed differences for two items only, in both cases 
significantly higher proportions of males used this stage than females. Comparisons of between-
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group differences of immature stages also revealed some gender differences: males demonstrated 
greater use of Stage 1 than females on two of the items; females demonstrated greater use of 
Transition Stage 2-3 on four of the items. 
3. 38 Problems interpreting the findings relating to Transitional Stages. 
Whilst use of categorical techniques enabled one to uncover some between-group differences in 
patterns of stage use that were not readily identifiable with reference to summary means; there were 
problems when it came to interpreting the fmdings relating to the Transitional Stages (i.e. Stages 1-2, 
2-3 & 3-4). It will be recalled from the overview to the SRM-SF that each major moral Stage may be 
further sub-divided into content categories known as "Aspects" (for example. Stage 3 has six different 
aspects: "Relationships", "Empathic Role-Taking", "Normative Expectations", "Prosocial 
Intentions", "Generalized Caring", and "Interpersonal Approval"). Broadly speaking, the Transitional 
Stages in the SRM-SF do not in themselves represent discrete types of moral reasoning. but are 
combinations of Aspects from adjacent major stages. (Transition Stage 3-4 is, of course somewhat 
different in this respect as whilst it can be seen as a mid-way point between Stage 3 and Stage 4, there 
is a distinct style of reasoning - "relativism of personal values"- associated with this stage). 
As Gibbs, Basinger & Fuller (1992) put it: 
"The transitional phases generally do not lend themselves to distinct discussion because their content 
categories are blends of aspects of the adjacent stage levels" Gibbs, Basinger & Fuller, 1992:28 
So, for example, each Aspect in Transition Stage 2-3 combines Aspects from Stage 2 ("Exchanging 
and Instrumental") and Stage 3 ("Mutual and Prosocial"). In global terms Transition Stage 2-3 is seen 
as a move away from "reciprocity as fact" and a shift towards "more hypothetical and intrinsic aspects 
of sociomoral behaviour". However, it is not clear from Gibbs, Basinger & Fuller (1992) whether one 
should interpret Stage 2-3 as being tending more towards Stage 3, more towards Stage 2 or as an 
equal mix of both Stages. Intuitively, if one made reference to theory and GMSS levels, one would 
categorise Transition Stage 2-3 as more representative of Stage 3 than Stage 2: the score allocated to 
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Transition Stage 2-3 is 250, this falls at the lower end of Transition 3(2) in GMSS terms, which is 
deemed to represent "majority Stage 3 usage and minority Stage 2 usage". However, given the 
problems associated with GMSS levels described above, this type of characterisation would be purely 
speculative. 
It was stressed in the introduction to this thesis that the findings relating to gender differences 
presented in this document were restricted to the investigation of structural differences in moral 
judgement (or differences in global stage usage) and that the issue of between-group differences in 
moral content or orientation within global stages was not one that would be addressed in the current 
study. Given the problems associated with interpreting the findings relating to the Transitional Stages 
with reference to structure alone, clearly one would wish to tum to content analysis of SRM-SF 
protocols as a means of resolving the issue. However, analysis of Transitional Stage protocols with 
reference to the Aspects or content categories of the SRM-SF is in itself potentially problematic. 
As noted earlier, the "Aspects" in each Transitional Stage are combinations of Aspects from adjacent 
major stages. For example, for the "Property and Law" sociomoral value Transition Stage 2/3: 
"Aspect 6" combines the ''Needs'' aspect of Stage 2 with the "Empathic Role-Taking" aspect of Stage 
3. This combination could be theoretically coherent in terms of representing a specific style of 
reasoning when one considers the Bear and Rbys (1994) argument that Stage 2 "fuses" both a 
"hedonistic" style of moral reasoning and a more empathic "needs" based style of moral reasoning. 
One could argue that this particular combination would represent a care focus rather than a rights or 
justice focus. However, some of the other Transitional "Aspects" are not as straightforward to 
interpret in theoretical terms. For example, Transition 2/3: "Aspect 8" combines "Advantages" (Stage 
2, Aspect 6) with "Prosocial Intentions" (Stage 3, Aspect 4) and "Empathic Role Taking" (Stage 3, 
Aspect 2). On the face of it, this combination incorporates both care and justice orientations. 
A further difficulty in analysing SRM-SF data by content category emerges when one considers that a 
single SRM-SF item may elicit more than one moral justification. Whilst there are rules in the 
manual concerning the scoring of justifications that correspond to different moral stage levels, no 
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mention is made of how one should deal with protocols that correspond to different aspects within 
stages. It should also be noted that the way the Aspects are combined and the number of content 
categories in the Transitional levels vary according to the sociomoral values under consideration. The 
examples given above come from the "Property and Law" value which has ten content categories or 
sets of combined Aspects; however, if one turns to the "contract and truth" sociomoral value, one 
finds that there are only seven content categories or sets of combined Aspects. So, for the "Property 
and Law" value one finds that Transition Stage 2-3, Aspect 4 is a combination of "Freedoms" (Aspect 
3 from Stage 2) and "Normative Expectations" (Aspect 3 from Stage 3). However, no such 
combination exists for the "contract and truth" value. Furthermore, there is in any case, no content 
category for Transition 2-3 "contract and truth" that incorporates ''Normative Expectations" - this 
despite the fact that the "Normative Expectations" Aspect is represented in the Stage 3 protocols for 
this sociomoral value. 
The difficulties associated with making sense of the Transitional Stages are particularly problematic 
when considering the Transitional Stages 2-3 and 3-4 (save for the items associated with offending 
behaviour, little use was made of Transition Stage 1-2 by any of the participants). The majority of all 
participants - including the offenders - were demonstrating evidence of Stage 2 and Stage 3 mix to 
some degree, and the modal Stage of both the offenders and the female non-offenders was Transition 
Stage 2-3. In this sample, the comparative immaturity of the offenders compared to non-offenders 
appeared to be a matter oflevels of performance rather than due to an innate cognitive deficit. 
Clearly, one would wish to explore patterns in styles of reasoning further, for example to try and 
identify when and where offenders are most different from their non-offending peers. However, the 
confusion surrounding the interpretation of Transition Stage 2-3 in terms of both structure and content 
has resulted in a loss of potentially valuable information in this respect. 
It follows from the above that when considering the interpretation of the findings relating to 
Transition Stage 3-4 there are problems in differentiating between 'justice" and "care" orientations 
within this particular Stage. As with Transition Stage 2-3 some of the combinations of "Aspects" 
seem to be more theoretically coherent than others. For example, in the property and law sociomoral 
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value one finds that Transition 3-4: that "Aspect 4" combines "Normative Expectations" (Stage 3. 
Aspect 3) with "Societal Requirements" (Stage 4, Aspect 1). This combination would seem to be 
well-matched in terms of representing an extension of interpersonal norms towards the requirements 
of a complex social system (Gibbs et ai, 1992: 29). However in some other content categories the 
Aspects that have been combined are if anything conflicting rather than complementary. For 
example, "Aspect 2" combines "Empathic Role-Taking (Stage 3, Aspect 2) with "Basic Rights or 
Values" (Stage 4, Aspect 2), and "Aspect 6" combines "Normative Expectations" (Stage 3, Aspect 3) 
with "Responsibility" (Stage 4 Aspect 3). 
Given that Gilligan differentiates between the "rights oriented morality" of males and the 
"responsibility oriented morality" of females (Gilligan 1982:22); the Aspect 2 match of an "empathic" 
(strong care focus) aspect from Stage 3 with a "rights" (strong justice focus) aspect of Stage 4 seems 
rather odd. Intuitively, from the above examples, it would seem to be more appropriate to combine 
"Empathic Role-Taking" with "Responsibility" and "Normative Expectations" with "Basic Rights or 
Values". 
It would seem, then, that when seeking to analyse moral reasoning using categorical interpreting 
findings relating to the SRM-SF "Transitional Stages" may be problematic in terms of uncovering 
potential sources of heterogeneity in the sample. This issue does not seem to be easily reconcilable 
with reference to the individual content categories of these Stages as they currently stand. 
One could perhaps resolve the problem by adopting qualitative techniques to code the data, However. 
this would then negate the use of a standard scoring manual, and, in any case might not be practically 
feasible with large data sets such as the one in the current study. In the introduction to this thesis it 
was noted that Gannon et al (1996) found no evidence to support the claim that the SRM-SF exhibited 
stage bias favouring males, but did find some evidence to support the claim that females were more 
care focussed in terms of content of moral judgements within each moral stage. However, the 
findings presented by Gannon et al (1996) are restricted to the consideration of differing moral 
orientations of those providing Stage 2 and Stage 3 justifications, and no information is given 
regarding moral orientations of Transition Stage 2-3 reasoners. The study carried out by Garmon et al 
(1996) would appear to be the only work using SRM-SF data that has sought to investigate moral 
130 
orientation with reference to the individual Aspects within Global Stages. It is, therefore, unclear how 
previous researchers have tackled the apparently problematic nature of interpreting findings relating 
to the Transitional Stages. This issue is one that requires clarification in future studies using SRM-SF 
data. 
3.39 Recoding SRM-SF Data to Impose an Upper Limit of "Stage 3" on the Data 
The final set of analyses that were carried out involved "recoding" the SRM-SF data in order to 
impose arithmetical homogeneity on the different "mature" levels of moral reasoning (i.e. to treat 
"Stage 3", ''Transition Stage 3-4" and "Stage 4" as equivalent in numerical terms). The main purpose 
of this set of analyses was to demonstrate a methodological point: i.e. how heterogeneity in "mature 
stage" use might impact on summary mean scores. No claims are made regarding the legitimacy of 
this approach in terms of moral reasoning theory - indeed one would not wish to argue that "Stage 3" 
''Transition Stage 3-4" and "Stage 4" could all be treated as representative of the same global stage of 
moral reasoning in theoretical terms. However, as pointed out in the overview to the measure, there 
seems to be somewhat of a conflict in the SRM-SF literature. On one hand it is acknowledged that 
Stage 3, Transition Stage 3-4 and Stage 4 are all representative of moral maturity, however, for the 
purposes of statistical analysis these Stages are treated as representing different points on an 
ascending scale. 
Gibbs et al (1992) attempted to address the issue of potential gender bias in measures of moral 
reasoning during the initial validation of the SRM-SF. Along with other researchers their assumption 
has seemed to have been that were there to be stage bias favouring males in the SRM-SF this would 
be picked up through between-group differences in summary means. As reported earlier, there is little 
evidence from the SRM-SF research to indicate that this is the case, indeed, where gender differences 
have been found on the measure typically the trend has been for adolescent females to out-perform 
adolescent males. 
In lay terms, then, many researchers seem to be content with the view that females are not 
"handicapped" in performance terms on the SRM-SF; however, this is clearly not the same thing as 
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giving females a "level playing field" to start off with. The exploratory recoding of the data 
attempted to address this issue. Comparisons of the findings obtained from the recoded data with 
those using the original coding scheme indicated that had the females been given a level playing field 
to start off with then the initial picture regarding between-group differences in overall means 
presented in Chapter 2 would have been somewhat different. 
Without falling into the trap of trying to prove the null hypothesis, it is clear that had there been no 
bias favouring male non-offenders in the current study one should not have observed any differences 
in the fmdings from the overall ANCOVAs according to the coding schemes used. However, in the 
current study, whilst there were no between-group differences in the overall means of male and 
female non-offenders using the original coding scheme, once the data had been recoded a gender 
difference emerged that favoured females. This finding was corroborated when comparing between-
group differences in the means of SRM-SF items using the recoded data. Whereas when the original 
coding scheme was used between group differences were found for two of the items "Telling the 
Truth" and "Saving the life of a friend" (with males having significantly higher means on the item 
''Telling the Truth" and females having significantly higher means on the item "Saving the life of a 
friend"), once the data were recoded between-group differences were found favouring females on 
three additional SRM-SF items. 
On the face of it, recoding the data did little to change the picture regarding the differences between 
offenders and non-offender overall means. For both sets of analyses between-group comparisons of 
offender / male non-offender means were statistically significant at the p<O.OOllevel. However, it 
was interesting to note that recoding the data appeared to have some impact on the magnitude of the F 
value for the offender / male non-offender comparison. When using the original coding scheme the 
offender / male non-offender F value was 111.49 (1,293), whereas once the data were recoded the F 
value dropped to 86.94 (1, 293). As with the overall mean comparisons, at first sight the recoding of 
the data did little to alter the picture regarding the individual SRM-SF item comparisons. For the 
offender / male non-offender comparisons both sets of analyses identified statistically significant 
differences for all eleven items. However, on further investigation, here too there was some indication 
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to suggest that recoding the data did have an impact on the magnitude of the offender / male non-
offender comparisons. When the original coding scheme was used between group item comparisons 
of offenders and male non-offenders found significant differences at the p<O.OO I level for nine of the 
eleven items and significant differences at the p<O.O I level for the remaining two items; however 
when the data were recoded the number of significant differences at the p<O.OOllevel had dropped to 
seven out of eleven, with two of the remaining items achieving significance at the p<O.O I level and 
two achieving significance at the p<O.05 level. 
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3.4 CONCLUSION 
The accumulated evidence from the various sets of findings presented in this Chapter corroborated the 
view expressed at the end of Chapter 2 that reliance on mean scores as the sole of information about 
the moral reasoning of adolescents is problematic. Furthermore, results of the subsequent analyses 
cast serious doubt on the validity ofGMSS ratings to characterise the SRM-SF data set in the current 
study. 
Bearing in mind that these two summary indices are the ones that are most commonly presented in the 
moral reasoning literature, these findings may have potentially serious implications - both in terms of 
interpreting the previous research in this field and for future work in the field. It became clear during 
the course of the analyses that inter-individual and intra-individual variation in moral stage use within 
samples are factors that need much closer attention in any future SRM-SF research. 
Heterogeneity in mature stage use uncovered by the analyses presented in this chapter seemed to be of 
primary importance when considering the potential "distortion" of the original picture regarding 
between-group differences in SRM-SF mean scores. From the results of the categorical analyses 
carried out in the current study it was clear that this distortion was largely attributable to presence of 
Stage 4 reasoning within the male non-offending sample not evident amongst the other two groups (it 
will be recalled that amongst the offenders and female non-offenders use of Stage 4 reasoning was 
negligible). This disparity seems to have "inflated" the moral maturity of the male non-offenders 
relative to the other two groups. The effect was most noticeable when comparing gender differences 
amongst the non-offending sample; however, the potentially distorting impact of this type of disparity 
on offender / male non-offender comparisons should not be overlooked. 
The final chapter that follows attempts to bring together some of the general themes that have 
emerged from the study as a whole. The key outcomes of the study are presented and the overall 
findings will be discussed with reference to their more global theoretical contexts. 
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CHAPTER 4: GLOBAL DISCUSSION 
4.1 Overview 
The current study set out to address a number of theoretical and methodological issues concerning the 
assessment of "moral reasoning" in adolescents using the SRM-SF. In the first section of this final 
chapter, the main findings to emerge from the empirical studies presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
are reviewed. In the second section issues relating to the findings are discussed in their theoretical 
context. Some suggestions for future research are also provided. Concluding remarks are presented 
at the end of the chapter. 
4.11 Review of Analyses carried out in Chapter 2: 
The analyses presented in Chapter 2 included a partial replication of previous work using the SRM-SF 
to compare between-group differences amongst offending and non-offending adolescents. It was 
considered to be essential to present this replication before carrying out further studies using 
alternative analytic techniques. By and large, initial findings comparing between-group differences 
corroborated previous work in this area - with male non-offenders having significantly higher overall 
means than the offenders. Comparisons of gender differences amongst the non-offenders found no 
significant differences in overall SRM-SF means. Broadly speaking, comparisons of individual item 
means replicated the findings obtained from the analyses of summary mean scores. 
A variant to previous work was that age of the participants came more closely under scrutiny than in 
some studies that have used similar participant groups. Participants were categorised according to 
three different age bands and separate analyses were repeated for age group. The key differences to 
emerge as a result of classifying participants according to age related to the youngest age band. In 
this category no significant differences were found in the means of offenders and male non-offenders; 
however, female non-offenders demonstrated significantly higher means than the male non-offenders. 
As with the participant group as a whole, results of between-group comparisons of individual item 
means within age bands corroborated the fmdings obtained from SRM-SF summary means. 
Comparisons of SRM-SF overall means across age-group categories were also carried out. The 
findings from these set of analyses indicated that offender mean scores showed little change across 
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age group bands, whereas non-offenders' mean scores rose by age. Amongst the non-offenders the 
"improvement" in SRM-SF means across age categories was more pronounced for males than 
females. 
The variability around the SRM-SF means was explored. Perusal of the Standard Deviations around 
summary means revealed that the Standard Deviation was somewhat higher for the male non-
offenders than for the other two participant groups. Comparisons were made between the Standard 
Deviations obtained in the current study and those presented in reported findings in the SRM-SF 
literature. It was found that whilst the magnitude of the difference between the Standard Deviation of 
the male non-offenders and the other two groups was higher than that quoted in some previous 
studies, it was by no means aberrant. However, it was noted that it was difficult to make more than 
speculative claims regarding the comparability of the Standard Deviations observed in the current 
study, as information of this nature is not always reported in the SRM-SF literature. It was posited 
that heterogeneity in use of mature stages of moral reasoning may have been a factor accounting for 
the greater variability amongst the male non-offending sample. 
In addition to replicating previous SRM-SF comparative studies of offending and non-adolescents, 
some tests of the internal consistency of the SRM-SF were also carried out. These included inter-item 
correlations, related t tests on items within the so-called sociomoral values and Factor analyses on 
SRM-SF items. Whilst the results of all inter-item correlations were statistically significant, the 
results of the other analyses were less conclusive in terms of demonstrating internal consistency of the 
scale. The results of some of the related t tests posed questions about the validity of the sociomoral 
values as representing coherent content categories. The results of the factor analyses raised some 
issues regarding the structural unity of the SRM-SF domain. 
The final set of analyses to be presented in Chapter 2 explored the nature of the decisions participants 
made about the "importance" of each moral issue under consideration (i.e. whether participants rated 
an issue as very important, important or not important). Whilst the majority of the participants rated 
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all SRM-SF issues as important, differences between offenders and non-offenders were significant on 
a number of items with higher proportions of non-offenders rating issues as unequivocally important. 
4.12 Review of Analyses Presented in Chapter 3: 
The bulk of the between-group analyses that were presented in Chapter 2 had been carried out with 
reference to summary mean scores of either the questionnaire as a whole or of individual SRM-SF 
items. However, in the Conclusion to Chapter 2, concern was expressed about the efficacy of overall 
summary means to adequately represent moral stage use within the sample. The subsequent analyses 
that were presented in Chapter 3 sought to address this issue by investigating patterns of Stage use 
through the use of alternative methods of analysis. 
The first set of analyses set out to investigate the properties of the GMSS scale. The GMSS scale was 
of interest as GMSS ratings are commonly used in the moral reasoning literature to characterise the 
moral reasoning of participant groups. However, given that GMSS ratings are based on summary 
mean scores and the concerns that were expressed about the mean as a result of the analyses that were 
presented in Chapter 2, it was felt that the reliability and validity of the GMSS scale needed 
investigation. Furthermore, it was noted that the GMSS scale had been derived from previous moral 
reasoning measures but had effectively been directly transferred onto SRM-SF data; therefore the 
applicability of this scale to characterise SRM-SF data might be questionable. As a result of the 
investigations into the properties of the GMSS scale, the conclusion was drawn that GMSS ratings as 
they stood were of limited use to characterise SRM-SF data, especially amongst a sample where there 
was evidence of variability in stage use. 
Between-group differences in modal Stage use were also investigated. Comparisons of between-
group differences of offenders and male non-offenders were statistically significant; the differences 
were mainly attributable to higher proportions of non-offenders than offenders being modally "at" 
higher stages of moral reasoning. Comparisons of male and female non-offenders did not reveal any 
significant differences. However, it was noted that whilst modal stage was perhaps superior to the 
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mean in terms of representing actual patterns of Stage use, the reliability of the mode as a summary 
index was equally susceptible to variability in the sample. 
A key aim of the analyses presented in Chapter 3 was to explore potential sources of variation in stage 
use within the sample and to investigate the potential impact that this may have had on the reliability 
of various summary indices. Variation in the sample was investigated from a number of different 
perspectives. Comparisons of both intra-individual and inter-individual variation in Stage use were 
carried out. Patterns of intra-individual variation were of particular interest, as this seemed to be an 
area that had been largely neglected in previous SRM-SF research. Overall, there was evidence of 
relative intra-individual variability in patterns of Stage use, with few participants demonstrating a 
range of stages restricted to adjacent levels only. Between-group differences in were also found - it 
emerged that male non-offenders as a group were less structurally consistent than either the offenders 
or the female non-offenders. 
Having identified that there was relative intra-individual variability in patterns of Stage use, some 
attention was paid to identifying the potential sources of the variation. From a literature review, it 
appeared that aside from gender, two other factors figured prominently in the moral reasoning 
research into this area. One of these related to external "situational variables" potentially influential 
on moral reasoning performance, for example the nature of issue under consideration and/or the 
nature of the task condition. The other prominent factor related to internal mechanisms of 
developmental change - most notably with reference to so called patterns of "consolidation and 
transition" in stage use. 
On further investigation it was found that situational factors were unlikely to be the sole cause of 
variability in the sample. Whilst variations in the nature of the issue under consideration undoubtedly 
impacted on the overall variability in the sample (for example, participants tended to perform rather 
better on the item relating to keeping promises to children than to other items in the questionnaire, and 
performed less well on the "theft" item), this would not have accounted for the between-group 
differences in variability that emerged. Variation appeared to be unrelated to task condition in terms 
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of number of scorable responses supplied by participants. The finding that male non-offenders were 
the group who were demonstrating highest intra-individual variation also called into question a 
"situational" interpretation of the findings. Male and female non-offenders had all performed the task 
under similar conditions - as a classroom exercise - whereas many of the offenders had been 
interviewed on a one-to-one basis. 
Applying the "consolidation and transition" model to the overall SRM-SF data proved problematic. A 
particular difficulty involved trying to relate patterns of modal skew to levels of intra-variability in the 
sample. Overall, whilst there was evidence of intra-individual variation in stage use, the sample was 
negatively biased in terms of modal skew. This seemed contra to theory. It was acknowledged that 
the selection of the "highest mode" when bimodality was present may have been partially responsible 
for this fmding. However, it was pointed out that when intra-individual variability increases the risk 
of bimodality does also; it was not clear how previous studies had tackled this issue. 
It was noted that there were potential artifactual confounds associated with the "consolidation and 
transition" model related to inherent characteristics of moral reasoning scales; as with the question 
surrounding bimodality it was not apparent whether these issues had been considered in previous 
work. However, whilst there appeared to be problems applying the "consolidation and transition" 
model to the overall data set, it was felt that between-group differences in "positive" and "negative" 
skew around modal levels "Stage 2", "Transition Stage 2-3" and "Stage 3" would be potentially 
revealing and worthy of further investigation. 
A further aim of the analyses presented in Chapter 3 was to explore between-group differences in 
patterns of stage use using categorical techniques. A recent meta-analysis into gender differences in 
moral reasoning (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000) had concluded that whilst overall there was limited evidence 
to support the claim that males and females differ in terms of justice and care focus in moral 
reasoning, certain factors appeared to moderate the magnitude of these differences. Differences were 
apparently greatest amongst adolescents, when using measures that did not make use of a dilemma 
and when the outcome was categorical rather than continuous (Jaffee & Hyde 2000:720). 
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Furthermore, Jaffee and Hyde had expressed the need for further work in this field using measures 
that could be scored using both continuous and categorical techniques. 
Comparisons of patterns of stage use amongst offenders and non-offenders revealed findings 
comparable to those obtained when comparing overall SRM-SF means in Chapter 2. Non-offenders 
demonstrated more consistent use of "mature" stage use than offenders across SRM-SF items. 
However, despite the apparent moral "immaturity" of the offenders, it was felt that making the claim 
that offenders were demonstrating an overall structural cognitive deficit would be misplaced. Whilst 
non-offenders were "out-performing" the offenders on the SRM-SF, the majority of the offenders had 
evidenced Stage 3 reasoning to at least one item in the questionnaire. 
In contrast to the findings presented in Chapter 2, clear gender differences were found in patterns of 
Stage use. The main source of the differences appeared to result from heterogeneity in mature stage 
use, with only the male non-offenders demonstrating more than negligible use of Stage 4. However, 
some gender differences were also found in patterns of "immature" stage use - with male non-
offenders making greater use of Stage 1 reasoning. This greater use by male non-offenders of Stages 
at the extreme ends of the SRM-SF would, in part, account for the failure to uncover gender 
differences through the comparison of group means alone. 
When treating the data in categorical terms a problem arose regarding the interpretation of the 
findings relating to the Transitional Stages. It was pointed out that the Transitional Stages were 
essentially "blends" of adjacent major stages, and as such could not be considered to represent distinct 
styles of moral reasoning. This created particular difficulties when seeking to interpret findings 
relating to Transition Stage 2-3 and Transition Stage 3-4 (save for on items relating to offending 
behaviour, use of Transition Stage 1-2 was negligible amongst participants in the current study). 
Furthermore, referring to the individual content categories or "Aspects" within stages did not appear 
to resolve this issue. 
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The final set of analyses attempted to demonstrate how heterogeneity in mature stage use had 
potentially impacted on the original summary mean scores. Concern was expressed that the greater 
use of Stage 4 reasoning amongst male non-offenders established through the use of categorical 
analyses may have inflated the overall means of this sample, and thus may have distorted the original 
findings regarding the relative overall "moral maturity" of the participant groups. It was noted that 
the general finding that females perform "at least as well as" males on the SRM-SF was not in itself 
evidence that the measure is gender-fair. Data were recoded to impose arithmetical homogeneity on 
the mature levels "Stage 3", "Transition Stage 3-4" and "Stage 4". Exploratory ANCOVAs were 
carried out, and findings compared with those obtained using the original coding scheme. As 
suspected, the fmdings differed according to the coding method used. The main difference to emerge 
related to between-group differences in the overall means of male and female non-offenders. 
Whereas no significant differences had been observed between the overall means of male and female 
non-offenders using the original coding scheme, once the data were recoded significant differences 
were found between these two groups, with females apparently demonstrating higher levels of moral 
maturity than males. 
4.2 DISCUSSION OF KEY FINDINGS IN THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
4.21 Issues Relating to the Scoring Procedure of the SRM-SF 
It was noted in the overview to the measure that the conventional way of scoring the SRM-SF 
questionnaire by questionnaire rather than item by item was potentially suspect in terms of reducing 
intra-individual heterogeneity in Stage use. It was felt that this method potentially introduced a "rater 
expectancy" effect. In the current study, this issue was addressed by technique of scoring SRM-SF 
data item by item. However, there are other aspects of the scoring procedure which may be 
problematic in this respect and that are less easy to address. For example, the treatment of 
"ambiguous response units" and multiple justifications to a single SRM-SF item potentially results in 
loss of valuable information regarding heterogeneity in Stage use. It will be recalled that "ambiguous 
response units" that express ideas corresponding to disparate moral levels are discounted as 
"unscorable". When "ambiguous response units" express ideas that are equally matched at two 
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adjacent moral levels the justification is scored at the higher level, and when "ambiguous response 
units" express ideas equally matched to three disparate levels the justification is scored at the 
intennediate level (Gibbs et ai, 1992:50). When multiple justifications are provided to a single SRM-
SF item, the item is scored at the highest developmental level evidenced. 
One of the main reasons that the SRM-SF was devised - aside from addressing the theoretical 
concerns surrounding Kohlberg's Stage 5 and Stage 6 - was to provide a more reliable and practically 
applicable alternative to the MJI. The main practical difficulties associated with the MJI lie with the 
intricacies of inferential assessment of moral protocols and the complexities of the scoring procedure 
(Gibbs et ai, 1992). The SRM-SF has clear advantages over previous measures in terms of "user-
friendliness" and inter-rater reliability; however, - despite the finding that the measure demonstrates 
"acceptable validity" (Gibbs et al, 1992:39) - it is possible that the emphasis on improving overall 
reliability has made the SRM-SF less robust than some other moral reasoning measures in terms of 
underlying ecological validity. 
It is interesting to note that one of the criticisms that Gibbs et al (1992) make of so-called recognition 
measures is that the developmental level of moral justifications one recognises as being important 
may not correspond to the developmental level of moral justifications that are spontaneously 
produced. Or as Rest et al (1999) put it: 
"as production tasks probably under-estimate a person's development, a recognition task probably 
over-estimates a person's development" (Rest et al. 1999:52). 
However, the general strategy of scoring each SRM-SF item only at the highest moral level evidenced 
may in itself create a bias towards over-estimating a person's moral development. Furthermore, by 
limiting the coding procedure to the allocation of just one moral reasoning score for each item one has 
potentially restricted the amount of information available regarding inter-individual differences in 
moral reasoning performance. For example an individual who gives three "Stage 2" justifications and 
one Tmnsition Stage 2-3 justification to a single item will be scored at same stage for that item -
Transition Stage 2-3 - as an individual who provides four Stage 2-3 justifications to a single item. In 
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terms of "moral competence", both individuals are "at" the same level, however, in terms of 
underlying moral performance the above response profiles are very different. 
It will be recalled that when comparing overall means of offenders and male non-offenders in the 
youngest age group category, whilst the non-offenders had higher means than the offenders, between-
group differences were not statistically significant, with both groups apparently demonstrating a 
predominance of Stage 2 reasoning. In terms of overall moral competence, then, the two groups were 
apparently very similar. However it may have been the case that had one made reference to levels of 
performance through the consideration of multiple justifications to single items one might have 
uncovered differences between the two groups. Whilst no attempt was made in the current study to 
investigate the proportion of "multiple justifications" supplied to items, from eyeballing the data in 
the current study and on the basis of the author's previous experience in scoring SRM-SF 
questionnaires, it is apparent that British adolescents frequently supply multiple justifications to 
individual SRM-SF items. 
In Chapter 3 the attempt to apply the "Consolidation and Transition" model to SRM-SF data was 
unsuccessful. This was despite the suggestion made by Walker et al (2001: 196) that the 
"Consolidation / Transition" model usefully be applied to the measure. However, Walker et al (200 I) 
did note that their approach is more suited to deal with all moral reasoning data produced in response 
to issues, rather than summary item scores: 
"the Bayesian approach introduced here is designed to deal directly with the distribution o.f'stage-
typed raw scores, rather than summary scores or the SRMS, but otherwise these techniques could be 
readily be brought to bear on the raw data prOVided by either the SRM or the SRM-SF" <Walker et al 
2001:196) 
By the inclusion of all moral justifications provided to individual items - rather than restricting the 
data set to one summary score per item - one would perhaps be provided with raw data more sensitive 
to between-group differences and that are more amenable to analysis with reference the consolidation 
/ transition model. However, this then leaves the question of how one would modify the SRM-SF 
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scoring procedure in such a way that sufficient information is provided, but that the measure retains 
its advantage over the MJI in terms of "user-friendliness" and "reliability". It should be noted that 
one of the reasons that Walker et at (2001) put forward for applying the consolidation and transition 
model to the SRM-SF is because it is more easily administered and scored than the MJI (Walker. et al. 
2001:196). 
4.22 Use of summary indices to characterise moral reasoning of participants 
Use of any summary index poses problems in terms of effecting an uneasy compromise between 
providing a manageable way of rational ising data and losing information about individual differences 
within the sample. In the current study problems were identified with all summary indices commonly 
used to represent SRM-SF data (the summary mean, GMSS rating scale and the mode) in terms of 
potentially masking heterogeneity in the sample. Comparisons of overall means and modal stages 
failed to identify gender differences between the non-offenders that were later identified when 
comparing frequencies of stage use. It was found that inter-individual and intra-individual variability 
impacted on the utility of GMSS levels to characterise patterns of Stage use. 
There is an increasing awareness in the forensic literature that when considering the impact of clinical 
interventions with young people there is a need to pay greater attention to individual differences 
within sample populations. In the current study, in line with previous work, between group 
differences were found in overall SRM-SF means of offenders and non-offenders in the predicted 
direction. However, whilst it is clearly of use to be able to establish that the measure is able to 
discriminate between the two groups, this finding may be of limited clinical applicability. Friendship. 
Falshaw and Beech (2003) and Friendship et al (2003,b) comment that in the past researchers 
evaluating the impact of offending behaviour programmes have over-emphasised the use of group 
means, statistical significance and effect size as outcome measures (Friendship. Falshaw and Beech. 
2003: 120) (Friendship et al2003, b). They point out that whilst group means may give one an 
indication of the collective outcome ofan intervention they "mask" individual outcomes and are of 
limited value in terms of identifying individual clinical need at the pre-test stage. 
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Bearing in mind that moral reasoning forms a component of the most widely run cognitive 
behavioural interventions in UK prisons (Blud et ai, 2003; Wilson, et al 2003), one would wish to usc 
a measure such as the SRM-SF as an assessment tool at pre-test and at post-test. However, 
researchers considering using the SRM-SF as an outcome measure may wish to take into 
consideration the potential shortcomings of summary indices to characterise patterns of moral 
reasoning within participant groups. 
4.23 Attrition Rate Resultingfrom Unscorable Items 
It is worth remembering that potentially valuable information regarding heterogeneity in Stage use 
had been already been discarded at a very early phase of the current study through the exclusion from 
analysis of those questionnaires resulting in fewer than 7 scorable responses. This strategy was 
adopted because it followed the guidelines in the SRM-SF manual: 
"Questionnaires yielding fewer than 7 scorable responses do not result in reliable protocol scores, 
and should be discardedfrom analysis" (Gibbs et aI1992:55). Gibbs et al (1992) do not qualify this 
statement, so it is unclear on what basis this decision was made. Intuitively, one would imagine that 
this decision is based on the proportion of scorable information provided to the questionnaire as a 
whole: If an individual provides 7/11 scorable responses they have "given answers" to approximately 
64 % of the questionnaire items, if an individual gives only 6/ II scorable responses this percentage 
drops to approximately 55%. However, due to the structure of the SRM-SF, a decision made on this 
basis may not be as straightforward as it initially appears. 
The 11 SRM-SF items are grouped under 5 content categories known as sociomoral values: "Contract 
and Truth" (items 1-4), "Affiliation" (items 5 & 6), "Life" (items 7 & 8), "Property and Law" (items 9 
& 10) and "Legal Justice" (item 11). Leaving aside any issues relating to the internal consistency of 
the sociomoral values for the time being, it is clear that questionnaires deemed "valid" for analysis 
may vary considerably in terms of the content that has been covered. The only way to ensure that 
participants have provided information relating to all the moral values is if they have provided 
scorable responses to every SRM-SF item (this is due to the "Legal Justice" value being represented 
by one item only). On the other hand, clearly, it is possible to cover all the sociomoral values with 
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only 5/11 responses. It seems questionable to make the assumption that 7/11 scorable responses 
covering only 3/5 content categories is more "reliable" than 5 or 6 responses that cover all the 
sociomoral values. 
Information about heterogeneity in the proportion of content covered in the SRM-SF is clearly of 
relevance to the researcher. Firstly, if there are disparities in the amount of scorable information 
provided to the sociomoral values, this may raise issues regarding the face validity of some of these 
values. For example, in the current study, overall, somewhat fewer participants provided scorable 
responses to the "Life" value (n=365) than to the "Affiliation" value (n=406). Secondly, variation in 
the proportion of SRM-SF content covered may impact on the overall means. In the current study, 
even though all inter-value correlations were statistically significant, participants in all three groups 
tended to perform less well on the "Property and Law" value (means of offenders = 192.59, means of 
male non-offenders = 245.86, means of female non-offenders 244.37 ) than on the "Contract and 
Truth" value (means of offenders = 228.40, means of male non-offenders = 277.57, means of female 
non-offenders 271.88). 
It follows that the observations made regarding the sociomoral values also apply to the individual 
SRM-SF items. Furthermore, on the basis of the evidence from the current study, whilst all inter-
item correlations were statistically significant, the results of the related t tests carried out on items 
within the "values" had raised some questions regarding the internal consistency of some of the 
sociomoral values. For example, within the "Contract and Truth" value overall mean scores were 
significantly lower for the item ''Telling the Truth" than they were for the item "Keeping a promise to 
a friend". 
As with the sociomoral values, between-group differences of offender and non-offender item means 
were more pronounced for some items than for others - for example. However, as was reported in the 
overview to the measure, few studies have analysed between-group differences in the SRM-SF on an 
item by item basis. To the author's knowledge there is only one (Palmer & Hollin, 1998) that has 
presented findings related to individual SRM-SF items with a broadly comparable UK based sample, 
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and in the Palmer & Hollin (1998) study the participants were somewhat older than the ones in the 
current study. 
The overall attrition rate was somewhat higher in the current study than that quoted in some of the 
previous work. The attrition rate can in part be attributed to task conditions - not all offenders were 
willing or able to supply moral justifications to all items; non-offenders completed the task as a 
classroom exercise, and it was not possible to monitor individual response sets or to usc "probe" 
questions when moral justifications were not forthcoming to particular items. However it was noted 
that when scoring the SRM-SF that four items in particular seemed to elicit a higher proportion of 
"unscorable" responses than others. These were: "Keeping a promise to a stranger", "Saving the life 
of a stranger", "Living even if you don't want to" and "Judges sending lawbreakers to jail". The 
strategy of scoring each questionnaire item-by-item probably accounts for the higher proportion of 
unscorable responses supplied to the "Stranger" items - these items "follow on" from questions that 
ask about "keeping a promise to a friend" and "saving the life of a friend", and a number of 
respondents provided answers such as "Same as before" to these items. (Whilst participants are 
instructed not to answer questions in this way, there are guidelines in the SRM-SF manual that allow 
one to assign the "same score" to this type of response as was assigned to the previous response. 
Clearly in the current study, having adopted the strategy of scoring responses item-by-item it would 
have been inappropriate to follow this procedure). However, the apparent difficulty in supplying 
scorable responses to the other two items is less easy to explain with reference to task conditions. 
As was described in the "method" section of the current study, a high proportion ofunscorable 
responses to the item "How important is it to live even if you don't want to?" arose as a result of 
participants giving answers like "it's up to them", "it's their choice" or "it's their life". It was pointed 
out that there was an apparent discrepancy in the SRM-SF manual relating to this type of response, in 
that it is given as an example ofa scorable Stage 2, Aspect 3 "Freedoms" type response (Gibbs et ai, 
1992:100) but cited as being unscorable when presenting Transition Stage 3-4 protocols to this item 
(Gibbs et ai, 1992: 106). On the face of it, it would seem that without further qualification this type of 
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response is equally well matched to Stage 2 and to Transition Stage 3-4 "Relative Personal Values". 
For the sake of rig our, then, in the current study, this type of response was deemed to be unscorable. 
The SRM-SF is more user-friendly in many respects than the MJI, however, it may be at somewhat at 
a disadvantage regarding the quantity of the moral reasoning data that it elicits to each issue. The 
lengthy interview technique of the MJI and use of probe questions to each dilemma, whilst susceptible 
in terms of reliability, clearly has the potential to elicit more information than a task where 
participants are required to supply written responses to a single question concerning a moral issue. 
It may be that for the "Living even if you don't want to" item, some of the shorter written answers do 
not provide the rater with enough information to code the item appropriately. Whilst the authors of 
the measure do advocate the use of "probe" questions in circumstances where insufficient information 
is supplied to an item, it should be remembered that the measure is presented as one that easily be 
administered as a pen-to paper task in group settings, and even, amongst adults, by mail (Gibbs et al 
1992:43). 
In Kohlberg & Elfenbein, 1975, illustrations are given of different "stage" responses to a moral 
dilemma asking if a doctor should "mercy-kill" a dying patient (which on the face of it is a similar 
moral issue to "living even if you don't want to"). This is a small excerpt from the "Stage 2" response 
of Jim aged 13: "If she requests it, it's really up to her" (Kohlberg & Elfenbein, 1975 :624); the 
following is taken from the "Stage 5" response of Jim aged 22: " ... {fit's her own choice, I think there 
are certain rights and privileges that go along with being a human being ... " (Kohlberg & Elfenbein. 
1975:625). These are snippets taken out of the context of much lengthier replies, and out of context. 
they are perhaps difficult to code reliably. It is only by examining the complete protocols supplied to 
this Kohlberg dilemma that one is clearly able to identify maturational differences in the types of 
responses given (Kohlberg & Elfenbein 1975:624-625). It is possible then, that for this type of issue a 
single probe question may not always be sufficient to elicit "scorable" moral reasoning data, 
particularly amongst younger participants. 
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It is possible that for adolescents the item "Living even if you don't want to" is one that is perceived 
as less ofa "moral issue" than some of the other issues under consideration in the SRM-SF, Some 
indication that this might have been the case came from the comparisons of the "importance" ratings 
of the items that were presented at the end of Chapter 2. As reported in the overview to the measure. 
Gibbs et al (1992) claimed that the issues put forward in the questionnaire represent commonly held 
values, Gregg et al (1994) corroborated this claim with their US based sample, with the majority of 
subjects rating all items as "important" or "very important", However, It was the "living even if you 
don't want to" question that received the lowest (88%) importance rating, with all other items 
achieving more than 90% consensus on importance, In the current study, when importance ratings 
were compared, care was taken to identify those who "unequivocally" considered the issue to be 
"important", thus the overall findings regarding "importance" ratings were somewhat lower than in 
the Gregg, Gibbs & Basinger (1994) study, Still, even with this modification it was found that the 
majority of participants rated SRM-SF issues as "unequivocally" important. However. as with the 
Gregg et al (1994) study "Living even if you don't want to" had the lowest importance rating of all 
the items (overall 61.5% rated this item as unequivocally important - compared to a 97% consensus 
for the highest rated item "Saving the life of a friend"), 
Berkowitz et al (1995) point out that self-harm - of which suicide is perhaps the most obvious form -
occupies an unusual prescriptive status in Western culture, On the one hand. it is considered morally 
wrong, yet on the other it is frequently argued that self-harm should not be subject to social control 
(Berkowitz et alI995:202). Berkowitz et al (1995) note that whilst there is a considerable body of 
research that has investigated how adolescents make psychological meaning of self-harm, and in 
particular suicidal behaviour, little is known about how adolescents make Dl2Jlll meaning of self-
harm (Berkowitz et ai, 1995:215), They cite evidence to suggest that adolescents may be more likely 
to view acts of self-harm as "prudential events" rather than as moral events, and that "prudential 
events" are perceived as "less wrong" and "less important" than moral acts impacting on others, 
Clearly the response "it's up to them" that was frequently elicited to the "Living if you don't want to" 
in the current study would seem to indicate that for a number of the adolescents this issue may be 
perceived as a matter of personal choice rather than as a moral act impacting on others, Furthermore, 
149 
given that in the past few years there have been a number of highly publicised "Right to die" cases 
presented in the media, it is perhaps hardly surprising that this question resulted in a more equivocal 
response set than other issues in the SRM-SF. Given the prevalence of self-harm and risk-taking 
amongst adolescents, Berkowitz et aI cite the need for further research into this area as a matter of 
urgency (Berkowitz et al 1995). Researchers interested in pursuing this area of investigation might 
wish to explore ways that the "Living even if you don't want to" item could be elaborated on in order 
to elicit information that provides more insight into the adolescent perspective. 
When it came to the item "How important is it for judges to send people who break the law to jail?" a 
number ofunscorable responses took the form of "it depends" or "it depends what they've done". On 
the face of it, the wording of this item makes it conceptually less straightforward to answer than some 
of the other items in the questionnaire. The wording may be particularly problematic for an 
adolescent sample - given that a number of the law-breaking activities commonly engaged in by 
adolescents (for example status crimes such as smoking and drinking under-age) do not usually result 
in custodial sentences. 
The ')udges sending people to jail" item seems to be qualitatively rather different in terms of 
"perspective taking" than some of the other items in the SRM-SF - for example "How important is it 
to keep a promise to a friend?". It would seem to be rather easier for a young person to imagine 
themselves in the position of the person keeping a promise to a friend than in the position of a judge 
sentencing a criminal. Furthermore, given that some of the young people answering this question 
were young offenders, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect that they would be willing or able to adopt 
the perspective of an individual giving out a jail sentence. As Krebs et al (1997) note, there are 
several "performance" factors that have been found to impact on moral reasoning, these include 
variations in "self "rather than "other" as the focus of the moral decision and variability in the 
consequences for the protagonist and recipient of the moral act. In this case, for the young offenders 
at least, it seems plausible that "self' is more likely to be viewed as the potential object of the 
punishment rather than "other". In a similar vein, it was interesting to note that on the item "Keeping 
a promise to a child", participants - including young offenders - tended to perform rather better than 
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on the other items in the questionnaire. For this issue, it may have been the case that the young 
people took the perspective of the recipient - the child - rather than of the person fulfilling the 
obligation. Amongst adults, perspective taking in terms of identifying with the protagonist or the 
recipient on both the "Judges sending people to jail" and "keeping a promise to children" might have 
been rather different than amongst an adolescent sample. As this is not an issue that seems to have 
been addressed in the SRM-SF literature, it is one that would seem worthy of exploration in future 
research. 
4.24 Issues Relating to Aspects Within Stages: 
In line with Kohlbergian theory the key emphasis of the SRM-SF is on the global structure of the 
moral reasoning justifications made rather than the on the content of decisions made about the various 
issues under consideration. Nevertheless, through the inclusion of "Aspects" within moral stages the 
SRM-SF should allow for the exploration of responses with reference to moral orientations within 
developmental levels. Indeed, during the initial "Self-training" phase of SRM-SF familiarisation one 
is advised to code the practice exercises according to the Aspects within stages. However, from 
perusal of the manual, particularly when referring to the Transitional Stages, it would appear that the 
"Aspects" may need further clarification if one is to gain maximum insight into differing moral 
orientations from SRM-SF data. 
It was noted when carrying out the categorical analyses that there was some difficulty interpreting the 
findings relating to the Transitional Stages and that attempting to resort to the Aspects within stages 
would not resolve this issue. The way in which aspects from adjacent major stages had been 
combined to form the content categories in the Transitional Stages did not always appear to be 
entirely theoretically coherent. Furthermore, there appeared to be some variation in the content 
categories according to the moral issue under consideration. 
Up until now, for the majority of researchers who have used the SRM-SF, potential problems 
associated with the Transitional Stages and Aspects within stages have not been issues - in line with 
the guidelines in the manual, findings are presented with reference to summary stage scores, most 
usually as an average over all questionnaire items. However, given that in the current study, findings 
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differed according to the technique of analysis that was adopted, (for example, whilst there were no 
overall differences in male and female non-offenders in summary means, clear gender differences 
emerged once the data were analysed using categorical techniques) and the identified need in the 
forensic research literature to represent intervention outcomes using indices more sensitive to change 
than summary means, it is apparent that these issues are important ones to address in future rescarch. 
Whilst it is almost undoubtedly the case that Gibbs et al (1992) have derived the "facets" or "Aspects" 
that define the moral stages on the basis of their considerable experience with other measures of moral 
reasoning, this is not explicitly stated in the SRM-SF manual. Furthermore, although it seems 
plausible that the protocols provided as scoring exemplars are representative of those most commonly 
provided in the construction phase of the measure, no specific information is given by Gibbs et al 
(1992) on this point. From the manual, there is no indication as to whether protocols represent more 
"typical" responses to an issue than others. The moral reasoning research goes back several decades. 
with MJI protocols being initially derived from US based males in the 1950s. It goes without saying 
that cultural and historical changes may have considerable impact on the nature of discourse 
surrounding moral issues. In the current study, coding the protocols was carried out with strict 
reference to the SRM-SF manual - no attempt was made to analyse the data in qualitative terms (the 
size of data set in the current study would have posed considerable practical difficulties to this typc of 
analysis). However, given the apparent problems in classifying some of the responses made to some 
of the items, it may be the case that by adopting a "Grounded Theory" approach (Strauss & Corbin 
1998) to SRM-SF data one might elicit moral themes that better represent the moral discourse of UK 
based adolescents in the 21st Century. 
4.25 Issues Relating to Age o!Participanls: 
It seems from some studies using the SRM-SF that more attention needs to be paid to the ages of the 
participants in the sample. Bearing in mind that the SRM-SF is a developmental measure it was 
somewhat surprising to discover during the literature review that in some studies (e.g. Palmer & 
Hollin, 1998) participants of a heterogeneous age range were treated as a homogenous group. It 
should be noted that this strategy was also adopted in the meta-analysis carried out by Jaffee & Hyde 
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(2000) that attempted to resolve conflicts in the literature regarding gender differences in patterns of 
moral reasoning. In their meta-analysis all "young people" aged between II and 19 were categorised 
as "adolescents" (Jaffee and Hyde 2000). Furthermore, the ages of some of those classed as 
adolescents were estimated - in some cases the midpoint of the sample age range was used. 
Therefore one cannot be clear from the meta-analysis what the actual age distribution of the 
adolescent sample was. Neither was it possible to tell whether there were disproportionately greater 
numbers of older females than younger males in the sample, or vice versa. So whilst Jaffee and Hyde 
noted that the magnitude of gender differences appeared to be greatest during adolescence it is not 
possible to tell from their study when and where these differences manifested themselves. 
Taking account of age disparities would seem to be particularly important when investigating moral 
reasoning amongst an adolescent sample. In the current study, once the sample was categorised 
according to age groups, information was revealed that was not identifiable from the sample as a 
whole. For example, when comparing overall between-group differences amongst male and female 
non-offenders no differences were found in overall means. However. once the sample was partitioned 
according to age bands it was found that younger female non-offenders had significantly higher 
means than the male non-offenders. Furthermore. whilst in the overall sample male offenders had 
significantly higher means than the offenders, in the youngest age group category there were no 
significant differences between the offender and male-non offender means. Differences between 
these two groups only emerged in the second age group band. Whilst the data were cross-sectional, 
the categorisation of participants according to age enabled one to make comparisons across age bands, 
these comparisons indicated that as a group the male non-offenders were showing more dramatic 
shifts in terms of moral reasoning means across age bands than either of the other two groups. 
Clearly, information of this nature is potentially extremely valuable when seeking to gain insight into 
normative patterns of moral development amongst adolescents; furthermore, adolescence is a time 
where marked maturational changes may take place over a span of months rather than years. It seems 
rather curious, then, that some researchers using the SRM-SF have apparently paid so little attention 
to potential age-related confounds within their sample. For example, in the Jaffee and Hyde (2000) 
meta-analysis where young people from 11-19 years old were classified as "adolescents", differences 
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in ')ustice" and "care" reasoning as evidenced in moral reasoning scores amongst older adolescents 
may have been partially cancelled out due to known gender differences in maturational rates amongst 
the younger participants. Moreover, when considering moral reasoning differences between an 
offending and a non-offending adolescent sample, taking account of relative chronological age would 
seem to be paramount, particularly when considering clinical interventions with young people. 
4.26 Ignoring "Flags" to Variability Present in Research Findings: 
In the previous sections, some attention has been paid to the way in which certain aspects of the 
scoring and analysis procedure of the SRM-SF may contribute to the masking of heterogeneity in 
stage use within the sample. However, it also appears from some studies that when evidence of 
heterogeneity in stage use is found within samples, there is a tendency to overlook this type of 
information. For example, a review of the literature found that although in some studies using the 
SRM-SF Standard Deviations were presented along with summary means, typically researchers 
tended to mention variation around the mean "in passing". In the current study, it was found that 
whilst there was little difference in overall means of males and females, the standard deviation was 
higher amongst male non-offenders. As not all moral reasoning studies present their findings relating 
to standard deviations around the mean, there were difficulties in establishing whether this finding 
was representative of previous work. Nevertheless, there seemed to be no indication from the 
available research that the standard deviations were aberrant. 
Clearly, information that one can glean from the standard deviations around moral reasoning means is 
potentially useful in a variety of ways. Between-group differences in magnitudes of standard 
deviations may add weight to, or qualify findings relating to group means. For example, as noted 
above, in the current study standard deviations around overall means were higher amongst male non-
offenders than amongst the other two groups. When one takes this finding in conjunction with the 
finding that between-group differences between offenders and male non-offenders in overall mcans 
were statistically significant, added weight is given to a claim that in a mixed-age sample offenders 
are demonstrating lesser evidence of developmental progression in moral reasoning than male non-
offenders. The finding that male and female non-offenders in the oldest age group category had 
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similar means (male non-offender means:: 278.74, female non-offender means = 272.41) but 
somewhat different standard deviations (male non-offenders SD = 41.14, female non-offenders 29.31) 
provided one with the preliminary indication that males were demonstrating greater heterogeneity in 
mature stage use that was later corroborated through the use of categorieal analyses. It would appear. 
then, in the SRM-SF research, that when presenting findings relating to summary means, greater 
attention needs to be paid to sources of variability as evidenced through standard deviations. 
4.27 Patterns of Intra-Individual Variation 
The current study appears to be the first to make a systematic attempt to investigate levels of intra-
individual variation in stage use with reference to SRM-SF data. Therefore one eannot tell whether 
the findings in the current study were idiosyncratic. From the analyses that were presented in Chapter 
3, it was apparent that participants were demonstrating relative intra-individual variation in stage use 
across SRM-SF items, there were problems, though, when it came to trying to pin-point the sources of 
this variation. A review of work carried out in this area using alternative moral reasoning measures 
such as the DIT and the MJI revealed that aside from gender differences two factors figured 
prominently in the literature: "external" situational factors potentially influential on moral reasoning 
performance, and variations in patterns of "consolidation" and ''transition'' associated with "internal" 
mechanisms of developmental change. However, on further investigation, neither model seemed 
adequate in itself to account for the patterns of variation observed in the current study. 
As reported earlier, difficulties in applying the "consolidation and transition" model to SRM-SF data 
may stem in part from the scoring procedure of the measure - assigning summary scores to each item, 
rather than including all raw stage-typed data elicited by participants. A further study that compared 
differences in patterns of stage distribution obtained with standard SRM-SF data with those obtained 
when including all stage typed information provided to items might be able to shed further light on 
this issue. 
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Whilst it seemed clear that overall patterns of intra-individual variation may have partially resulted 
from situational factors relating to the nature of the issue under consideration, certain variations in 
task conditions did not seem to impact on levels of intra-individual variability. Furthermore the 
finding that male non-offenders demonstrated significantly higher intra-individual variation than the 
other two groups poses problems when seeking to interpret the findings purely with reference to a 
situational framework. Male and female non-offenders had all performed the task under the same 
environmental conditions. 
As reported in the introduction to this thesis, researchers investigating sources of variability in moral 
reasoning have turned their attention to a wide range of potentially mediating variables. Indeed, as 
Krebs et al (1997) point out, the study of performance factors impacting on moral reasoning is 
potentially never-ending (Krebs et al1997: 135). Typically, though, in the literature relating to intra-
individual variability in moral reasoning, one finds that the research is somewhat polarised, with 
studies tending to focus either on external situational factors Qr on internal person-related 
characteristics as mediators of moral reasoning. Rather less attention in the research has been paid to 
the investigation of the potential interaction between these types of processes. 
For example, Narvaez, et al (1999) note that in the study of moral development two models are 
typically put forward to explain change: "cultural socialisation" and "internal cognitive construction 
of moral meaning" (Narvaez et al, 1999:478). However, in the literature these models are frequently 
treated as "rival explanations" rather than as mutually interactive (Narvaez et al I 999:479). 
Those studies that have sought to investigate the interaction between person-related characteristics 
and situational factors as mediating influences on moral reasoning have typically compared gender 
differences in stage use across so-called "real life" and "hypothetical dilemmas". The results of these 
studies have been mixed. For example, whilst a number of studies demonstrate that participants' 
moral reasoning varies across types of dilemma (e.g. Haviv & Leman, 2002; Wark & Krebs, 2000; 
Wark & Krebs, 1996~ Jadack et al, 1995~ Carpendale & Krebs, 1992; and see review by Krebs et al 
1997), the results regarding the impact of gender are conflicting. Furthermore, due to variations in 
experimental design and potential confounds associated with some of the studies, the findings are 
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sometimes hard to interpret (further issues relating to some of this previous work will be discussed 
when considering the implications of the gender differences observed in the current study). 
It would seem plausible that the patterns of intra-individual variability observed in this sample may be 
the result of a complex interaction between age, gender, offence status, environmental conditions and 
nature of the issue under consideration. For example, whilst the male and female non-offenders 
carried out the task under ostensibly the same conditions - as a classroom exercise - it may be the 
case that the task condition has the potential to elicit more intra-individual variability amongst males 
than amongst females. It was noted in Chapter 3 that in a study carried out by Gaiotti et al (1991) 
where males and females were asked to carry out an open ended essay task giving examples of 
personally relevant moral issues females tended to respond more thoroughly to the task than males. In 
the UK, females are now out-performing males in terms of academic performance at all levels of 
secondary education, it may be the case that the written task was more onerous for some of the males 
than it was for the females. On the other hand, given that moral reasoning protocols in measures such 
as the MJI were initially generated on the basis of male moral justifications. the SRM-SF may simply 
be more sensitive to intra-individual variation amongst males than it is amongst females. Were this to 
be the case, then the finding that male non-offenders demonstrated greater intra-individual variation 
than the (male) offenders might be attributable to differential patterns of developmental change in the 
two samples - mirroring the fmdings obtained when comparing between-group differences in the 
standard deviations of the participant groups. 
Aside from those longitudinal studies exploring patterns of consolidation and transition amongst 
young people, much of the more recent work exploring internal structural flexibility in moral 
judgement within males and females has been carried out amongst adults - frequently university 
students - based in the US or in Canada. Less attention has been paid in the research to exploring 
potential sources of intra-individual variation amongst adolescents. Furthermore, whilst there are a 
host of studies that have investigated potential mediators of inter-individual differences in moral 
reasoning amongst offenders, little interest has been shown in the research in exploring patterns of 
intra-individual variation in moral reasoning amongst this participant group. Bearing in mind the 
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recent concerns expressed in the forensic literature regarding the efficacy of summary indices to 
identify clinical need it seems clear that further research in this area is required. 
4.28 Observations Regarding the Offending Sample. 
In line with a now well-established body of research, the initial analyses comparing overall SRM-SF 
means of offenders and male non-offenders revealed significant between-group differences, with non-
offenders demonstrating higher means than non-offenders. It was of course useful to be able to 
corroborate previous work in this area, however, the finding in itself does little in terms of providing 
an original contribution to the field and is limited in terms of its clinical applicability. The findings 
resulting from the subsequent analyses that were carried out are, however, potentially more interesting 
in terms of novel information that was provided. 
Researchers using the SRM-SF to compare the moral reasoning of offenders and non-offenders have 
tended to attribute the poorer performance of the offending group to a "pervasive cognitive structural 
immaturity" (e.g. Gregg et al1994; Palmer & Hollin, 1998). However, in the current study. whilst 
offenders were overall apparently globally "at" a lower level of moral reasoning than their non-
offending peers, the results of the subsequent analyses would seem to call this type of interpretation 
into question. From the results of the comparisons of the SRM-SF summary means of offenders and 
male non-offenders in Age Group 1 presented in Chapter 2, one was not able to evidence a global 
structura1 deficit in the offending group. Although the mean scores were higher amongst the male 
non-offenders, between-group differences were not statistically significant. In Chapter 3, once the 
data were analysed in categorical terms it was found that whilst overall non-offenders were more 
consistent in their use of "mature" stages, a substantial majority of the offending sample were 
providing "Stage 3" justifications to at least one item in the SRM-SF. 
In the Discussion in Chapter 2, it was acknowledged that the results pertaining to the younger males 
may have been idiosyncratic to the current study. The sample size available for comparison was 
rather small, it may have been the case that had one made between-group comparisons amongst a 
larger data set significant between-group differences would have emerged. Furthermore, it was noted 
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that whereas in some studies (e.g. Gregg et ai, 1994) efforts were made to "clean" the non-offending 
data set by eliminating school students perceived by teachers as exhibiting conduct disorders. no 
attempt in the current study was made to clean the data set in this way. However. it was also pointed 
out that a certain amount of data "cleansing" of the non-offending sample would probably have 
occurred by default, with those pupils excluded from school for challenging behaviour being naturally 
eliminated from the sample. Moreover, it was posited that the younger offenders may have 
represented an extreme point of the spectrum in terms of persistent anti-social behaviour, having been 
convicted of a criminal offence at a very young age. For example, if one refers to recently published 
statistics comparing patterns of crime during the adolescent years, one finds that in 1998 27,300 
young people were found guilty or cautioned for a criminal offence in the 12-14 age group, this rose 
sharply to 67,200 in the 15-17 age group, and then levelled off somewhat in the 18-20 age group 
77,500 (Coleman & Schofield, 2001:87). 
As was pointed out earlier, previous studies using the SRM-SF to compare moral reasoning levels of 
young offenders and non-offenders have used samples with rather broad age ranges. Furthermore, the 
average age of both offending and non-offending participants in those studies was somewhat older 
than the average age of the participants in the current study. As far as the author is aware. this was the 
first study to date that sought to investigate differences in SRM-SF scores between younger offenders 
and non-offenders. In order to clarify the position one would need to carry further comparative 
studies amongst male offenders and non-offenders in this age group. Further research of this nature 
would seem to be essential, as if the findings observed in the current study are replicated. then this 
may present problems for those seeking to use the SRM-SF as an assessment tool with younger 
offenders. 
It may be the case that although the differences in mean scores between the younger (male) offenders 
and male non-offenders are not statistically significant, they do represent a critical difference in terms 
of criminogenic risk. As Friendship et al (2003b) point out in their discussion of the assessment of 
clinical interventions, differences in effect size ignore the relevance of the level of functioning 
amongst participant groups (Friendship et al 2003b: 120). The male non-offender means were higher 
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than offenders by some 10 points (male non-offenders = 228.84, offenders = 218.41). This difference 
may seem minimal numerically, however, it may represent an important one in terms of identifying 
clinical need amongst the offending group. 
Clearly, the difficulties associated with the GMSS scale that were identified in Chapter 3 - most 
notably as a result of intra-individual and inter-individual variability in stage use - preclude one from 
using this scale as a reliable index of the moral reasoning levels of participants. Nevertheless it is 
perhaps interesting to note that the mean scores of the younger offenders and male non-offenders 
correspond to differing levels of the GMSS scale. The mean score of the offenders in Age Group I 
(218.84) corresponds to global GMSS level "Stage 2" whereas the mean score of the non-offenders 
(228.41) corresponds to global GMSS level "Stage 2(3)". In theoretical terms, then, if a future study 
replicated the findings amongst a "structurally consistent" sample the higher score of the non-
offenders mean scores would represent the first signs of the morally desirable shift from Stage 2 
reasoning towards Stage 3 reasoning (if one adopts the Gibbs et al (1984), view that Stage 3 acts as a 
"cognitive buffer" against anti social behaviour). 
Given that the first indications that there is a shift towards Stage 3 is manifested in the production of 
''Transition Stage 2-3" moral justifications, one might seek to explore patterns of stage amongst the 
younger males with reference to the frequencies of Stage 2 and Transition Stage 2-3 mix across the 
eleven items of the questionnaire. However, as was pointed out in Chapter 3, problems were 
encountered when seeking to interpret the data set in this way. Clearly, the overall level of variability 
in range of scores that was problematic when seeking to interpret the findings with reference to 
GMSS ratings is also an issue when seeking to characterise the data with reference to potential 
proportions of "adjacent stage mixes". It was found that in the current study, very few of the 
participants restricted their stage use to adjacent levels only. Furthermore, as not many participants in 
the current study provided scorable responses to all eleven items in the questionnaire, one could 
hardly claim that profiling the data set in this way was representative of the participant sample as a 
whole. Finally, there is, in any case, as far as the author is aware, no information currently available 
in the SRM-SF regarding typical response sets associated with the moral developmental levels. 
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However, for those interested in using the SRM-SF with younger males in future research it may be of 
interest to note that if one were to "translate" the mean scores of the younger offenders and male non-
offenders into proportions of Stage 2 and Stage 2-3 mix across eleven items, the differences in the 
mean scores would result in rather differing profiles for the two groups. In terms of a "Stage 2" and 
"Transition Stage 2-3" mix the mean score of the offenders approximates to seven "Stage 2" 
responses and four '1'ransition Stage 2-3" responses (this mix results in a score of 218.18) whereas 
the mean score of the male non-offenders approximates to five "Stage 2" responses and six 
'1'ransition Stage 2-3" responses (this mix results in a score of 227.27). In an "ideal case" scenario. 
then, where there is evidence of structural consistency amongst participants providing scorable 
responses to all SRM-SF items, whilst the younger offenders are showing majority "Stage 2" and 
minority "Transition Stage 2-3" use across the SRM-SF, the reverse is true of the non-offenders. 
Thus a minimal difference in SRM-SF means may represent a very real difference in terms of moral 
reasoning developmental levels. 
As was noted earlier, the representation of the moral reasoning evidenced to individual SRM-SF items 
through the use of one summary score alone may mask important information regarding raw stage 
typed data being elicited through multiple justifications to issues. This may be of particular 
importance when seeking to identify differences between younger males. As reported in the 
Discussion in Chapter 2, typically, in the research when comparing the moral reasoning of offending 
and non-offending adolescents one fmds that offenders are comparatively immature in relation to non-
offending peers, and that there is greater evidence of "Stage 3" use amongst the non-offenders. It was 
pointed out that whereas it may be relatively straightforward to make a distinction between 
proportions of "Stage 2" use and "Stage 3" use amongst an adolescent sample with a broad age-range. 
or amongst older adolescents; in theoretical terms one might expect to encounter difficulties when 
seeking to make the same kind of distinction amongst the younger males, as "Stage 2" represents the 
norm for this age group. However, it may have been the case that had one made reference to all the 
types of moral information being provided to each item, one might have been able to better 
discriminate between the younger offenders and male non-offenders. For example, one might have 
found through scrutinising multiple justifications provided by the younger males that whilst summary 
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scores attained for items were similar in terms of being coded as "Stage 2" or "Transition Stagc 2-3", 
performance levels in terms of consistent production of these stages within items differed betwcen 
groups. Bearing in mind that one of the reasons offered as a possible explanation of the apparent 
failure to apply the "consolidation and transition" model to the SRM-SF scores in the current study 
was paucity of raw stage type data, this would seem to be an area worthy of further investigation in 
the research. 
A further explanation of the failure to establish global differences between the younger males offered 
in Chapter 2 was that the younger offenders may not be very different in terms of overall moral 
reasoning but may be manifesting specific deficits that are in themselves risk factors for the 
development of moral reasoning. The one issue where clear differences did emerge between the 
younger offenders and male non-offenders was on the item "Obeying the law". This was of course 
the one area where there were clear behavioural differences between the two groups. It was posited 
that moral reasoning disparities amongst younger males in this sub-domain had the potential for 
considerable "knock-on" effects resulting in global divergence in moral reasoning in later years. For 
example it was argued that continued involvement in persistent offending activity was likely to 
"reinforce" the "Stage 2" reasoning already present and was not conducive to a normative 
developmental shift towards Stage 3 "Mutual and Prosocial" reasoning. It was pointed out that 
criminal activity is more easily justifiable to the young person if they focus on "pragmatic" 
considerations rather than taking the perspective of the victim; it was also noted that continued 
involvement in offending behaviour was likely to have a negative impact on those "normal" social 
relationships considered essential by Kohlbergian theorists for the development of global moral 
competence. 
The finding that younger offenders and non-offenders differed on the item "How important is it to 
obey the law?" is potentially interesting, nevertheless this item represents only one out of the eleven 
issues under consideration in the SRM-SF. Furthermore, the item is very broad in terms of its scope, 
and is not informative in terms of addressing those specific types of law breaking activities commonly 
engaged in by young people. The one item that does address specific aspects of law breaking 
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behaviour - "How important is it not to take things that belong to other people"- addresses "theft" in a 
rather indirect way and failed to discriminate between the younger offenders and male non-offenders, 
When scoring the item "How important is it to obey the law?" it was noticed that common 
justifications elicited from the young-offenders took the form of "Otherwise you willi might get into 
trouble". This type of response is deemed to be characteristic of the immature Stage 1-2 or Stage 2 
reasoning more prevalent amongst young offenders than non-offenders. However, moral 
justifications of this nature tell one little in terms of relating moral reasoning to moral action. The 
young offenders as a group had all broken the law, and they had all "got into trouble" as a result. One 
cannot tell from this response whether the young person is addressing this issue retrospectively with 
reference to the consequences of previous law-breaking behaviour or in terms of considering current I 
future conduct. It should also be noted that amongst British adolescents "The law" is frequently used 
as a slang referent for "the police"; therefore some of the young people may have been answering this 
question in terms of obeying figures of authority rather than in terms of conforming to specific social 
norms. 
If, as the result of future research it transpires that younger (male) offenders and non-offenders arc 
little different in terms of global moral reasoning, but do manifest identifiable differences when it 
comes to the sub-domain relating to offending behaviour, then clearly this is an area that should be 
explored in more depth. It should be remembered that the types of "offending behaviour" most 
typically engaged in by adolescents encompass a rather restricted range of criminal acts: the majority 
of "young offenders" do not commit the majority of the offences that are on the statute books. In 
future studies, researchers investigating moral reasoning amongst younger offenders might consider 
"tailoring" the SRM-SF in order to address those specific criminal activities most commonly engaged 
in by young people (e.g. status crimes, acquisitive offences, criminal damage, car-crime and drug 
offences). 
Whilst the results of the comparisons of the overall means of the offenders and non-offenders 
corroborated previous research in the field indicating that offenders were morally immature in relation 
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to their non-offending peers, the results ofthe subsequent analyses were less conclusive in this 
respect. In particular, the findings from the categorical analyses presented in Chapter 3 that the 
majority of offenders were apparently able to spontaneously produce "Stage 3" justifications to at 
least one item in the SRM-SF raised issues regarding the pervasiveness of moral reasoning cognitive 
deficits amongst this population. The findings obtained from the categorical analyses can be 
considered to be "new" in the sense that they arose from a novel approach to tackling SRM-SF data: 
however, they can hardly be said to be "news" to researchers in the field. As far back as 1980 both 
Blasi and lurkovic expressed caution about interpreting moral reasoning differences amongst 
offenders and non-offenders with reference to underlying global structural deficits. 
It may of course have been the case that the findings relating to the spontaneous production of "Stage 
3" reasoning were idiosyncratic to the current study. However, it should be recalled that the 
offending sample was drawn from a wide variety of different settings spanning the Icngth and breadth 
of the UK. Evidence of Stage 3 reasoning was provided by at least one young offender in every 
participant setting. Furthermore, there was no indication from the initial comparisons of overall 
means that the offenders in this sample were performing at a higher level of moral maturity than has 
been evidenced in previous research. Indeed, the reverse may said to be the case. Thc average age of 
the participants in the current study was younger than in other comparable studies using the SRM-SF. 
The overall means of the offenders in the current study were actually somewhat lower than those 
reported by other researchers (for example Gregg et ai, 1994 report mean SRM-SF scores of 243.10 
for male adolescent offenders in their study). 
In the literature, offenders are most frequently referred to in terms of their limitations and deficiencies 
compared to non-offending peers rather than in terms of capabilities and competencies (Carroll et al 
2001). Indeed, as reported earlier, researchers using the SRM-SF to compare the moral reasoning of 
offending and non-offending adolescents frequently interpret their findings regarding the poorer 
performance of offenders on the measure to underlying pervasive structural deficits (e.g. Gregg et ai, 
1994, Palmer & Hollin, 1998). This emphasis in the literature is of course hardly surprising, if one 
considers the need to identify underlying criminogenic risk factors, and the assumption of structural 
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consistency in moral reasoning that underpins Kohlbergian theory. However, for practitioner and 
young offender alike, this stress on global inadequacies in the research does little in promoting 
motivation to change. In the moral reasoning research the convention to present moral reasoning 
findings with reference to summary means reinforces the view that "deficiencies" amongst young 
offenders are global and fixed, rather than specific areas of need that are responsive to remedial 
intervention. 
For the academic researcher establishing that there are apparent global deficiencies in the moral 
reasoning of offenders compared to non-offending peers and that these deficiencies manifest 
themselves amongst diverse age ranges in disparate cultural settings is of considerable importance. 
Ascertaining that there are global trends of this nature contributes to our general understanding of 
psychological factors implicated in offending behaviour amongst young people, and points the way 
towards future research investigating the potential underlying causal influences of this offending 
behaviour. For the criminal-justice practitioner, however, whilst it is clearly of use to know that 
moral reasoning "deficits" represent a criminogenic risk factor, academic research findings may 
contribute little of clinical relevance to intervention work being undertaken in the field. For the 
practitioner, the key emphasis is not on understanding underlying global causal factors relevant to the 
general offending domain, but on promoting socially desirable behavioural shifts amongst individuals. 
There are now a number of studies using the SRM-SF that have identified those global differences in 
moral reasoning amongst offenders and non-offenders well documented in research using alternative 
measures of moral reasoning. It was clearly necessary to carry out this type of research for validation 
purposes and in order to demonstrate that the SRM-SF reliably discriminates between offenders and 
non-offenders amongst diverse populations. However, now that the necessary ground-work has been 
done in validating the measure, attention should tum towards ways in which academic research using 
the SRM-SF can be geared towards practical work in the field. It is of course much easier for an 
academic researcher to provide evidence of global moral deficiency amongst a large sample of young 
offenders than it is for a practitioner to demonstrate that there is a desirable moral shift at post-test 
amongst a small number of young people participating in a group-work intervention. Earlier in this 
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discussion, concerns were expressed that SRM-SF summary means may not in themselves be 
sufficiently sensitive to detect the slight or at best moderate global shifts in moral reasoning that one 
could realistically expect to find at outcome of a short-term programme of intervention. Clearly lack 
of sensitivity of the measure limits its clinical applicability. 
It is extremely disheartening for practitioner and young person alike when perceived meaningful 
improvement in a specific domain as the result of a moral reasoning intervention is not reflected by a 
corresponding change in global scores at post-test. Furthermore, lack of "statistically significant" 
change in overall means may mask within-group and within-domain improvements that are of some 
considerable clinical relevance. However, whilst research findings relating to overall SRM·SF means 
may be limited in terms of their practical applicability, there are other aspects of SRM·SF research 
that are potentially more useful in this respect. 
Focusing on specific content categories within the global moral reasoning domain may be one way in 
which moral reasoning theory can make a more valuable practical contribution to the field. From the 
evidence provided to date in the SRM-SF literature it is apparent that offenders perform less well than 
non-offenders on the SRM·SF. However, from those few studies that have compared patterns of 
moral reasoning across individual SRM·SF items there is some indication that young offenders may 
be more disparate than non-offenders in some areas of the moral reasoning domain than in others. 
From the evidence of the current study it was found that offenders' moral reasoning was lower on the 
socio.moral values relating to offending behaviour than on other sociomoral values in the SRM·SF; 
similar disparities in performance across moral values were also observed by Palmer & Hollin (1998) 
and Gregg et al (1994). Ifas the result of future research it is established that this represents a general 
trend, then this may have significant implications for the effective targeting of clinical interventions. 
For example, if one finds that amongst an offending sample that "deficits" in moral reasoning are 
most notable when it comes to "Justice" issues, but that the offenders are demonstrating greater 
evidence of moral maturity when it comes to "relationship" issues, then the focus of the moral 
reasoning intervention may be on promoting the generalisation of moral competence from specific 
areas to the global domain. On the other hand, if amongst an offending sample one finds that there is 
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no evidence of reasoning above Stage 2 to any of the issues in the SRM-SF then the focus of the 
intervention will be on the best way to stimulate and initial morally desirable shift. Knowledge that 
some content areas may be more amenable than others in this respect is clearly of value. For 
example, one wish to establish evidence of moral maturity within the "relationship" sub-domain 
before attempting to stimulate shifts in a potentially more challenging "legal justice" domain. It is 
worth noting that the poorer performance on the items relating to offending behaviour was not merely 
restricted to the young offenders in this sample. The legal justice domain may be one that is more 
susceptible to "downward press" on moral reasoning performance than other aspects of the domain. 
Whilst it is clearly necessary to challenge distorted or morally "immature" thinking amongst offenders 
participating in a remedial intervention, highlighting those areas where offenders are doing "as well 
as" their non-offending peers may be equally important. As a result of their experiences within the 
criminal justice system many of the young offenders will have been made all too aware of their 
shortcomings compared to same age non-offending peers. Ifpractitioners and lor the young people 
tend to view these shortcomings as global and stable attributes then this presents challenges when it 
comes to motivating young people participating in a clinical intervention. As Gibbs (2000) points out 
Kohlberg's theory is not in itself enough to motivate young offenders to change. There is of course a 
considerable difference between demonstrating that an individual is not performing as well as other 
people and demonstrating that an individual is not performing at their own optimal level. 
Furthermore, focusing solely on the ways in which young offenders differ from their non-offending 
peers may actually be counter-productive in motivational terms, especially if one adopts the Emler 
and Reicher (1995) view that delinquency is a form of self-presentation and that some young 
offenders may seek to enhance their "delinquent reputations" (Emler & Reicher, 1995:7). 
As was pointed out earlier, whilst offending amongst adolescents is perceived to be widespread, the 
offending behaviour typically engaged in by young people is restricted to a relatively narrow range of 
criminal acts. The majority of offenders commit a minority of offences. As Emler & Reicher (1995) 
note whilst "non-conformity" tends to attract the limelight in the research literature as soon it becomes 
a social problem, the absence of delinquent behaviour is of as much interest psychologically as its 
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presence (Emler & Reicher 1995:8). Jamieson et al (1999) point out that in the research one finds a 
division between studies that focus on the causes of offending behaviour and those that concentrate on 
factors influential in the cessation of offending behaviour. Their recent study amongst Scottish 
adolescents attempted to bridge this gap by investigating choices made by young people regarding 
"resistance to", "desistance from" and "persistence in" offending. They suggested that as the bulk of 
research in this field stems from the US there was a clear need for further empirical work in this area 
in a UK context (Jamieson et al 1999: 1-3). 
Gaining further insight into factors underlying "resistance to and "desistance from" offending is 
clearly as important as understanding why some young people persist in engaging in criminal activity. 
However, further understanding in this field may not give us direct insight into young people arc 
motivated to conform to some social norms and not others. The main emphasis in the offending 
literature has been on understanding underlying influences relevant to anti-social behaviour. Far less 
attention has been paid in the research on factors that promote conformity andlor pro-social behaviour 
amongst a young offending population. In the current study, when reading through the responses 
given to the item "How important is to obey the law?" the author gained the impression that the 
majority of young people had responded to the question with reference to potential negative 
consequences of breaking the law rather than with references to the positive benefits of law-abiding 
behaviour. Whilst there was an overall tendency for young people to respond to SRM-SF items with 
reference to negative consequences of transgressing the norm rather than to potential positive 
outcomes of conforming, this seemed to be less the case for some items than others. For example. 
whilst it appeared that some responses to the item "How important is it to keep a promise to a friend" 
focused on potential consequences if the promise was broken (e.g. "otherwise your friend might get 
upset"), a number made reference to the benefits of keeping the promise (e.g. "It shows your friend 
you can be trusted"). It was noted earlier that responses provided by young offenders to the item 
"How important is it to obey the law" frequently took the form of "Otherwise you wilVmight get into 
trouble". Whilst these responses are indicative of the comparative moral "immaturity" associated 
with group, this type of response can hardly be considered to be informative in explaining individual 
behavioural choices young people had made regarding resistance to, desistance from or persistence in 
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criminal activity, and / or why offenders might consider it important to obey some laws and not 
others. Furthermore, it should be noted that the type of response cited above was relatively common 
amongst non-offenders as well as offenders. Future SRM-SF research might seek to explore between-
group and between-item differences in ''transgression or conformity" issue focus: for example by 
exploring whether young offenders are more likely to focus on the consequences of transgressing a 
norm than non-offenders, and/or whether some issues are more likely to elicit "transgression focused" 
responses than others. A possible extension of this type of research would be to include additional 
issues in the SRM-SF that relate more directly to pro-social activity (for example with reference to 
helping, sharing and donating activities). One acknowledges that there may not necessarily be a linear 
relationship between increase in pro-social activity and reduction in anti-social behaviour; however. 
there would seem to be a need to shift the emphasis in the offending-behaviour research from 
focusing solely on the negative attributes associated with this group, towards gaining a greater 
understanding about positive qualities pre-existent in this population that one would seek to foster 
and nurture. 
4.29 Observations Regarding Gender Differences 
Some of the most interesting findings to emerge from the current study concerned gender differences 
in stage use amongst the non-offending adolescents. As noted in the introduction to the measure. the 
majority of previous work using the SRM-SF has failed to uncover evidence that the measure is 
unfavourably biased against females. Indeed, when comparing SRM-SF means of younger male and 
female adolescents it has often been found that females out-perform males on the measure: when this 
finding has emerged, it has generally been interpreted by researchers as indicative of known gender 
differences in maturation rates in early adolescence. In the current study, the preliminary findings that 
were obtained from between-group comparisons of SRM-SF summary scores apparently corroborated 
previous work. When comparing overall SRM-SF means no significant differences were found 
between male and female non-offenders. When comparing SRM-SF means by age category, it was 
found that only in Age Group 1 were there any significant between-group differences, with females 
having higher SRM-SF means than males. However, on further investigation, it became clear that the 
position regarding gender differences was not as straightforward as it had initially appeared. The bulk 
169 
of the evidence concerning gender differences emerged from the "subsequent analyses" presented in 
Chapter 3; nevertheless, as previously discussed, there were preliminary indications from some of the 
analyses carried out in Chapter 2 that use of SRM-SF summary means as the sole source of reference 
regarding the moral reasoning of the sample may have masked useful information regarding 
heterogeneity in stage use. It was suggested that previous researchers using the SRM-SF had failed to 
attend to potential between-group differences in inter-individual variability when presenting their 
findings regarding gender differences. 
In Chapter 3, when patterns of stage use were compared using categorical techniques, some 
significant gender differences did emerge. These included the finding that there were between-group 
differences in use of Stage 3 and Stage 4 (with females making greater use of Stage 3 and males 
making greater use of Stage 4). It was of course interesting to note that there were between-group 
differences in stage use amongst male and female non-offenders that apparently corresponded to the 
Gilligan (1982) hypothesis; however, what is possibly of more interest to the researcher is that this 
between-group difference only emerged when analysing the data using categorical techniques. As far 
as the author is aware, this was the first study using the SRM-SF that had sought to compare findings 
obtained when data were treated as "continuous points on a scale" and when data were treated as 
"categorical", therefore there is no way of telling whether the differences in outcome that were 
observed were idiosyncratic. One would need to replicate the findings in future work in order to 
clarify this issue. It would seem to be essential carry out further work of this nature, as if the findings 
are replicated, then this may raise serious questions regarding the interpretation of findings from some 
of the previous research. 
In a recent article published by Barriga et al (200 I) exploring the relationship between moral 
reasoning, gender and offending, a somewhat pessimistic view is taken of the contribution that moral 
stage theory has made to our understanding of antisocial behaviour in young people. Barriga et al 
(2001) claim that there are two notable problems in this respect. Firstly, they point out that although 
there is an established link between moral reasoning "stage delay" and antisocial behaviour, the 
magnitude of the relationship in many of the reported studies is rather small. Secondly, they suggest 
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that "moral stage" theory has had rather little to offer in the way of explaining gender differences in 
antisocial behaviour. Barriga et al argue that if "moral judgement stages" were the most important 
and most direct influence on moral behaviour, then one would expect to see corresponding gender 
differences evidenced in the moral judgement research. However, Barriga et al state that save for the 
acknowledged maturational differences in early puberty, gender differences in moral reasoning have 
been found to be "negligible". They back this statement up by drawing attention to Walker's (1984) 
large scale meta-analysis that "demonstrated" that gender accounted for a "nonsignificant 1/20 
percent of the variation in moral judgement stage (Barriga et ai, 200 1:535). 
In light of the findings observed in the current study the recent comments made by Barriga et al 
(200 I) are particularly interesting. The main claim that is made - that moral reasoning theory has 
made only a limited contribution to our understanding of gender differences in antisocial behaviour -
is based on the apparent failure of the moral reasoning research findings to provide strong evidence of 
between-group differences in the predicted directions. However, as has been noted at several points 
during the course of the current study, whilst academic researchers in the moral reasoning field 
frequently present their findings with reference to gross markers such as overall mean scores, use of 
such summary indices may mask valuable between-group and within-group information that is of 
considerable clinical relevance. It is possible, then, that by restricting their discussion to the apparent 
failure of the global moral reasoning research findings to contribute to our understanding of offending 
behaviour that Barriga et al may be at risk of'1hrowing the baby out with the bathwater". 
The first "problem" highlighted by Barriga et al (2001) concerns the small magnitudes in effect size 
that are commonly reported in findings that have established a relationship between moral stage delay 
and antisocial behaviour. However, as was pointed out earlier in this discussion, differences in 
magnitude of effect do not in themselves say anything about differences in levels of cognitive 
functioning (e.g. Friendship et al (b)2003). Differences in developmental levels of functioning would 
appear to be key to understanding differences in moral reasoning between offenders and their non-
offending peers. Typically, in the research, one finds that the apparent moral delay of offenders is 
interpreted with reference to an apparent failure to make the shift from "morally immature" Stage 2 to 
"morally mature" Stage 3. Between-group differences of similar magnitudes may have very different 
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developmental implications depending on where they "sit" on the SRM-SF scale (for example the 
difference between a mean score of 220 and one of 260 corresponds to a developmental shift from 
Stage 2 to Stage 3(2), whereas the difference between a mean score of 280 and one of 320 does not 
represent a change in developmental level, both scores corresponding to Global Stage 3). Conversely. 
increases in the magnitude of between-group differences do not necessarily result in greater 
disparities in moral reasoning developmental levels. 
The second problem that Barriga et al (2001) cite relates to the failure of the moral reasoning research 
to "mirror" known gender differences in antisocial behaviour. Aside from gender differences in early 
adolescence, there is no evidence to indicate that females out-perform males in the moral judgement 
domain. However, Barriga et al (2001) are perhaps misguided in their assumption that if "moral 
judgement stages" were the most important influence on moral behaviour then one would find 
evidence of corresponding gender differences in the moral reasoning literature. Much of the existing 
research into gender differences in moral reasoning has focused on addressing the claim that moral 
reasoning measures are biased against females. Thus, until recently, the main emphasis has been on 
trying to establish whether females are disadvantaged on moral reasoning measures, not on when and 
where they may be morally "superior" to males. Indeed, this was the main focus of the Walker (1984) 
meta-analysis that is cited by Barriga et al (2001) as evidence of "negligible" gender disparities in 
moral reasoning. As was noted in Chapter 3, the finding that females can do "as well as" males on 
moral judgement tasks does not in itself provide evidence that moral reasoning measures are gender 
fair. Furthermore, where gender differences have been found on measures of moral reasoning they 
almost invariably correspond to the same trend. Females tend to demonstrate greater evidence of 
Stage 3 relative to Stage 4 reasoning than males, and also tend to demonstrate greater evidence of care 
oriented reasoning relative to justice oriented reasoning than males. Tangney and Dearing (2002:264) 
point out that they know of no studies that demonstrate that males have a significantly greater "ethic 
of care" than females. Much of the research in this field stems from studies comparing summary 
means from a typology where Stage 3 (which according to a strong version of the Gilligan, 1982 
hypothesis represents a "care oriented reasoning" style of reasoning), is scored at a lower level than 
Stage 4 (which Gilligan, 1982 considers to be more '~ustice oriented in its style). To date, as far as 
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the author is aware, none of the researchers in the moral reasoning field have devised a typology 
where the position is reversed so that "care" reasoning sits above "justice" reasoning in a moral 
reasoning hierarchy. Therefore there seems no reason to expect that there would be global evidence 
from the research findings to indicate that females out perform males in moral judgement. 
In the current study, it was demonstrated that merely by recoding the data so that arithmetical 
homogeneity was imposed on the "mature" stages, one could apparently change the outcome 
regarding overall gender differences on the SRM-SF. Whilst the findings from the current study may 
be idiosyncratic, it seems likely that issues relating to the measurement and statistical analysis of 
moral reasoning may be partially responsible for the failure to identify global gender differences 
favouring females in the moral judgement sphere. As Gilligan and Wiggins pointed out in 1987: 
"If there are no sex differences in empathy and moral reasoning, why are there sex differences in 
moral and immoral behavior? Either there is a problem in the way thaI empathy and moral 
reasoning are being measured, or the role of empathy and cognition in moral development has been 
overstated" (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987:279). 
For Barriga et al (2001) the fact that gender differences favouring females arc restricted to younger 
adolescents apparently represents a failing of the moral reasoning research to account for gender 
differences in antisocial behaviour. However, the fact that these gender differences emerge at the 
time when one starts to see clear evidence of gender divergence in criminal activity may in fact be key 
to furthering our understanding of the relationship between moral reasoning and offending behaviour. 
Future research in the field that focuses on gender differences in moral reasoning amongst younger 
adolescents, and that also pays particular attention to potential sources of variation within samples 
would help to shed light on this issue. 
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4.3 CONCLUSION 
The empirical research presented in this thesis involved a comprehensive investigation of the patterns 
of moral reasoning of male offending and male and female non-offending adolescents in the UK using 
the SRM-SF. By use of differential techniques of analysis a number of theoretical and 
methodological issues came to light that had not been identified in previous research using the 
measure. 
A major aim of this thesis was to shed light on the controversy surrounding "structural consistency" 
of moral reasoning with reference to differential techniques of analysis. It was noted that the 
conventional strategy of treating moral reasoning scores as continuous data and presenting findings 
with reference to summary mean scores may have served to "mask" heterogeneity in patterns of stage 
use within and between samples. By adopting alternative "categorical" strategies to tackle SRM-SF 
data and comparing findings obtained with those obtained using "conventional" techniques, the 
researcher successfully illustrated that "masking of heterogeneity" was indeed an issue that may have 
impacted on the interpretation of previous research findings using the measure. 
One of the more important messages to be drawn from the current study is that the statistical method 
used to analyse moral reasoning data clearly does impact on the nature of the findings that emerge. In 
Chapter 2, when using traditional strategies adopted by researchers to analyse between-group 
differences in moral reasoning, findings, broadly speaking, corroborated with those presented in 
previous research studies. However, in Chapter 3, once the data were analysed using alternative 
techniques several inconsistencies emerged. These were perhaps most notable when comparing 
between group differences amongst male and female non-offending adolescents. In Chapter 2 when 
data were analysed with reference to summary means there were no apparent differences between 
male and female non-offending adolescents, however, in Chapter 3, once the data were reanalysed 
using alternative techniques clear gender differences emerged. These differences apparently 
corresponded to the Gilligan (1982) hypothesis that females were making greater use of Stage 3 type 
reasoning and that males were making greater use of Stage 4 type reasoning. Whilst the findings 
relating to gender differences may have been idiosyncratic to the current study, the finding that 
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different techniques of analysis result in different patterns of results is not reconcilable in this way. 
Researchers planning future work in this area should be aware of the potential impact that differential 
statistic techniques may have on results that emerge, and should take account of this when interpreting 
their findings relating to SRM-SF data. 
Adopting differential techniques of analysis of SRM-SF data proved useful as a means of gaining 
insight into potential sources of differences in patterns of moral reasoning between offending 
adolescents and non-offending adolescents. When comparing overall SRM-SF means of offenders 
and non-offenders in Chapter 2, offenders demonstrated significantly lower mean scores than non-
offending adolescents. This finding was in line with that observed in previous studies. However, on 
further investigation it was found that characterising the offenders as being morally immature with 
reference to their non-offending peers was an over-simplistic representation. As a result of 
subsequent analyses it emerged that the majority of offenders seemed to have the cognitive facility to 
access moral maturity as evidenced by providing a "Stage 3" justification to at least one SRM-SF 
item. It was noted that the emphasis on "global cognitive deficits" apparently exhibited by young 
offenders that seems to be prevalent in the research literature may be counter-productive when applied 
to clinical interventions that seek to enhance the moral reasoning of young people. In the author's 
opinion there is a need for future moral reasoning research to pay more attention to when and where 
young offenders may be performing as well as their non-offending peers. Striving to find ways that 
areas of specific moral competence can be generalised to other areas would seem to be a more 
constructive way of approaching clinical interventions with young offenders than focusing on the 
apparent global inadequacies of the young people concerned. 
A novel approach that was adopted in the current study was the attempt to make a systematic 
investigation of sources of intra-individual variability in patterns of moral stage use with reference to 
SRM-SF data. It had been noted that previous research studies had, in general, focused on bctween-
group differences in patterns of stage use and that little attention had been paid to potential sources of 
variation within participant samples. Investigations of patterns of intra-individual variation were 
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carried out, and it was found that there was evidence of intra-individual variability in patterns of stage 
use, however, identifying the potential sources of this variability proved problematic. 
The development of the SRM-SF as a research tool has made a considerable contribution in terms of 
potentially furthering our understanding of the moral reasoning of young people. Its user-friendly 
format makes it practically applicable in a wide range of settings. Its use of open-ended questions 
provide the researcher with a potentially rich source of data about the way in which people think 
about moral issues. The SRM-SF was first published in 1992, and, understandably, much of the 
research carried out over the last decade has focused on establishing its reliability and validity in a 
variety of settings. When constructing and validating a measure of this nature it is of course essential 
to establish global benchmarks that can usefully be applied across studies. Indeed, in the current 
study, one of the primary aims of the first set of analyses presented was to corroborate previous 
findings using the measure. However, now that there are several published studies indicating that the 
SRM-SF is globally applicable, in the author's opinion the research focus should now tum to more 
detailed analysis of the potential sources of individual variation in moral reasoning within the 
measure. 
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Appendix 1: The Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form. 
Instructions 
Date of Birth: 
Gender: 
Instructions 
In this questionnaire we want to find out about the things that you think are important for people to 
do, and especially why you think these things are important. Please try to help us understand your 
thinking by WRITING AS MUCH AS YOU CAN TO EXPLAIN. Please don't just write "same as 
before. Please answer ALL the questions, especially the "Why" questions. Thank you very much for 
your help. 
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Appendix 1 (contd): SRM-SF Items: 
1. Think about when you have made a promise to a friend of yours. How important is it for people to 
keep promises, if they can, to friends? 
Circle one: very important important not important 
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT / IMPORTANT / NOT IMPORTANT 
(WlDCHEVER ONE YOU CIRCLED)? 
2. How about keeping a promise to anyone? How important is it for people to keep promises, if they 
can, even to someone they hardly know? 
Circle one: very important important not important 
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT / IMPORTANT / NOT IMPORTANT 
(WHICHEVER ONE YOU CIRCLED)? 
3. How about keeping a promise to a child? How important is it for parents to keep promises, if they 
can to their children? 
Circle one: very important important not important 
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT / IMPORTANT / NOT IMPORTANT 
(WHICHEVER ONE YOU CIRCLED)? 
4. In general, how important is it to tell the truth? 
Circle one: very important important not important 
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT / IMPORTANT / NOT IMPORTANT 
(WHICHEVER ONE YOU CIRCLED)? 
5. Think about when you've helped your mother or father. How important is it for children to help 
their parents? 
Circle one: very important important not important 
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT / IMPORTANT / NOT IMPORTANT 
(WHICHEVER ONE YOU CIRCLED)? 
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Appendix l(continued) SRM-SF Items 
6. Let's say a friend of yours needs help and may even die, and you're the only person who can save 
him or her. How important is it for a person (without losing his or her own life) to save the life of a 
friend? 
Circle one: very important important not important 
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT / IMPORTANT / NOT IMPORTANT 
(WHICHEVER ONE YOU CIRCLED)? 
7. What about saving the life of anyone? How important is it for a person (without losing his or her 
own life) to save the life of a stranger? 
Circle one: very important important not important 
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT / IMPORTANT / NOT IMPORTANT 
(WHICHEVER ONE YOU CIRCLED)? 
8. How important is it for a person to live even if that person doesn't want to? 
Circle one: very important important not important 
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT / IMPORTANT / NOT IMPORTANT 
(WHICHEVER ONE YOU CIRCLED)? 
9. How important is it for people not to take things that belong to other people? 
Circle one: very important important not important 
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT I IMPORTANT I NOT IMPORTANT 
(WHICHEVER ONE YOU CIRCLED)? 
10. How important is it for people to obey the law? 
Circle one: very important important not important 
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT / IMPORTANT / NOT IMPORTANT 
(WHICHEVER ONE YOU CIRCLED)? 
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Appendix 1 (continued) SRM-SF Items 
11. How important is it for judges to send people who break the law to jail? 
Circle one: very important important not important 
~ISTHATVERYIMPORTANT/IMPORTANT/NOTIMPORTANT 
(WlllCHEVER ONE YOU CIRCLED)? 
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Appendix 2. Pearson Correlation Coefficients Obtained from Comparisons of SRM-SF Items and 
SRM-SF Sociomoral Values 
2a) Pearson correlation coefficients for inter-item comparisons 
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 010 011 
Promise Promise Promise Telling Helping Save Save Stay Not Obey Judges 
Friend Stranger Children Truth Parents Friend Stranger Alive Steal Law Jailing 
01 
02 r .501 
p .000 
N 294 311 
03 .353 .442 
P .000 .000 
N 325 267 353 
04 .245 .324 .385 
P .000 .000 .000 
N 330 268 305 356 
05 r .312 .347 .326 .291 
P .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 331 267 307 313 362 
06 r .335 .387 .364 .309 .331 
P .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 309 257 288 290 296 340 
07 r .210 .234 .227 .226 .213 .264 
P .001 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 
N 236 202 221 222 221 222 256 
08 r .255 .236 .256 .327 .340 .303 .237 
P .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 273 225 257 260 263 243 192 301 
09 r .322 .364 .216 .132 .267 .258 .200 .207 
P .000 .000 .000 .011 .000 .000 .002 .001 
N 323 263 296 299 306 288 217 247 349 
010 r .335 .296 .380 .484 .384 .288 .270 .311 .256 
P .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 293 241 275 278 280 270 200 237 270 322 
011 r .340 .360 .342 .338 .350 .233 .277 .378 .296 .529 
P .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 279 227 256 265 264 253 184 221 259 241 
2b) Pearson correlation coefficients obtained from inter-value comparisons 
CONTRUTH AFFIL LIFE PROP LAW JUSTICE 
CONTRUTH Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (I-tailed) 
N 
AFFIL Pearson Correlation .494 
Sig. (I-tailed) .000 
N 405 
LIFE Pearson Correlation .331 .358 
Sig. (I-tailed) .000 .000 
N 364 359 
PROP_LAW Pearson Correlation .474 .360 .288 
Sig. (I-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
N 400 394 353 
JUSTICE Pearson Correlation .443 .337 .361 .458 
Sig. (I-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 304 299 264 298 
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Appendix 3 Overall Frequencies of Moral Stage Use by Participant Group: 
Number of Responses 
Stage 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ 
(n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % (n) % 
offender 75 51.0 44 29.9 19 12.9 5 3.4 3 2.0 1 0.7 
male non-offender 98 65.8 38 25.5 7 4.7 3 2.0 3 2.0 
female non-offender 100 85.5 15 12.8 2 1.7 
Total 273 66.1 97 23.5 28 6.8 8 1.9 6 1.5 1 0.2 
Transition Stage 1-2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ 
n % n % n % n % n % n % 
Offenders 60 40.8 57 38.8 21 14.3 6 4.1 3 2.0 
Male Non-Offenders 92 61.7 44 29.5 11 7.4 1 0.7 1 0.7 
Female Non-Offenders 77 65.8 31 26.5 7 6.0 2 1.7 
All 229 55.4 132 32.0 39 9.4 9 2.2 4 1.0 
Stage 2 
Frequency 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ 
n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % 
Offenders 9 6.1 26 17.7 34 23.1 36 24.5 21 14.3 11 7.5 7 4.8 3 2.1 
Male Non-Offenders 45 30.2 38 25.5 31 20.8 23 15.4 8 5.4 2 1.3 1 0.7 1 0.7 
Female Non-Offenders 25 21.4 39 33.3 26 22.2 16 13.7 6 5.1 3 2.6 2 1.7 
All 79 19.1 103 24.9 91 22.0 75 18.2 35 8.5 16 3.9 10 2.4 4 0.9 
Stage 2-3 
Frequency 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ 
n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % 
Offenders 10 6.8 22 15.0 37 25.2 35 23.8 24 16.3 13 8.8 5 3.4 1 0.7 
Male Non-Offenders 26 17.4 36 24.2 36 24.2 26 17.4 18 12.1 5 3.4 2 1.3 
Female Non-Offenders 4 3.4 24 20.5 34 29.1 22 18.8 19 16.2 10 8.5 3 2.6 1 0.9 
All 40 9.7 82 19.9 107 25.9 83 20.1 61 14.8 28 6.8 10 2.4 2 0.5 
Stage 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ 
Frequency n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % 
Offenders 38 25.9 45 30.6 31 21.1 23 15.6 6 4.1 2 1.4 2 1.4 
Male Non-Offenders 26 17.4 30 20.1 28 18.8 35 23.5 14 9.4 13 8.7 3 2.0 
Female Non-Offenders 9 7.7 14 12.0 38 32.5 31 26.5 9 7.7 9 7.7 7 6.0 
All 73 17.7 89 21.5 97 23.5 89 21.5 29 7.0 24 5.8 12 2.9 
Stage 3-4 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ 
n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % 
Offenders 127 86.4 12 8.2 6 4.1 1 0.7 1 0.7 
Male Non-Offenders 47 31.5 37 24.8 33 22.1 14 9.4 8 5.4 6 4.0 3 2.0 1 0.7 
Female Non-Offenders 49 41.9 33 28.2 16 13.7 9 7.7 5 4.3 2 1.7 1 0.9 2 1.8 
All 223 54.0 82 19.9 55 13.3 23 5.6 14 3.4 8 1.9 5 1.2 3 0.7 
Stage 4 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7+ 
n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % 
Offenders 143 97.3 3 2.0 1 0.7 
Male Non-Offenders 107 71.8 27 18.1 6 4.0 5 3.4 3 2.0 1 0.7 
Female Non-Offenders 109 93.2 8 6.8 
All 359 86.9 38 9.2 6 1.5 6 1.5 3 0.7 1 0.2 
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Appendix 4 Frequency Data Used for Chi-Square Analysis of Between-Group Differences in Patterns 
of Stage Use 
1 1 1-2 1-2 2 2 2-3 2-3 3 3 3-4 3-4 4 4 
(n) % n % n % n % n % n % n % 
Promise Friend 0 15 11.5 5 3.8 23 17.7 51 39.2 28 21.5 8 6.2 0 0.0 
MN 5 3.6 2 1.5 10 7.2 44 31.9 43 31.2 31 22.5 2 14 
FN 1 0.9 1 .9 6 5.3 32 28.3 49 43.4 23 20.4 1 0.9 
Total 21 5.5 8 2.1 39 10.2 127 33.3 120 31.5 62 16.3 3 0.8 
Promise stranger 0 7 6.2 3 2.7 51 45.1 35 31.0 13 11.5 3 2.7 1 0.9 
MN 5 4.7 1 1.0 24 22.9 31 29.5 19 18.1 18 17.1 7 6.7 
FN 1 1.1 1 1.1 17 18.3 36 38.7 22 23.7 15 16.1 1 1.1 
Total 13 4.2 5 1.6 92 29.6 102 32.8 54 17.4 36 11.6 9 2.9 
Promise Children 0 17 13.7 4 3.2 11 8.9 53 42.7 36 29.0 2 1.6 1 0.8 
MN 3 2.3 5 3.8 6 4.6 31 23.7 22 16.8 54 41.2 10 7.6 
FN 2 2.0 3 3.1 9 9.2 19 19.4 24 24.5 41 41.8 0 0.0 
Total 22 6.2 12 3.4 26 7.4 103 29.2 82 23.2 97 27.5 11 3.1 
Telling Truth 0 7 5.3 5 3.8 63 47.4 49 36.8 8 6.0 0 0.0 1 0.8 
MN 3 2.4 2 1.6 30 24.4 38 30.9 22 17.9 22 17.9 6 4.9 
FN 3 3.0 4 4.0 41 41.4 26 26.3 17 17.2 8 8.1 0 0.0 
Total 13 3.7 11 3.1 134 37.7 113 31.8 47 13.2 30 8.5 7 2.0 
Helping Parents 0 8 6.2 2 1.6 45 34.9 48 37.2 19 14.7 7 5.4 0 0.0 
MN 3 2.3 1 .8 26 20.0 44 33.8 29 22.3 24 18.5 3 2.3 
FN 11 10.7 54 52.4 25 24.3 12 11.7 1 1.0 
Total 11 3.0 3 .8 82 22.7 146 40.3 73 20.2 43 11.9 4 1.1 
Saving Friend 0 17 13.4 3 2.4 23 18.1 40 31.5 43 33.9 1 0.8 0 0.0 
MN 14 11.6 1 .8 18 14.9 18 14.9 57 47.1 7 5.8 6 5.0 
FN 1 1.1 1 1.1 5 5.4 24 26.1 58 63.0 3 3.3 0 0.0 
Total 32 9.4 5 1.5 46 13.5 82 24.1 158 46.5 11 3.2 6 1.8 
Saving Stranger 0 5 5.3 4 4.2 30 31.6 26 27.4 28 29.5 2 2.1 0 0.0 
MN 4 4.2 3 3.1 21 21.9 11 11.5 49 51.0 5 5.2 3 3.1 
FN 2 3.1 0 0.0 22 33.8 8 12.3 30 46.2 3 4.6 0 0.0 
Total 11 4.3 7 2.7 73 28.5 45 17.6 107 41.8 10 3.9 3 1.2 
Staying Alive 0 2 1.8 1 0.9 50 44.2 25 22.1 32 28.3 3 2.7 0 0.0 
MN 3 3.1 0 0.0 30 30.6 20 20.4 24 24.5 18 18.4 3 3.1 
FN 0 0.0 0 0.0 20 22.2 23 25.6 34 37.8 11 12.2 2 2.2 
Total 5 1.7 1 0.3 100 33.2 68 22.6 90 29.9 32 10.6 5 1.7 
Not stealing 0 13 10.3 41 32.5 30 23.8 34 27.0 6 4.8 2 1.6 0 0.0 
MN 23 18.4 22 17.6 17 13.6 27 21.6 28 22.4 5 4.0 3 2.4 
FN 6 6.1 17 17.3 11 11.2 43 43.9 15 15.3 6 6.1 0 0.0 
Total 42 12.0 80 22.9 58 16.6 104 29.8 49 14.0 13 3.7 3 0.9 
Obeying the Law 0 14 12.1 31 26.7 41 35.3 20 17.2 5 4.3 3 2.6 2 1.7 
MN 5 4.3 13 11.2 18 15.5 9 7.8 28 24.1 23 19.8 20 17.2 
FN 2 2.2 12 13.3 14 15.6 22 24.4 25 27.8 12 13.3 3 3.3 
Total 21 6.5 56 17.4 73 22.7 51 15.8 58 18.0 38 11.8 25 7.8 
Legal Justice 0 9 8.7 30 28.8 39 37.5 18 17.3 4 3.8 3 2.9 1 1.0 
MN 5 4.3 23 20.0 23 20.0 22 19.1 9 7.8 25 21.7 8 7.0 
FN 1 1.2 12 14.0 35 40.7 22 25.6 7 8.1 9 10.5 0 0.0 
Total 15 4.9 65 21.3 97 31.8 62 20.3 20 6.6 37 12.1 9 3.0 
Appendix 5: Chi Square Statistics for Comparisons of Between-Group Differences in Stage Use 
Across SRM-SF items. 
Stage 1 Offenders I Male I Female 
Male Non-Offenders Non-Offenders 
Promise Friend X" = 5.99; df =1; p<0.05 X" = 2.02' df =1' ns· 
Promise Stranger X'" = 0.23; df =1; ns X"= 2.25; df-1; ns· 
Promise Child X"= 11.49; df=1' p<0.01 y"= 0.02; df=1; ns· 
Tell Truth X" = 1.36; df =1' ns· x" = 0.07' df =1' ns· 
Help Parents x"= 2.41; df=1; ns x"= 2.41; df=1; ns· 
Save Friend X"= 0.19; df=1; ns y" = 8.77; df =1; p<0.01 
Save Stranger X" = 0.13; df =1; ns X"= 0.13; df=1; ns· 
Stay Alive x'" = 0.38; df =1; ns x" = 2.80' df =1' ns· 
Not steal X'" = 3.34' df =1' ns x"'-7.32· df=1; p<0.01 
Obey Law X" = 4.64; df =1; p<0.05 X" = 0.67' df =1; ns· 
Legal Justice x"'= 1.69; df=1' ns x"= 1.72' df=1; ns· ." . , Fisher s Exact Test 
Offenders I Male I Female 
Stage 1-2 Male Non-Offenders Non-Offenders 
Promise Friend X'" = 1.49; df =1' ns X" = O. 17' df = l' ns 
Promise Stranger x'" = 0.88; df =1' ns X"'= 0.01' df=1; ns 
Promise Child X" = 0.07; df =1; ns x"'= 0.10' df=1; ns 
Tell Truth X" = 1.09; df =1; ns X'" = 1.22; df =1' ns 
Help Parents X" = 0.35; df =1; ns X'" = 0.80; df =1; ns 
Save Friend X" = 0.92' df =1; ns X'" = 0.04; df =1' ns 
Save Stranger x" = 0.16' df =1; ns X'" = 2.07; df =1' ns 
Stay Alive x'" = 0.87; df =1; ns 
D 
Not steal x"= 7.4S· df=1; p<0.01 x" = 0.00' df =1; ns 
Obey Law X"= 9.09; df=1; p<0.01 X" = 0.22; df =1; ns 
Judges Jail X" = 2.33 df =1; ns X'" = 1.25; df -1; ns 
Fisher's Exact Test 
2Not computed - none of the non-offenders used this stage for this item 
Offenders I Male I Female 
Stage 2 Male Non-Offenders Non-Offenders 
Promise Friend x"= 6.76; df =1; p<0.01 X" = 0.39; df =1' ns 
Promise Stranger X"= 11.97' df=1; p<0.01 x" = 0.63' df =1; ns 
Promise Child x"'= 1.86' df=1' ns x"= 1.94' df=1; ns 
Tell Truth X"'= 14.S9; df=1; p<0.001 X"= 7.31; df=1; p<0.01 
Help Parents X"= 7.21' df=1; p<0.01 X" = 3.74; df =1; ns 
Save Friend x"= 0.47; df =1; ns x7 = 4.84; df =1' p<0.05 
Save Stranger X"= 2.30' df=1; ns X" = 2.84; df =1' ns 
Stay Alive X"= 4.1S· df=1; p<O.OS x"= 1.69' df=1; ns 
Not Steal X"= 4.30; df =1; p<O.OS x" = 0.28; df =1; ns 
Obey Law x"= 12.02' df=1; p<0.01 x"= 0.00' df=1' ns 
Judges Jail x"'= 8.24; df=1; p<0.01 X"= 10.27; df=1; p<0.01 
Offenders I Male I Female 
Stage 2 - 3 Male Non-Offenders Non-Offenders 
Promise Friend X"= 1.S8; df=1; ns x"= 0.37; df =1; ns 
Promise Stranger x"= 0.S4· df=1; ns X"= 1.86' df =1' ns 
Promise Child X"= 10.S0; df =1; p<0.01 x"= 0.60' df=1; ns 
Tell Truth x"= 1.01' df=1; ns x"= 0.57; df =1; ns 
Help Parents x"= 0.32; df =1' ns x"= 8.14' df=1' p<0.01 
Save Friend X"= 9.S5; df=1; p<0.01 X"= 4.1S; df=1; p<0.05 
Save Stranger X"= 7.74; df=1' p<0.01 x"'= 0.03; df=1' ns 
Stay Alive x"- 0.92; df=1; ns x"= 0.71; df=1' ns 
Not steal x"= 0.99' df=1; ns x"= 12.66' df=1; p<0.001 
Obey Law x"= 4.77' df =1; p<0.05 x"= 11.04' df=1; p<0.01 
Judges Jail X"= 0.12; df =1; ns x7 = 1.20; df=1; ns 
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Appendix 5: Chi Square Statistics for Comparisons of Between-Group Differences in Stage Use 
Across SRM-SF items. 
Offenders I Male I Female 
Stage 3 Male Non-Offenders Non-Offenders 
Promise Friend X"= 3.18; df=1; ns x" = 3.99; df =1; p<0.05 
Promise Stranger XL= 1.89; df=1; ns XL = 0.93; df =1; ns 
Promise Child x"= 5.43; df -1; p<0.05 X/. = 2.07; df =1; ns 
Teli Truth X"= 8.71; df=1; p<0.01 X" = 0.02' df =1; ns 
Help Parents XL= 2.46; df=1; ns XL= 0.13; df=1; ns 
Save Friend x"= 4.52; df =1; p<0.05 x" = 5.34; df -1; p<0.05 
Save Stranger X"= 9.23; df=1; p<0.01 x" = 0.37' df =1' ns 
Stay Alive XL= 0.40; df =1; ns XL = 3.88; df =1 p<0.05 
Not Steal x"- 16.67; df=1; p<0.001 XL= 1.78; df=1; ns 
Obey Law t'= 18.69; df-1; p<0.001 )(" = 0.35; df =1; ns 
Judges Jail xL= 1.55; df = 1; ns XL= 0.01; df=1; ns 
Offenders I Male I Female 
Stage 3-4 Male Non-Offenders Non-Offenders 
Promise Friend XL= 14.32; df=1; p<0.001 x/.= 0.16; df=1' ns 
Promise Stranger x"= 13.12; df=1; p<0.001 XL = 0.04' df =1' ns 
Promise Child X"- 58.31; df=1; p<0.001 X/.= 0.01; df=1; ns 
Tell Truth x"'= 26.03; df=1; p<0.001 x"'= 4.51' df =1; p<0.05 
Help Parents XL= 10.44' df=1; p<0.01 x'" = 2.04; df =1; ns 
Save Friend X'- 4.96; df-1; p<0.05 XL= 0.74; df=1; ns 
Save Stranger X"'= 1.30; df=1; ns XL = 0.03; df =1; ns 
Stay Alive xL= 14.46; df=1; p<0.001 XL = 1.36; df =1; ns 
Not Steal X"'- 1.35; df=1; ns x'" = 0.53; df =1; ns 
Obey Law x"= 17.33; df=1; p<0.001 XL= 1.52; df=1' ns 
Judges Jail x"'= 17.41; df=1; p<0.001 -'iZ: = 4.45; df =1; p<0.05 
Offenders I Male I Female 
Stage 4 Male Non-Offenders Non-Offenders 
Promise Friend x"'= 1.90; df =1; ns XZ= 0.17' df=1' ns 
Promise Stranger )("'= 5.15; df=1; p<0.05 xL= 3.98; df=1; ns 
Promise Child X"'= 7.19; df=1; p<0.01 x"'= 7.82' df=1' p<0.01 
Tell Truth xL = 4.09; df =1; p ns xL=4.96· df=1; p<0.05 
Help Parents X"= 3.02; df=1; ns X'" = 0.61; df =1; ns 
Save Friend xL= 6.44; df =1; p<0.05 XL = 4.69' df =1; p<0.05 
Save Stranger X"'= 3.02; df=1; ns X'" = 2.07; df =1; ns 
Stay Alive x/.= 3.51; df=1; ns x7 = 0.13; df=1; ns 
Not Steal xL = 3.06; df=1' ns XL = 2.38; df =1' ns 
Obey Law X"= 16.27; df=1; p<0.001 X"'= 9.88; df=1; p<0.01 
Judges Jail x"= 4.98; df=1; p<0.05 x'" = 6.23; df =1; p<0.05 
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